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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Olympics-led Regeneration: The Five East London Olympic Boroughs

The centre of Olympics-led regeneration is the five East London Olympic boroughs of Newham, Tower Hamlets, Hackney, Waltham Forest and Greenwich. They have rising populations, a high percentage of young people compared to the rest of England and relatively high levels of social deprivation. Since the nineteenth century East London has provided the location for manufacturing industries and the city’s docklands. It housed the city’s working classes and remained, throughout the twentieth century, relatively poor compared to the rich west of London. When the docks closed in the 1970s, the area suffered major job losses in traditional manufacturing and processing industries from which many parts have not recovered. By the beginning of the twenty first century, the extensive regeneration of London’s Docklands and improvements in infrastructure had created an area that is socially polarized, containing pockets of relative affluence within an area that has a high concentration of relative poverty and deprivation.

The hosting of the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012 is aimed at catalyzing a process of extensive social and economic renewal that addresses these underlying social and economic issues. In linking the games to the social transformation of East London, the government and the key stakeholders in ‘London 2012’, have embarked upon a new and highly ambitious interpretation of the games’ contribution to the social legacy to be achieved by hosting the world’s most prestigious sporting event.

Defining Olympic Legacy

“Legacy” has come to prominence in Olympic discourse in recent years because of the capacity the term offers in managing tensions between Olympic dreams (or promises) and municipal-financial realities. Olympic “legacy” offers bridges between two potentially divergent narratives setting the practical accountancy (and financial and political accountability) of city planning, against the ‘creative’ accounting that underpins Olympic dreams and promises.

Legacy has assumed a complex range of meanings in the discourse of the sports mega event and the evaluation of its implications for urban regeneration and economic development. It is not to be confused with the ‘narrower’ evaluation of socio-economic impact whose focus is primarily upon the costs and benefits of the sports event itself. Its focus combines the direct Games-related evaluation of income/costs with a broader evaluation of the additional or indirect contribution to infrastructural, environmental, cultural, economic and social development. In this sense ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ legacies accrue over time. Indeed, the time span for evaluation should reflect the complexity of this process.

Examples of ‘Best Practice’ from past Host Cities

- The event is a stage in a wider and longer term strategy aimed at regional/city-wide regeneration and economic development (Barcelona, Rio);
- The event provides an opportunity for infrastructure developments to strengthen the specific purpose and identity of districts (zoning) within the city (Barcelona);
- The event targets very specific locations for extensive regeneration rather than being loosely distributed across a city (Manchester, Sydney, Vancouver);
Long term benefits arise from plans designed to sustain the regeneration ‘momentum’ – with each ‘new’ plan addressing previous omissions (Barcelona, Sydney) and introducing new dimensions (Rio, Barcelona);

Effective regeneration programmes require cohesive and coordinated interventions at all stakeholder and governmental levels (Manchester, Barcelona, Sydney);

There is a potential for a hiatus following the event which can be effectively avoided if ‘legacy’ is a key component of the preparations for the games (Sydney, Athens), otherwise iconic venues may become disconnected from the main life of the city and experience a period of disuse (Sydney) or decline (Athens).

Soft legacy may become hard – improved perceptions of the city attracts business network development, tourism and inward investment (Manchester, Barcelona, Sydney);

Soft legacies – education, volunteering – require careful planning to secure a post-games legacy (Manchester)

**The ‘London 2012’ Policy Framework**

**The policy is driven by government five promises:**

- Making the UK a world-leading sporting nation.
- Transforming the heart of east London.
- Inspiring a new generation of young people to take part in volunteering, cultural and physical activity.
- Making the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living.
- Demonstrating the UK is a creative, inclusive and welcoming place to live in, visit and for business.

**Their implementation:**

- Relies upon public funding and is led by central government;
- Combines visionary/aspirational promises and specific performance targets;
- Seeks to integrate a number of programme initiatives relating to national, regional, city-wide and local borough strategies;
- Involves a large number of policy making institutions and delivery agencies;
- Combines the representation of key institutions and agencies through the constitution of the representative boards of the delivery vehicles;
- Requires the key institutions and special purpose vehicles to deliver specific/discreet components of the event and its legacy;

**The successful completion of this programme requires:**

- Cross-party and cross-institutional consensus;
- Clarity of role and purpose, especially for those agencies created specifically for the implementation of the Games and its legacy;
- Effective mediation of potential conflicts of interest arising between national policy and city-wide and local borough programmes and performance targets;
- Commitment to continued public funding in a resource context that will become increasingly challenging between 2012 and 2020;
- Recognition of the hiatus that typically follows the Games;
- account taken of other strategic regeneration projects that come to fruition in the period 2013-2020 and further stages of post-games legacy planning,
- Practical mechanisms for ongoing local public engagement in legacy planning and legacy-related projects
The Policy Framework: Knowledge Gaps

The five promises are reflected in the Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF). In addition, LMF Area Plans have been recently created under the direction of the LDA. The Area Plans focus upon proposals for the development of high quality and sustainable communities in six locations within the vicinity of the Olympic Park, Stratford:

- Stratford Waterfront – a waterfront location, adjacent to Waterworks River and Stratford city;
- Olympic Quarter – sport, education and housing development near to the main stadium;
- Old Ford – a family housing area;
- Hackney Wick East – a learning, living, neighbourhood area;
- Stratford Village – a family neighbourhood next to Stratford City
- Pudding Mill Lane – a mixed employment and housing development

The Area Plans are currently the subject of public consultation; the proposals seek to establish community developments building, in part, on existing features to be found in each location. The Area Plans aspire to provide a significant increase in housing (10,000-12,000 new homes) and contribute to the development of a ‘new town’ within East London.

The relationship between these Area Plans, the broader Legacy Masterplan Framework and other policy initiatives at sub-regional level is not clear. How the Area Plans may complement other policy initiatives and investment strategies recently developed at sub-regional level – the Strategic Regeneration Framework (SRF) and the ‘draft’ Multi Area Agreement – has not been articulated by the London 2012 stakeholders.

The SRF is currently the subject of debate amongst the stakeholder network. These discussions are focusing upon the ways in which the ‘convergence’ of East London with the rest of London may be achieved through the identification of specific policy objectives and the setting of performance targets for improving the socio-economic position of resident communities.

Aligning these policy initiatives and investment plans with the aspirations expressed in the area plans is essential if integrated economic and socially cohesive future development is to occur. Unless this takes place there is a real risk of confusion and conflicts arising between the current policy initiatives under discussion at area and sub-regional levels.
The Olympic Park – Knowledge Gaps

It remains uncertain in the period of transition from the London Development Agency (LDA) and Olympic Development Agency (ODA) to the OPLC (Olympic Park Legacy Company) as to whether the OPLC will assume responsibility for the whole site or merely a designated portion of it. There are several matters to be resolved through the clarification of the legacy company’s role, these include:

- The funding model for the OPLC’s development of the Park, including the conversion of the permanent buildings that will remain post-games;
- How the authority to plan and design the development of the Park may be vested in the OPLG, given that the parkland covers four London boroughs;
- The specific dimensions of the park area to be designated for legacy use;
- How the Park’s development will relate to other significant development projects within the ‘Olympic Arc’, including the major retail/housing/office and community development of Stratford City;
- The processes (timescale/stakeholders) by which proposals for the use of permanent venues will be finally agreed;
- The mechanisms by which government promises set within the regional regeneration framework concerning the Park’s legacy may be achieved – here ‘gaps’ may appear.
- The legal and social designation of the park for ‘public use’; public access to the Park (and Stratford City) may be restricted for security reasons during the pre- and event phases of development, however, after the games public use of the park and ‘footfall’ through the park may be restricted if the park, or constituent areas within it are designated as being under the ownership or control of development and/or estate management companies – such limitations may create ‘splintered communities’

The Five Olympic Boroughs: Future Scenarios

Evidence from previous host cities suggest that it is possible to enhance a specific area of a city by displacing or replacing lower socio-economic groups with those from higher socio-economic backgrounds. In effect, this process of ‘gentrification’ tends to change the geographical location of social inequality rather than address the underlying socio-economic issues that gave rise to it. The most that may be achieved is the movement of relatively deprived socio-economic groups to areas where land values, house prices and basic amenities are cheaper than in the designated area of regeneration.

To minimise the ‘displacement/replacement effect’, and thereby enhance social integration and achieve ‘sustainable communities’, it is necessary to focus upon those conditions that generate significant degrees of movement (the inward and outward mobility) of local communities. In recognising this, the five Olympic boroughs have focused upon three main themes arising from the Strategic Regeneration Framework and the draft Olympic boroughs’ Multi Area Agreement (MAA), these are worklessness and skills, housing and the public realm. These regional and local initiatives are supported by national policies but are not fully integrated into legacy planning. Hence, we identify three possible future scenarios:

- **Transformation Inertia** - premium housing and exclusionary leisure facilities dis-embeds the Olympic development and its usage from the everyday flows and spaces over local life in East London; inducing and repeating the landscape of splintered urbanism evident around other large-scale East London regeneration projects.
- **Steady-state Regeneration** - creation of an Olympic park that seeks to reconcile ‘public good’ and the shorter term recouping of public investment; this produces a ‘hybrid’ development, creating areas of public utility alongside restricted access driven by commercial development needs for exclusivity. The distinctive parts may work but they do generate an effective ‘whole’.
• **Transformation Momentum** - creation of the Olympic area as an open and accessible green space devoted to (partly) locally defined conceptions of the public good and handed in part or in totality back to the stewardship of local and London-wide government—without the pressure to maximise return on investment as soon as possible. The creation of centres of excellence developing new industries and enterprises, disseminating environmental technologies and providing community-based facilities (health, leisure, education)

**Mega Event Governance**

Governance is a complex matter, it may be helpful to analyse the form of institutional relations by reference to three approaches:

• State centred – where central government provides the policy framework and the role of non-state institutions is mainly confined to the (part) financing and delivery of the project;

• Public/private partnership - where the economic or commercial interests of the latter are privileged in the process of the projects development;

• Networks of Stakeholders – where the interests of all stakeholders (the state, private sector and local communities and civic groups) are represented in the governance framework and the vision and policy goals of the project

**Governance and Legacy Outcomes**

The relationship between the governance model and the achievement of legacy outcomes is complex and any provisional conclusions must acknowledge that the evidence available is not consistently captured by host cities using comparable data sets over consistent periods of time. Second, legacy achievements are subject to wider economic, cultural and environmental conditions that vary considerably between host cities and nations. Finally, the governance model adopted by each host city reflects the type of institutional and political relations that prevail within the host nations at the time. Accepting these important caveats, it is possible to suggest that:

• The ‘leverage’ model of public/private sector partnership tends to generate legacies that are favourable to private sector or commercial interests but which reinforce existing patterns of social disadvantage through displacement/replacement and the process of ‘gentrification’; subsequent phases of planning and development assume a similar character (Atlanta 1996);

• The state-centred approach may reflect the relative weakness of cross-institutional cooperation (Athens 2004) or the prevailing political and institutional arrangements within the host nation (Beijing 2008), while it may ‘guarantee’ the successful financing and completion of the event, it facilitates social transformation only in so far as legacy is a central component of longer term planning (Barcelona 1992; Beijing 2008; also Sochi 2014);

• The social network model of governance may provide enhanced institutional flexibility but may also bring greater organizational complexity unless ‘cross-institutional consensus’ is effectively linked to successive stages of legacy planning and development (Barcelona 1992));

• Social network relationships and the transformative capacities entailed to this developed regeneration capacity may lose focus and momentum if agencies are mainly event -related rather than legacy-focused (Sydney 2000).
Governance and London 2012

- The network model of governance is operating effectively in its event-related functions but issues remain concerning legacy planning, especially the use(s) of several permanent facilities post-games;
- Legacy planning and development requires a lead agency to establish an overview of the Olympic Park development within a wider community and regional context, this remit is potentially beyond the scope of the OPLC but not yet owned by an appropriate central government department;
- The role of the newly formed OPLC is not clearly defined in terms of scope, funding and legal powers;
- The relationships between the Olympic Park development and other major projects, such as Stratford City, are not clearly articulated as part of a wider East London plan;
- The four major instruments of economic growth and development across the Thames Gateway are the Olympic Park/Stratford City, Canary Wharf, London Gateway Tilbury, a major shipping infrastructure development, and Ebbsfleet, a Channel rail link station and location for housing expansion. The credit crunch and resulting recession has significantly slowed housing and other development in the Thames Gateway and employment has fallen in finance and related sectors. The extent to which these ‘drivers’ of change may be able to assist in tackling worklessness, improve the skills base of the resident population and meet housing needs across the region requires urgent review.

Conclusions

1 The existing governance framework is sufficient to secure a successful event-phase but is currently unlikely to achieve ‘Transformative Momentum’;
2 ‘Steady state Transformation’ is, presently, the likely outcome to London 2012’s legacy;
3 ‘Transformative Momentum’ may be secured through:
   - The effective alignment of the Legacy Masterplan Framework and other key legacy plans/proposals (the LMF, LMF Area Plans, the Strategic Regeneration Framework and the draft Multi Area Agreement) – all underpinned by a clearly defined investment strategy;
   - An urgent review of the current ‘drivers’ of local and regional transformation;
   - Recognition of the ‘hiatus’ surrounding the Olympic Park and its environs following the games and the development by the OPLC of proposals for an holistic approach to the Park’s development which effectively balances social and commercial goals
PART 1 THE FIVE OLYMPIC BOROUGHS AND THE LONDON 2012 GAMES

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The London bid was considered to be second or third behind Paris and Madrid, when in July 2005 the final presentations were made to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in Singapore. London’s success was attributed to its focus on urban regeneration and the importance attached to the sporting legacy to be provided for generations of young people as Jack Straw (then Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office) commented in parliament on the day following the announcement in Singapore:

‘London’s bid was built on a special Olympic vision. That vision of an Olympic games that would not only be a celebration of sport but a force for regeneration. The games will transform one of the poorest and most deprived areas of London. They will create thousands of jobs and homes. They will offer new opportunities for business in the immediate area and throughout London....One of the things that made the bid successful is the way in which it reaches out to all young people in two important respects: it will encourage many more to get fit and to be involved in sport and, whatever their physical prowess, to offer their services as volunteers for the Olympic cause’.


The centre of Olympics-led regeneration is the five East London Olympic boroughs of Newham, Tower Hamlets, Hackney, Waltham Forest and Greenwich. They have rising populations, a high percentage of young people compared to the rest of England and relatively high levels of social deprivation. Since the nineteenth century East London has provided the location for manufacturing industries and the city’s docklands. It housed the city’s working classes and remained, throughout the twentieth century, relatively poor compared to the rich west of London. When the docks closed in the 1970s and 1980s, the area suffered major job losses in traditional manufacturing and processing industries from which many parts have not recovered. By the beginning of the twenty first century, the extensive regeneration of London’s Docklands and improvements in infrastructure had created a sub-region that is socially polarized, containing pockets of relative affluence within an area that has a high concentration of relative poverty and deprivation. The hosting of the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012 is aimed at catalyzing a process of extensive social and economic renewal that addresses these underlying social and economic issues. In linking the games to the social transformation of East London, the government and the key stakeholders in ‘London 2012’, have embarked upon a new and highly ambitious interpretation of the games’ contribution to the social legacy to be achieved by hosting the world’s most prestigious sporting event.
1.2 THE FIVE OLYMPIC BOROUGHS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

The Olympic Park’s main location in the Lower Lee Valley, places the London borough of Newham at the centre of developments, though its physical area includes land located in the adjacent boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Hackney and Waltham Forest. South of the River Thames lies the borough of Greenwich which is set to host some Olympic events in its historic maritime area. The boroughs are located in the broader region of London Thames Gateway, an area that experienced significant change in industrial structure over recent decades.

It is important to understand the causes and sheer scale of the economic changes and their impact on the regional economy. As noted earlier, the residents of East London provided the labour for the docks and associated areas, but technological changes such as the introduction of containerization and larger ships requiring deep water ports undermined the economic rationale of the London docks, resulting in their closure and transfer of activities to Tilbury. It is estimated that the London docklands boroughs lost 150,000 jobs between 1966 and 1976, or 20% of the total

- Docks related industries such as transport, distribution and food/drink processing were worst hit
- The London Thames Gateway population fell by nearly 40,000 between 1971 and 1981. It took until 2001 for the population to recover to its 1971 level of around 500,000.
- Abandonment and dereliction of sites. Estimates that closure of Docks left 8 square miles of derelict land.
- This left a long term legacy of deprivation. By 1981, unemployment rates in the London part of the Thames Gateway were at 9.6%, almost a quarter higher than the regional average.

Whilst the docks industries were located in Tower Hamlets, Newham and Southwark, the effects on employment levels were felt more widely, and the area also faced the wider problems of a long term decline of manufacturing industry, including the end of car production at Ford’s Dagenham plant in 2002.

The decline in manufacturing and the rise in service industry employment have been particularly evident in the five boroughs over the last twenty years. For example, manufacturing accounted for between 11 and 15 percent of those employed in the host boroughs in 1991 (above the Greater London average of 10.6%) but had declined to 4.5-6.0 percent by 2007 (still slightly above the Greater London average of 4.2%). In each of the five boroughs the vast majority of those employed in 2007 were in the service sector – between 90-92 percent of total employees (consistent with London as a whole at 92% but higher than the Great Britain average of 83 percent). A significant proportion of those employed in services in four of the boroughs worked in the public sector – between 32 and 37 percent – with the exception of Tower Hamlets where 16.5 percent worked in the public sector and a far higher proportion (21 percent) worked in finance and related business sectors.

Major policy interventions to regenerate the London Docklands and the wider Thames Gateway have been ongoing since 1981, firstly through the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), and latterly through the Thames Gateway programme. Whilst major progress has been made in terms of infrastructure provision (particularly transport), and in encouraging new investment and employment to the area, the five host boroughs and the Thames Gateway areas both lag behind on a number of key socio-economic indicators.
Tables 1.2.1, 1.2.2 respectively provide a chronology of some of the key events in and policy interventions in the area, and a summary of the impacts of employment by industry across the London Thames Gateway. Table 1.2.3 provides a summary of total employees by industry (manufacturing/services) for the period 1995-2007 in the five host boroughs. This table reveals a consistent fall in manufacturing employment, a rise in total numbers employed in each borough and a corresponding growth in the relative and absolute totals employed in service industries. Of particular note is the significant growth in employees in employment in Tower Hamlets, reflecting the expansion of finance and business services employment in the borough.

**Table 1.2.1 A Chronology of Industrial Change in East London 1960-2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1960s Events</th>
<th>1970s Events</th>
<th>1980s Events</th>
<th>1990s Events</th>
<th>2000-12 Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decline</td>
<td>Renewal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1969 St Katherine’s Dock closed</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>London Docklands Development Corporation created (LDDC)</td>
<td>1987 Docklands Light Rail opens from Isle of Dogs/Canary Wharf to Stratford</td>
<td>1998 LDDC winds up, Canary Wharf first stage complete</td>
<td>1999 Canary Wharf area is further developed with new tower buildings under construction East of the main tower.</td>
<td>2000 New Jubilee underground line extension links Central London with Canary wharf, London Docklands, Stratford and the new Millennium Dome opposite the Royal Victoria and East India Docks.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1990s</td>
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<td>2000-12</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

London’s Olympic legacy “Think piece”
**Table 1.2.2: Employment Change by Sector in London Thames Gateway 1998-2007**

![Graph showing employment change by sector in London Thames Gateway 1998-2007]


**Table 1.2.3 Five Olympic Boroughs: Total Employees by Sector (Manufacturing/Services) 1995-2007**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borough</th>
<th>Total Employees</th>
<th>Manufacturing Total Employees (%)</th>
<th>Services Total Employees (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greenwich</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>52,601</td>
<td>4908 (9.3)</td>
<td>44,196 (84.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>67,100</td>
<td>3100 (4.7)</td>
<td>60,800 (96.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hackney</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>70,191</td>
<td>9988 (14.2)</td>
<td>57,765 (82.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>81,800</td>
<td>4800 (5.8)</td>
<td>74,800 (91.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Newham</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>55,385</td>
<td>7282 (13.1)</td>
<td>45,836 (82.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>72,600</td>
<td>3700 (5.1)</td>
<td>65,400 (91.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tower Hamlets</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>114,000</td>
<td>13,450 (11.8)</td>
<td>96,796 (85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>198,000</td>
<td>10,700 (5.4)</td>
<td>181,300 (91.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.3 DEPRIVATION IN THE FIVE HOST BOROUGHS

The host boroughs’ were home to what would have been regarded as traditional working class communities, and suppliers of labour to declining industries such as the docks and manufacturing. The docks areas have also historically been first destinations for different groups of new migrants, given their proximity to employment and relatively cheap accommodation. As such, it is unsurprising that the levels of economic deprivation in the five boroughs are high.

Well-being may be evaluated in a number of ways. Perhaps the most comprehensive approach in the UK to measurement is the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). The scores reflect a composite index of deprivation covering seven main topic areas: income, employment, health, education and skills, housing, crime and living environment. Each of these topics or ‘domains’ contain sub-components; the domains are weighted by their importance in contributing to deprivation with income, employment and health rated the highest.

Hackney, Newham and Tower Hamlets have remained in the list of the most deprived English boroughs since the IMD was first published in 2004. The index is relational; the average scores are ranked by English local authorities of which there are 354. The lower the ranking, the higher is the level of multiple deprivation. Waltham Forest and Greenwich stand jointly at 24th in the ranking of the most deprived boroughs.

**Table 1.3.1 Index of Multiple Deprivation (2007) for Five Host Boroughs**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Authority</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Rank of Average Score (2004 ranking in brackets)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greenwich</td>
<td>33.94</td>
<td>24 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hackney</td>
<td>46.10</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newham</td>
<td>42.95</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower Hamlets</td>
<td>44.64</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waltham Forest</td>
<td>33.94</td>
<td>24 (23)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

London’s Olympic legacy “Think piece”
Figure 1.3.1 below provides an immediate visual image of the concentration of social deprivation in east London compared to the rest of London:

**Figure 1.3.1 2007 Index of Multiple Deprivation Map of London**

As part of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR) evaluation, the research team developed a typology for the most deprived 20% of neighbourhoods. Figure 1.3.2 shows the typology applied to the five boroughs. Essentially, the areas shaded in green, yellow or blue are less problematic because they are either areas of transit, or where there is a healthy population churn as residents move through them at different stages of their family lives. More problematic are the ‘isolate’ areas, which are shaded red. As the name suggests, these are areas where there is less population churn, and where people can become stuck in deprived areas with few opportunities. The map shows a number of ‘isolate’ areas, but particular concentrations in Newham and Hackney.
Figure 1.3.2 2012 Host Boroughs: Typology of Deprived Areas

The typology of deprived LSOAs has been created by Amion Consulting and Robson, Rae and Lymeropoulos as part of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal evaluation.

2012 Host Boroughs Deprived Area Typology
- Gritter
- Gritterer
- Isolate
- Transit

Produced by the Spatial Analysis Unit, ASD
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Ordnance Survey Licence number /0001896/2006/11 008

Data Sources:
Amion Typologies
1.4 EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND WORKLESSNESS

TABLE 1.4.1 FIVE OLYMPIC BOROUGHS EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borough</th>
<th>Employment Rate</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greenwich</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hackney</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newham</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower Hamlets</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waltham Forest</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host borough Ave</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government Office for London, ONS 2008-9

The employment rate (63.8%) is much lower than the rest of London (70.1%) and nationally (74.5%). The worklessness problem has many facets, including the low skills base of local population groups, higher than London and national levels of benefit dependency (14% for London/nationally and 19-20% across the five Olympic boroughs). Figure 1.4.1 shows the narrower Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) claimant count rates for the London area in October 2009, with the host boroughs outlined in black. Whilst the rate of increase in the five boroughs over the last year in similar to the London average (indicating no additional downturn effect), the map illustrates that the host boroughs have localized concentrations of some of the highest unemployment rates in the capital city.

FIGURE 1.4.1 JOB SEEKERS ALLOWANCE CLAIMANT RATES, LONDON

![Figure 1.4.1](image-url)
There have been a great variety of initiatives and agencies engaged in ‘return to work’ programmes – about 300, according to the five Boroughs draft Multi Agreement (published April, 2009). The MAA aims to streamline provision in this service provision. Finally, there is strong evidence of a high concentration of worklessness for those people living in social housing – suggesting that the housing benefit system may act as a disincentive to gain work, as the draft MAA explains;

‘Changes to Housing Benefit – We have evidence that for some of our young families in temporary accommodation, their net income would be lower if they took a job given the resulting increase in work-related costs. We also know that many more households perceive that employment would not pay. We are therefore looking to adjust the rules around housing benefits so that the element which would be lost on gaining employment is instead turned into a block grant to act as a financial incentive for employment. We have the evidence that this would work well for people in temporary accommodation however we would like to explore a broader tenure approach which stimulates employment for those in social housing and for those who choose to go through a private rental route rather than be declared homeless. This approach will both remove the disincentive to work and the limitation on financial gains from employment that high London rents and housing benefit can create’.

Source Five boroughs Draft Multi Area Agreement (April 2009)
p22http://mginternet.hackney.gov.uk/s/(g5d1hh45ou4kgbr0emk3b355))/Published/C00000111/M00000805/A000002937/SOlympicLegacyMultiAreaAgreementAPP3_v2.docA.ps.pdf; accessed October 2nd, 2009

The location of employment hotspots may also be an issue, with the highest densities of jobs being located on the border of the City of London and Tower Hamlets/Hackney, and at Stratford, but particularly so at Canary Wharf (which is located in Millwall and Blackwall and Cubitt Town wards) as shown in figure 1.4.2. However, the 2012 related development opportunities around the River Lea between Stratford and the Thames should help to address this issue.

**Figure 1.4.2 ABI Employment Levels in the five host Boroughs (2007)**
There is a significant skills gap between people of working age in East London compared to the average for the city as a whole. This is expressed in at least three dimensions. First, the percentage of the working age population in the five boroughs with no qualifications is much higher than London as a whole: 17.6% (2007) against a London figure of 11.6%. Second, there is a significant gap between London and the host Olympic boroughs concerning higher level skills: the proportion of working age Londoners with a NVQ4+ (degree level equivalence) is 40.6% against a five borough figure of 36%. Finally, the percentage of young people not in employment is high compared to the rest of the city. As noted in the previous section, these problems are likely to be exacerbated in the future as the employment growth in East London is forecast to require increasingly high-qualified employees, and are likely to inhibit residents’ opportunities to access jobs in nearby employment concentrations such as the central London, Canary Wharf and Stratford.
A higher percentage of young people are not in employment, education or training (NEET) in the five London boroughs compared to the London average (Figure 1.5.1) though there have been increases in the number of apprenticeships undertaken within the five boroughs in the period 2004 to 2007 and improvements in the school performance of children taking 5 GCSEs and obtaining five A to C grades. School performance, however, continues to lag behind the rest of London (Figure 1.5.2):

**Figure 1.5.1 Young People 16-18 not in employment, education or training (NEET) in the five Olympic boroughs**

Source: Department of Schools, Families and Children (updated monthly)

**Figure 1.5.2 Five GCSEs at A to C grades in the five Olympic boroughs (2008)**

Source: Department of Schools, Families and Children (updated annually)
1.6 DEMOGRAPHY

London’s population in 2008 was just over 7.5 million. Its population in 1939 stood at a peak of 8.6 million. Since 1988, the population has expanded each year with growth occurring particularly to the east of the city. It is estimated by the Greater London Authority (GLA) that the growth in population in the east will continue over the next twenty years. Table 1.2.1 is derived from the London Mayor’s Plan (2009) and demonstrates the anticipated population growth that will take place in East London and, in particular, in the five Olympic host boroughs:

**Figure 1.6.1 London’s Projected Population Growth to 2030**
The distribution of the population in London, however, is not fully captured by the growth map. Another perspective on the spatial concentration of London’s population is provided below (Table 1.6.2). This illustrates how the River Lee has constituted a barrier to population growth, a barrier between the east and the rest of London, that has arisen in recent times from its use as a waterway that has supported manufacturing industries around which housing development on any significant scale has not occurred. It is in this area that the Olympic Park (Stratford) is located.
The overall growth in population since 1988 has been supported by the expansion in relative and absolute terms of the ethnic minority population. Ethnic minority groups grew by 51 percent in the period between the 1991 and 2001 census. In the five Olympic boroughs, this population growth has been underpinned by the growth in numbers of young people, especially from Asian and Black British backgrounds (Table 1.6.1):
Each of the five Olympic boroughs has distinct characteristics in relation to their ethnic minority populations. Tower Hamlets and Newham have relatively higher proportions of Asian or Asian British citizens (33-34% compared to 13.3% for London as a whole) and Hackney has a relatively high proportion of Black British residents compared to London as a whole (20.9% compared to 10.6 for London as a whole).
Figure 1.6.3 Religion by Local Authority Designation: Five Olympic Boroughs
Source: Annual Population Survey 2007-2008

Figure 1.6.3 reveals the relatively high proportion of Muslim residents in Tower Hamlets. It is also the borough that is closest to the major regeneration project of Canary Wharf. Proximity to Canary Wharf may help to explain why the borough experiences a particularly complex range of socio-economic issues. The total number of employees within the borough has risen dramatically in the period 1995-2007 (see Table 1.2.3 above). Despite this it has a relatively high unemployment claimant count compared to the London average in 2008-9, indicating that unemployment has risen as the UK economy has moved into recession (Table 1.6.4). Those who are in employment (full-time workers per annum) earn more than the London average wage (Figure 1.6.5). Despite the earnings data, Tower Hamlets remains one of the most deprived boroughs in England. The earnings data suggests that average employee earnings are boosted by employment in finance and related services though a relatively high proportion of these earners are not resident in Tower Hamlets.

Figure 1.6.4 Tower Hamlets Claimant Count and Change in Claimant Count 2008-9
Source: Office of National Statistics (2008-9)
**Figure 1.6.5. Average Earnings Five Olympic Boroughs (2007-8)**

Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2007-8
1.7 **Housing – The Profile of the Five Olympic Boroughs**

London experiences a range of significant housing issues. These include:

- The urgent need for new homes to be built
- The high cost of purchasing housing
- The requirement for an increase in affordable homes
- Overcrowding
- An ageing housing stock

Housing demand in London significantly outstrips supply:

‘The rise in house prices has been exacerbated by the failure of housing supply to respond adequately to demand. New housing supply in London averaged 19,000 homes a year throughout the 1990s, but has been far higher in recent years, with net supply in 2007/08 of 28,199 homes. But that increase has been driven by the shift to smaller one and two bedroom flats, from around 7,400 in 1997/98 to around 23,400 in 2007/08’.


In a report written in 2008 and published in 2009 (GLA, *2008 London Strategic Housing Market Assessment,*), the Greater London Authority estimated that London required an annual new house build of 32,000, with over 18,000 of these being affordable homes to begin to meet the real demand for housing in the city. The five Olympic boroughs experience these problems in acute form.

Of the five Olympic boroughs, Waltham Forest’s housing profile is closest to the profile for the rest of London and for England. Hackney and Newham have a higher proportion of local authority housing stock than the rest of London and England and Tower Hamlets and Hackney have a higher percentage of Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) compared to the rest of the capital and England. Excepting Waltham Forest, the Olympic boroughs have a significantly smaller percentage of dwellings that are owner occupied or privately rented compared to the rest of London and the average for England. Overcrowding in the five host boroughs varies between 18 and 38 percent of households, compared to a London average of 7 percent, with three boroughs having the highest levels of overcrowding nationally. Market conditions in recent years have priced many local residents out of the housing market within the boroughs, leaving many existing residents with little housing choice. The combined future effects of domestic population growth and the need for social housing reflected in currently high waiting lists has to be balanced with the anticipated movement of higher skilled workers into the area. These circumstances create tensions between the urgent housing needs of the existing community and the potential needs of higher skilled workers moving into the sub-region.
### Table 1.7.1 The Five Olympic Boroughs: Housing by Type in 2008

Source: Neighbourhood Statistics, ONS
[http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadKeyFigures.do](http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadKeyFigures.do)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Type</th>
<th>Tower Hamlets</th>
<th>Hackney</th>
<th>Newham</th>
<th>Greenwich</th>
<th>Waltham Forest</th>
<th>London</th>
<th>England</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LA 13</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSL 11</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 13 11</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner Occupied and Private Rented 13</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An important indicator of the relative wealth of a borough’s population is reflected in the numbers of people claiming housing benefit. The number of people claiming housing benefit in three (Newham, Tower Hamlets, Hackney) of the five Olympic boroughs is high compared to the rest of London with only modest improvements occurring in their relative positions in the period 2005 to 2008:

### Table 1.7.2 Five Olympic Boroughs: Number of People Claiming Housing Benefit (%)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Borough</th>
<th>05-06Q1</th>
<th>05-06Q2</th>
<th>05-06Q3</th>
<th>06-07Q1</th>
<th>06-07Q2</th>
<th>06-07Q3</th>
<th>07-08Q1</th>
<th>07-08Q2</th>
<th>Rank out of 33 London boroughs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greenwich</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hackney</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newham</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower Hamlets</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waltham Forest</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.8 Social Inclusion

The five boroughs summarized the concentration of deprivation and the need for social transformation in the draft Multi Area Agreement, published in April 2009. The document highlights the incidence of high levels of child poverty and the multiple causes:

*This is the area of the most concentrated deprivation in the country and has the biggest intra-regional gap between the most prosperous and most deprived parts of the region. The current employment rate in the five boroughs is only 60% (2007) and we would need to see another 100,000 residents in work if we were to even approach the national average, and that is without modelling for the...*
current levels of population churn; one in three households across the 5 boroughs with dependent children contain no adult in work; a child in one of the 5 boroughs is twice as likely to grow up in a workless household as the rest of England; there are major challenges in the overcrowding and quality of our housing and the gap between housing affordability and earnings; our boroughs look run down in many places and that reduces the level of civic pride, resulting in high levels of littering and graffiti, low levels of resident satisfaction and well-being, and reducing levels of property and business desirability.

These five boroughs are the place which will need transformational change if Government is to achieve its national aspirations to eliminate child poverty; an 80% employment rate; 79% of working age adults qualified to level 2 or above and 56% to level 3 and above; 3 million new homes in London; 70,000 new affordable homes per year; and to halve the number of households in temporary accommodation. These social and economic conditions raise a wider question of social equity given the opportunities already seen in growth point of such significance and Canary Wharf and the expectation of the impact of the Olympics.

The persistence of the deprivation also shows that the realisation of regeneration in this part of London as an Olympic Legacy will not bring benefits to the communities living in the area unless there is an explicit and focused plan to ensure that socio/economic conditions improve in line with the physical development of the area’. Source: Five Olympic Boroughs (2009) Draft Multi Area Agreement, p5. 

http://mginternet.hackney.gov.uk/(S(g5d1hh45ou4kgbr0emk3b355))/Published/C00000111/M00000805/AI00002937/$OlympicLegacyMultiAreaAgreementAPP3_v2.docA.ps.pdf, accessed October 1st, 2009.

The picture of social inequality presented by the five boroughs suggests that ‘growth points’ such as the development of Canary Wharf have exacerbated rather than reduced social inequalities over the past two decades creating what we define later in this piece as ‘splintered’ rather than integrated and cohesive communities. This may be reflected in the specific case of Tower Hamlets where, as we have seen above, the onset of the recession (2008-9) has created a higher than average rise in the claimant count, though full-time average earnings are above those levels achieved for the other Olympic boroughs and the rest of London. Social inequality within the borough has tended to increase over the past decade with the recession exacerbating this trend. This may be reflected in the response of residents in Tower Hamlets to questions concerning social cohesion; the percentage who ‘consider that their local area is a place where people get on despite different backgrounds’ is lower than that for the rest of London and lower than other host boroughs. Overall, however, in boroughs of high density population, with a significant level of population ‘churn’ and high social deprivation, at street level, people perceive that they get on well with each other (Table 1.7.1).

**Table 1.8.1 Five Host Olympic Boroughs Cohesion Measures (CLG: 2009)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohesion Measures</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NI 1: % respondents who agree that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenwich</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hackney</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newham</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower Hamlets</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waltham Forest</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Average</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England Average</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Crime rates in the five host boroughs have been higher than the London average in the period 2001/02 – 2007/08. While actual crime levels have declined over this period, the gap between the five host boroughs and London overall has increased. The Strategic Regeneration Framework (2009) notes that:

‘In 2008, there were nearly 14 offences reported per 100 people living in the sub region, 20% higher than the average for London. The gap between the London average and the average across the five host boroughs is even wider for violent crime. Notably, the 2008/09 data shows that there were 21% more violent crimes reported (relative to population) in the 5 Olympic boroughs than across London overall. People who live in the five host boroughs also suffer from higher levels of anti-social behaviour; on average 38.9% of residents perceive anti-social behaviour as a problem locally, compared with a London average of 28.5%. This impacts negatively on the fabric of communities and can make people feel less safe and negatively affect their wellbeing’.

Source: Strategic Regeneration Framework, p54

The actual and perceived problems of crime and violent crime have several policy implications at sub-regional level particularly in relation to young people and their integration into cohesive, multi-ethnic communities. (See Tables 1.8.1 and 1.8.2) Volunteering, sports participation and other Olympics-related initiatives may achieve significant reductions in unsocial behavior and enhance the sense of belonging. Along with local and sub-regional initiatives, the improvement to the public realm needs to take place across the boroughs and not be confined to Olympic event specific areas. Unless these matters are addressed there is evidence from outer East London boroughs, such as Barking and Dagenham, that extremist parties may seek to benefit from the fear of crime especially in a period of economic recession.

**Table 1.8.1 Perceptions of Anti-Social Behaviour Five Host Boroughs 2008**

Source: Five Boroughs SRF page 53

![Perceptions of Anti-Social Behaviour, 2008](image)

**Table 1.8.2 Five Host Boroughs: Violence Against the Person 2008**

Source: Source: Five Boroughs SRF page 53

![Violence Against the Person](image)
1.9 Health and well-being

Differences in health and well-being between East London and other major areas of the city are reflected in such data as male life expectancy rates and in the incidence of patients registering with their General Practitioner as clinically obese. (Figures 1.9.1 and 1.9.2). These indicators reveal high concentrations of poor health being concentrated in very specific local ward areas. The evidence also suggests that there is a higher rate of child mortality in East London boroughs compared to London and the UK as a whole. An important component of the legacy of the games is increasing exercise and activity across the UK and London and, specifically, in east London.

**Figure 1.9.1 Geographical inequalities in male life expectancy at birth by ward 1998-2002**

![Map showing geographical inequalities in male life expectancy at birth by ward 1998–2002](image)

**Figure 1.9.2 Obesity hotspots and healthy boroughs**

Source North East London PCT
1.10 THE FIVE OLYMPIC HOST BOROUGHS: SUMMARY

A brief review of the socio-economic profile of the Olympic host boroughs affirms that the sub-region retains many of the broad characteristics of social deprivation that was evident in the nineteenth and twenty centuries in East London. The sub-region has:

- a rising population and rising population density;
- a growth in relative and absolute numbers of young people;
- an expanding black and minority ethnic community;
- higher levels of ‘worklessness’ within its resident communities;
- relatively low levels of skills and qualifications compared to the city as a whole;
- high levels of social deprivation across the sub-region;
- specific areas where social inequalities has increased significantly over recent years;
- high levels of overcrowding and the need for improved diversity in housing provision;
- relatively high levels of crime and perceptions of crime within the resident population.
East London is also, however, an area that has encompassed significant change in industrial structure over recent years and is at the centre of the city's future development and expansion. London, as a city, is moving East, the east side of the city is the most dynamic site of urban regeneration and development in the UK. It is establishing a new transport infrastructure that facilitates movement from east to west and north to south; it is the location for new housing development and is the site of the Olympic Park and other major regeneration projects such as Stratford City. Over the next two decades, East London’s transformation will be closely associated with the achievements of London 2012, ‘the legacy games’.
PART 2 LONDON 2012 AND LEGACY

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This section examines what key stakeholders seek as the legacy of hosting the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. It commences with a brief discussion of ‘legacy’ and distinguishes this from ‘impact’ - a term often used to evaluate the shorter term economic ‘cost/benefits’ of the Games. It is suggested that London’s bid and its subsequent preparations for the Games, reflects the most comprehensive and ambitious attempt by a host city, to date, to ally the event to a programme of urban regeneration and renewal – the ‘transformation’ of East London, one of the most socially deprived areas of the United Kingdom.

Such ambition, as expressed in the applicant bid, its presentation in Singapore and, most importantly, in the period of preparation since, generates questions concerning what hosting the Games really ‘can and cannot’ achieve within specific spatial, temporal and resource constraints. This section focuses upon this theme. It outlines the policy framework for London 2012, draws upon the lessons provided by ‘best practice’ in past host cities and briefly reviews the outcomes achieved by some recent urban development projects in the UK and East London. It concludes by identifying gaps in the knowledge-base that might constructively inform decision-makers in the current phase of preparation and specifies some of the changes that could be made to realise the objectives set down by national, city-wide and local stakeholders.

2.1 UNDERSTANDING ‘LEGACY’

“(Olympic) Games are no longer seen as ends in themselves. They become a means – a means for something good. That ‘Good’ is legacy”.

“Legacy” has come to prominence in Olympic discourse in recent years because of the capacity the term offers in managing tensions between Olympic dreams (or promises) and municipal-financial realities. Olympic “legacy” offers bridges between two potentially divergent narratives setting the practical accountancy (and financial and political accountability) of city planning, against the ‘creative’ accounting that underpins Olympic dreams and promises.

The negative financial aftermath of some Games, from Montreal (1976) on, has focused attention on the IOC and (in turn) upon OCOGS to better assure a positive future after the Games. “Legacy” becomes prominent because it takes the emphasis away from the sporting mega event and from the conspicuous-consumer-like excessiveness of the global spectacular that invites (legitimate) questions. The legacy discourse attempts to give weight to the narrative and historical context of the Games and the (after-) life of the city and host nation. As DCMS put it in their report title, “Before, during and after”, are terms to affirm a narrative conception in the Olympic/city intervention. Games are no longer seen as ends in themselves. They become a means – a means for something good. That ‘Good’ is legacy. As Preuss (2007), Cashman (2005) and Moragas (2003) point out “legacy” is a contested term in the mega event and Olympic literature. It is sometimes conflated with (much shorter term) ideas such as ‘impact’, when, in fact, it should be seen as counter to such temporary temporal (macro or micro-) economic fluctuations. Nor is there consensus that ‘legacy’ is always to be positive (Preuss 2007). There are negative ‘legacies’ although these are often re-badged as unforeseen (and unforeseeable) consequences rather than ‘legacies’ as such.

Nor must legacy be confined either to the concrete and steel infrastructure of sports stadia. There are other infrastructure benefits to consider. Land remediation lacks profile, but such fundamental preparatory work is at London’s Olympic legacy “Think piece”
the heart of urban and environmental transformation and underpins a lot of the ‘hidden’ gains attaching to Olympic projects and connected regeneration. But there are, in addition, ‘soft’ legacies; civic pride, individuals’ educational or skills gains arising as direct or indirect results of Olympic ‘inspiration’. At the supra-individual level, it is common to talk of ‘buzz’ or ‘can-do’ attitudes emerging in cities around projects such as the Olympics. Such ‘buzz’ can be an index of more deep rooted / rooted developmental transformation of global and, in particular, local social and cultural networks.

The definition of ‘legacy’ is partly constituted in the measurement of immaterial ‘cultural’ factors such as city image, but also in less readily auditable changes in morale and affect (however distributed and registered). As ‘legacy’ works to legitimate hosting the Games, ‘legacy outcomes’ become subject to accountability. The definition and assurance of “legacy”, alongside cost, is typically at the heart of stakeholders’ agendas. As such the indices of legacy take on a certain prominence in the planning, management and governance of the event in the long and short term. The depth or superficiality of legacy measures, and the seriousness with which the measurement processes and the dissemination of findings is taken, becomes itself a further index of the credibility of the ‘good’ Games. While macro and micro economies can be tracked, housing, construction projects and employment rates monitored, and approval ratings collated and compared, there are certain ‘feel good / feel bad’ factors around the Olympics city-brand which can be rendered in ways so reductive as to diminish the sought for legacy-credibility. As MacAloon (2008) shows, in rich detail, the ‘legacy’ discourse in some ways complements and in other ways supersedes the ‘brand’ discourse within the IOC.

As Baim (2009, see Table 2.1 below) suggests the IOC’s commitment to legacy has extended over recent years to include a wider range of social, economic, cultural and environmental indicators which must be included in candidate city bids. For example, the environment or sustainability was included in the IOC’s criteria for evaluating the candidate city bids for the first time for the 1996 summer Olympic Games and, more recently, the IOC has introduced a requirement for host cities to undertake a comprehensive Olympics Global Impact (OGI) study that consists of a longitudinal evaluation of an extensive set of performance indicators. Trialed at Beijing (2008), London (2012) will be the first host city to undertake a comprehensive OGI study. The IOC commitment has been reinforced by cities and nations themselves seeking to ally the IOC agenda with their own plans and proposals for urban development and renewal. Seoul (1988) and Barcelona (1992), in very different political and socio-economic contexts, provided a significant and successful impetus for this development which has subsequently been emulated by other host cities.
### Table 2.1: History of Urban Investment by Sector: Olympic Games 1896-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Host</th>
<th>Sports Facilities</th>
<th>Housing</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Urban Culture</th>
<th>Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Stockholm</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Antwerp</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Helsinki</td>
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<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Mexico City</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Montréal</td>
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<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key to table: blocked cells = ☐ = fully implemented ☐ = partially implemented


Table Notes

1. Temporary housing was built for athletes. The housing structures were destroyed after the Games.
2. Little done for Olympics since most infrastructure investment was completed for the 1967 World’s Fair.
3. A new terminal was built in Moscow airport.
4. The 1984 Games renovated existing facilities but built no new facilities.
5. Airport had a second deck added to accommodate departing passengers.
In summary, legacy has assumed a complex range of meanings in the discourse of the sports mega event and the evaluation of its implications for urban regeneration and economic development. It is not to be confused with the ‘narrower’ evaluation of socio-economic impact whose focus is primarily upon the costs and benefits of the sports event itself. Its focus combines the direct Games-related evaluation of income/costs with a broader evaluation of the additional or indirect contribution to infrastructural, environmental, cultural, economic and social development. In this sense ‘hard’ and ‘soft’, ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ legacies accrue over time. Indeed, the time span for evaluation should reflect the complexity of this process, as the case studies of ‘best practice’ will reveal.

2.2 THE LONDON 2012 POLICY FRAMEWORK

Here the key stakeholders are identified and the policy framework outlined. The Games are overseen by government, the Mayor of London and the British Olympics Association. The agency acting on their behalf is LOCOG (the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games - whose composition reflects this coalition) and their delivery, via the Olympic Development Authority (ODA), is trusted to a private sector consortium. The key government ministry responsible for the Games is the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (the DCMS has a Government Olympic Executive responsible for the oversight of London 2012), while the Minister with direct responsibility for 2012, Tessa Jowell, is located in the Cabinet Office. The Department of Communities and Local Government (CLG) also has a significant role in London 2012 through its allocation of funding to the project and because of the close alignment of its strategic objectives with those of the policy outcomes sought by the Games. CLG works, in turn, closely with its regional office ‘The Government Office for London’ and the local authorities of East London, and particularly the five host Olympic boroughs (Tower Hamlets, Redbridge, Newham, Greenwich and Hackney) and, importantly the Mayoral family. This consists of the London Development Agency (LDA) which has performed an important development role in conjunction with the Olympic Development Authority (ODA) in the purchasing of the land required for the Olympic Park, the Greater London Authority and the London Assembly, which consists of elected representatives of the inner and outer London electorate.

The regional dimension of the Games’ location is Thames Gateway; The Thames Gateway scheme was initiated in 1990 by the South East Regional Policy Guidance Plan and was championed by the then Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine. The decision in 1991 to route the Channel Tunnel Rail Link through North Kent and into central London via Stratford, provided an important catalyst for improvements in road and rail infrastructure and by 1995 the Thames Gateway Task Force drew up plans for 30,000 new homes and 50,000 new jobs to be established in the Thames Corridor by 2021 (Buck, Gordon, Hall, Harloe, Kleinman 2002:84-5). Since 1997 successive Labour governments have provided vigorous support for the Thames Gateway through the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG, formerly the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, ODPM) and a variety of partnership agencies, including the Mayor’s Office, the Greater London Authority (GLA), the London Development Agency (LDA) and the local authorities located within the region.

The ambitions for the development of the Thames Gateway have correspondingly risen with, for example, the proposal to develop a new bridge crossing the Thames and an expansion of plans for house building and the development of new townships along the Thames corridor. These plans were incorporated into the Labour government’s ‘Creating Sustainable Communities’ (2003) in which the number of new houses to be built increased to 120,000, with many of these located in fourteen ‘zones of change’ and has since been revised and further developed with the production of a Thames Gateway Interim Plan and a Delivery Plan published by CLG in November 2007. These were complemented by the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation (LTGDC) being set up in 2004 to promote development in the Lower Lea Valley and London riverside areas, with the former incorporating Canning Town, Bromley-by-Bow, the Lea River Park and the Olympic Arc (which includes the Olympic Park area). The Thames Gateway is an evolving programme whose emphasis has recently expanded to include proposals to create 160,000 new dwellings and 225,000 jobs based upon four keys developments or catalysts of
change - the Olympic Park/Stratford City, Canary Wharf, London Gateway Tilbury, a major shipping infrastructure development, and Ebbsfleet, a Channel rail link station and location for housing expansion. Locally, in 2008, the five Olympic boroughs established a Five Boroughs Olympic Unit and produced an Olympic boroughs’ Multi Area Agreement (MAA) in 2009 to secure a strong legacy from the Games – with the agreement focusing upon three main themes - worklessness and skills, housing and the public realm. MAAs were a national governmental initiative designed to encourage local authorities to collaborate together to achieve enhanced integration of infrastructure schemes and a more efficient use of public investment funds.

In relation to the Olympic Park, an Olympic Legacy Company (OPLC) was established early in 2009 to implement a Legacy Masterplan Framework. The company consists of private sector representatives, two public sector representatives (the Mayors of Newham and Hackney) board appointees made by the CLG and GLA and a political advisory group that represents wider public sector interests. The OPLC’s specific remit, funding and strategy is being finalized in the autumn/winter 2009-10. The land designated for use as the Olympic Park was compulsory purchased by the London Development Agency (LDA). The LDA is funded by central government though responsibility for its strategic management rests with the Mayor of London. The Olympic Delivery Authority Board consists of representatives from the public and private sectors and works with the London Development Agency (LDA), Transport for London (TfL), Thames Gateway and the five designated Olympic local authorities – Greenwich, Hackney, Newham, Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest. The Nations and Regions Group (NRG) has the responsibility for ensuring the whole of the UK benefits from the 2012 Games. It is made up of twelve senior representatives from UK business and sport: nine from the English regions and one each from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland - the ‘home nations’. London 2012 may, therefore, be seen as a central component of a wider strategic framework for regeneration that has national, regional, local and Park-specific dimensions. The delivery of the games and its legacy is publicly funded:

| TABLE 2.2.1 2012 OLYMPIC BUDGET PUBLIC FUNDS (SOURCE: CLG) |
|-------------------|------------------|
| Total Budget      | £9.3 bn          |
| Maximum ODA Budget| £8.09 bn         |
| Non-ODA Items (inc. security) | £1.226 bn |
| Contingency       | £2.509 bn        |
| Allocated         | £500 m           |
| ODA               | £968 m           |
| Funders:          |                  |
| CLG               | £2.8 bn          |
| DCMS              | £1.4 bn          |
| DfT               | £1.0 bn          |
| Lotteries         | £1.8 bn          |
| Mayor             | £1 bn            |

1 With commercially derived inputs to LOCOG coming via Olympic sponsorships, merchandising and IOC allocations from TV rights – these are largely to be absorbed in the event costs.
The policy focus of legacy is the Legacy Framework Masterplan, a set of five aspirations/promises. Table 2.2.2 provides an overview of the Masterplan promises and the main agencies engaged with their interpretation and delivery. It also indicates where these relate to other major policy initiatives:
## Table 2.2.2: Promises/Strategic Objectives National Government (DCMS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promise 1: Making the UK a world-leading sporting nation</th>
<th>Key Programmes</th>
<th>Lead Stakeholder(s)</th>
<th>Sub-Strategies</th>
<th>Performance/evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK world class performance programme PE &amp; sport strategy Healthy living campaign</td>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>Investment in most talented athletes Quality community sport programme Promote Olympic ideals Secure athletes success at London 2012 Maximise sport participation across UK Maximise participation at community level across London Promote activity as component of Strategic Regeneration Framework</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise 2: Transform the heart of East London</td>
<td>Legacy Masterplan Framework ODA Delivery Plan LEST Action Plan Regeneration Framework ‘Why Place Matters’ Olympics Legacy Multi-Area Agreement London Plan</td>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>Maximise economic, health, environment benefits the games brings to UK/East London Maximise cultural benefits of Games to UK/East London Sustainable legacy plan for Olympic park Create 12,000 job opportunities, help 20,000 jobless Londoners; create 2,500 apprenticeships/placements Transport infrastructure development, housing, employment opportunities Priorities - Housing, skills/worklessness, public realm Infrastructure/connectedness; employment, skills, housing tetro investment and agreements with LAs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise 3: Inspire a generation of young people</td>
<td>Cultural Olympiad Personal Best Programme London 2012 Education Programme</td>
<td>LOCOG</td>
<td>Secure support/engagement across UK Stage inspiring opening/closing ceremonies and cultural events 70,000 trained volunteers (10% graduates of PB Programme) Engagement with schools, colleges, universities across UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise 4: Make the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living</td>
<td>ODA Sustainability Strategy London 2012 Sustainability Plan Olympic Park Legacy (OPLC)</td>
<td>LDA</td>
<td>Remediate land Deliver venues on-time, to budget Deliver venues for agreed legacy use Develop plan for effective legacy use post-2012 Effective legacy use of sports facilities across London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise 5: Demonstrate the UK is a creative, inclusive place to live, visit and do business</td>
<td>Business Network Train to Gain HMG Tourism Strategy Cultural Olympiad</td>
<td>LOCOG/ODA/LOCOG/5 Boroughs</td>
<td>Contracts Supply chain (50,000 contracts) Skills, apprenticeships, work placements (2,500 places) East London – a place to visit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In summary, the policy framework:

- Is fully publicly funded and led by central government;
- Combines visionary/aspirational promises and specific performance targets;
- Seeks to integrate a number of programme initiatives relating to national, regional, city-wide and sub-regional or local borough strategies;
- Involves a large number of policy making institutions and delivery agencies;
- Combines the representation of key institutions and agencies through the constitution of the representative boards of the delivery vehicles;
- Requires the key institutions and special purpose vehicles to deliver specific/discreet components of the event and its legacy;

The successful implementation of this complex programme that constitutes the legacy framework requires:

- Cross-party commitment from representatives of the political parties;
- Clarity of role and purpose, especially for those agencies created specifically for the implementation of the Games and its legacy;
- Effective mediation of potential conflicts of interest arising between national policy and city-wide and local borough programmes and performance targets;
- Commitment to continued public investment in a resource context that will become increasingly challenging between 2010 and 2014;
- Recognition of the hiatus that typically follows the Games and account taken of other strategic regeneration projects that may come to fruition in the period 2013-2020; these are briefly recorded in the Table 2.2.3 below:
- Practical mechanisms for ongoing local public engagement in legacy planning and legacy-related projects

Table 2.2.3 Major Project Completions, Legacy Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Olympic Park completion; Zones 1, 4, 5 Stratford City completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-20</td>
<td>Olympic Park Neighbourhood Development: Six sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Housing: Arc Masterplan-completion 6886 housing units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>UK bid to Host FIFA World Cup Olympic Stadium venue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Crossrail completion; Stratford City Development completion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is helpful to be forewarned of the ‘hiatus’ that has been identified post-Games in recent years – notably in Sydney and in Athens. As Cashman (Cashman 2009) argues the legacy of the Sydney Olympics took time to define. It evolved through several stages and, arguably, became an important issue only after the event had taken place. Unlike London, the Sydney bid was formulated before the lessons of Barcelona could be learned and at an early phase in the IOC’s deliberations on the importance of the catalytic role of the games in delivering programmes of urban regeneration, and the emergent emphasis on ‘legacy’. Cashman’s account of the immediate aftermath is instructive;
One commentator described the park as a ghost town and another referred to it as a ‘wasteland of white elephants’ (Cashman 2006: 31). There was sustained media criticism of the park in 2001 and 2002 because of the absence of public events there and the cost of maintaining struggling Olympic venues. (there were some notable exceptions to the rule, such as the Sydney international aquatic centre, which increased its patronage after the games). Because the park was under-used in 2001 and 2002, there was much public concern that it would become a future burden to the state government and ultimately to the taxpayers. Others suggested that it was essential to develop public confidence in the park. Ric Birch, the acclaimed director of the Sydney Olympic opening ceremony, stated that buildings by themselves do not create ‘an atmosphere’ and a public attachment to the park (Cashman 2006: 154). it was necessary then to develop a public commitment to use the park (Cashman 2006:137).

In Athens, the hiatus arising in the aftermath of the games, has led to increasingly pessimistic conclusions about legacy, as Panagiotopoulou (2009) writes:

...perhaps the success of the Athens games may be gradually equaled by the success of its legacy. the influence of the legacy will become visible after some years, if there is a consistent and realistic plan to exploit the positive impact that the event had upon the city. three years after the end of the games, Greece seems, however, to be exhausted by the great effort required during the long preparation period and the staging of the event. (Panagiotopoulou 2009:160)

2.3 DISCOVERING ‘BEST PRACTICE’

Examples of ‘best practice’ are drawn from the experience of past Olympic cities and cities that have hosted major sporting events in the UK. The examples must, however, be placed in their specific socio-economic context.

Economists and commentators have noted recently that the ‘credit crunch’ and subsequent global recession have few precedents – the Great Crash of the 1930s and the economic crisis of the 1970s being, perhaps, the two events over the past hundred years. Given these circumstances, it is no longer possible for ‘London 2012’ to feel assured that global economic conditions will help it to use the Games to promote patterns of economic growth and development that rely heavily upon the expansion of consumer-oriented service industries and rising real estate values.

Cities that have successfully hosted the Games in the recent past, and achieved broader social and political objectives, have secured or celebrated the benefits of rapid and dynamic industrial development and announced their new found status within a region or internationally (Seoul, Beijing) or have used broadly favourable locational and economic conditions to enhance their economic status and regional position (Barcelona, Atlanta, Sydney). The case studies below provide a brief review of the achievements of recent host cities and identifies some of the strengths and weaknesses of the legacies arising from hosting the games. Rio de Janeiro is also included since it will be hosting the 2016 games and there is evidence that the city has drawn some important lessons from past host cities, particularly Barcelona in relation to that city’s zonal re-development and London 2012, especially in terms of its commitment to the transformation of the lives of local residents. Finally, Manchester’s experience of hosting the 17th Commonwealth Games in 2002 is also briefly explored since it provides an instructive UK-based example of the development and application of socio-economic policies that resonate with the policy framework and goals of the key stakeholders concerned with London 2012.
Historically, Barcelona’s industrial and commercial base centred upon the docks and manufacturing industries; their decline caused the city and regional government of Catalunya to develop an urban regeneration plan that pre-dated the bid to host the Olympic Games in 1992. The implementation of the plan became a central goal in hosting the Games. The Games was a catalyst for urban renewal. Renewal took place in a wider context of Spain’s entry to the European Community (1986) and the introduction of the European Union Single Market in 1992. These developments facilitated Barcelona’s role in connecting the markets of northern Europe to the Iberian peninsula, enabling the city to become an attractive location for inward investment, especially by those companies engaged in the expanding European services sector. The investment made between 1986 and 1992 proved critical to Barcelona’s subsequent economic success and has been followed by two further phases of development between 1992 and 2004 and 2004 to 2010.

The Olympics related investment phase focused upon coastal recovery, telecommunications and services, housing, office development, sports and cultural facilities and roads and transport. The second phase, 1992-2004, addressed the city environment, telecommunications and the continued improvement in transportation infrastructure through the opening of a high speed train service (AVE), the extension to the airport and the development of the regional train, tram and bus network. The current phase is centred upon further transport and environmental improvements and the creation of a high technology business park in the Poblenou district and the Forum 2004 – a flexible open space for cultural and creative activities. Each development has addressed omissions from previous phases and has sought to overcome negative effects of the preceding cycle of urban development. For example, the current period of regeneration is designed to more effectively distribute commercial, cultural and leisure activity across the city, reducing the overcrowding effect that arose with the successful regeneration of the city centre. In this sense, Barcelona’s regeneration has proceeded through three phases, achieving a ‘legacy momentum’ that has outlived the immediate impact of hosting the 1992 event, and providing a ‘model’ that other host cities have attempted to follow.

Tourism is perhaps the headline success story:

The Olympic Games.. had, from the point of view of stimulating tourist activity, a double virtue: on the one hand, they constituted a colossal exercise of promotion for the city, that allowed it to project an image based primarily on its cultural and architectural charm; but on the other hand, attracting public and private investment for the city, with very noticeable effects in the area of infrastructures and facilities, also included the carrying out of a "Hotel Plan". This allowed the city to move from 118 establishments and 18,569 beds in 1990 to 148 establishments and 25,055 beds in 1992. Since then, the supply has not stopped growing and in the year 2000 it reached the figure of 187 establishments and 31,338 beds. Up to the year 2004, the addition of 7,500 new beds is foreseen. Simultaneously, demand has also experienced a very sharp increase, which has led it from 3.8 million overnight stays in 1990 to more than 7.7 million in 2000, doubling in one decade. Some 29% of the visitors are Spanish, and, of the rest, those who come from the following countries stand out: the United States (13.5%), the UK (11.2%), Italy (6.3%) and Germany (5.8%). (Nello 1997:93)

The transformation of the city economy since 1986 has been led by growth in the services sector. Services accounted for 82 percent of employment in 2006 (rising from approximately 40 percent in 1986) compared to 67 percent for Spain as a whole. The downturn in European regional economies in the early 1990s was significantly modified in Barcelona by the investment arising from hosting the 1992 Games. The city economy has specialised in the expansion of financial services, business services, real estate, health care, public administration and education. In the decade since 1995, the demand for space for tertiary activities has grown by 500,000 square metres per
annum; the city and regional government has played a significant role in the development of investment and regeneration plans. There have been

varying balances and approaches used in six different spheres of public operation - the urban visual improvement scheme (Barcelona posa't guapa - make yourself beautiful), the Olympics, the recuperation of the Old City, the Plan 2000, international economic promotion, and the investment company formed to invest in industry. One of the factors ... stressed was the importance of public sector leadership, and especially the need to commit municipal funds to catalyse action. (Marshall 2004:14)

The Games represented a significant investment in infrastructure - over three times the sum spent upon the event itself. The cost of the Games was underwritten by national, regional and city governments, though investment was distributed across the public and private sectors (Spanish government 12%, Catalunya Regional government 15%, Barcelona 2%, Spanish private companies 22%, foreign private companies 11% and Spanish public companies 14%). The Games balance sheet was assisted by significant income from television rights (Los Angeles achieved 288 million dollars, Barcelona 635 million dollars) which contributed to an operating surplus of over $300 million. The example of the Barcelona Games provided the model for subsequent bids from cities that sought to use the event to catalyse the process of urban regeneration. The Sydney (2000), Athens (2004) and London (2012) bids followed this catalytic approach.

BARCELONA: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ZONING OF CITY VIA FOUR OLYMPIC DISTRICTS</td>
<td>RISE IN HOUSING COSTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INWARD INVESTMENT IN SERVICE INDUSTRIES</td>
<td>OVERCROWDING OF CITY CENTRE AS TOURIST DESTINATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERMANENT EMPLOYMENT GAIN</td>
<td>DISPLACEMENT OF POORER COMMUNITIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATING SURPLUS ON EVENT</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CITY PLANNING CONTINUED POST-GAMES — DIVERSIFICATION INTO NEW INDUSTRIES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENHANCED INFRASTRUCTURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCKLAND RENEWAL, CITY OPENED TO SEAFRONT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VISITOR DESTINATION</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
A promotional account of Barcelona’s “post-legacy legacy”; a continued set of regeneration initiatives building on the pre-1992 achievements and the Games.

**Atlanta 1996**

The legacy of the Atlanta Olympics has been widely assessed as having been mixed. Atlanta achieved certain goals connected to its role as a major business centre in the Southern USA; for instance the relocation of 18 major companies to the city following the completion of the games: Hosting the event was one of the key reasons for achieving the designation by the federal government as one of six ‘federal empowerment zones’ enabling further developmental gains to be made and attracting inward investment.

The instructive lesson for London however is this: The Olympics left a legacy of ill-will amongst particular neighbourhoods that lost housing and experienced severe dislocation arising from the urban developments that accompanied the event. The difficulties in reconciling the social regeneration agenda with a business-centred approach to organising mega events was revealed by the difficulties in reconciling the social regeneration agenda with a business-centered approach. The ‘governance’ structure – which failed to capture the effective and integrative input of governmental bodies - failed to engage effectively with important social aspects of regeneration.

Despite Atlanta’s example, the commercial model has remained a compelling approach to urban development over recent years, informing policy-making agendas for several cities that have sought to host major sporting events, including subsequent Olympic Games. At the core of the approach is the marketing of place and the branding of a city as a site for investment in, and venue for, consumption led economic development. The assumption that such an orientation is one sufficient to delivering a legacy for London is an assumption that should, on the evidence of Atlanta, be countered by a commitment to a broader conception of what city-
development entails; not least in a post credit crunch environment where the dynamics of FDI and national public-private partnership driven development appear changed.

Atlanta: Strengths and Weaknesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attraction of Federal aid</td>
<td>No major social regeneration achieved for inner-city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inward investment by major US companies</td>
<td>Failure to engage with local neighbourhoods before, during, after games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redevelopment of business district of inner city</td>
<td>Trajectory of future city development tilted to commercial rather than social renewal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating surplus on games</td>
<td>Poor transport and technical operation of games; weak coordination of venue functions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SYDNEY 2000**

The Olympics in 2000 was designed by its organisers to promote Sydney as a ‘global’ city; enhance international tourism to New South Wales and Australia and attract service based industries from within the Asia/Pacific region. The Sydney Organising Committee of the Olympic Games had support from local, state and national governments. The Committee also carefully established local community relations, particularly with the Aboriginal people, who threatened to disrupt the Games with protests aimed at highlighting the Australian government’s failure to recognise indigenous people’s rights. New sporting facilities were constructed for the Games, including the main stadium and an aquatic centre (opened in 1994, one year after Sydney had been chosen as the venue for 2000). The main investment, however, was in telecommunications, including the Sydney Media Center and the city’s transport system.

The promotion of Sydney was intimately linked to the promotion of Australia by the Australian Tourism Commission (ATC). The ATC established a sophisticated strategy for using the Games to, in effect, re-brand Australia as a young, vibrant country rather than a distant nation with lots of ‘outback’ (IOC: 2001). The legacy of the Olympic Games for Sydney appears to be more mixed compared to Barcelona. Tourist visits to the city were up by 11% in 2000 and £2.4 billion additional income from tourism was raised in 2001-2 according to IOC and official government figures; convention business also increased by 34 percent over the same period. Conversely, leading sports venues have remained underutilised since the Games ended. In 2001, the NSW government allocated $50 million to promote commercial development of the Olympics site, hoping eventually it would become self-supporting.

In its report to the New South Wales Parliament (2002) the Auditor General compared estimated and actual costs of the Games. Variances and their causes were identified. SOCOG had higher operating costs arising from underestimates of the costs of technology and ticketing arrangements. Slightly higher revenues were anticipated to cover these cost overruns. The late addition of some sports events accepted for the Games caused a cost rise
though, on the other hand, income from the sale of the media village after the Games and a foreign exchange gain largely covered these costs. The Games cost was $4,788.2 million. It closed with a small deficit of $45 million. Secondary or infrastructural investment in Sydney cost approximately $2.6 billion with sports facilities, the Olympic village (later converted to housing) and transport development being the main expenditures. The Homebush ‘brownfield’ area on the outskirts of Sydney was extensively regenerated, though the overall catalytic effect of the Games was less than that achieved by Barcelona over the same post-event period of approximately seven years.

As Cashman (2009) has argued the legacy of the Sydney Olympic Games took time to define, proceeded through several stages and, arguably, became an important issue only after the event had taken place. In mitigation, however, the Sydney bid was formulated before the lessons of Barcelona could be learned and at an early phase in the IOC’s deliberations on the importance of the catalytic role of the Games in delivering programmes of urban regeneration.

Sydney: Strengths and weaknesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure improvements, renewal of ‘Homebush’ area, a brownfield site;</td>
<td>Event focus, legacy development after ‘hiatus’ arising at end of games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-branding of city as event destination, enhanced service industries development</td>
<td>Under-utilisation of permanent sports facilities post-games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental agenda example of good practice</td>
<td>Olympic park development stalled for two years following completion of games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful games, small operating deficit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ATHENS 2004

Athens and its region, Attica, sought to utilise the 2004 Games to achieve several goals. First, the city’s infrastructure, particularly its transport systems, required major renewal and the city’s environmental pollution required urgent attention. Second, the city was seeking to preserve and enhance its share of tourism which had decreased from 40 percent of arrivals in Greece in 1980 to 16 percent in the mid-1990s. Third, the city sought to increase the availability of industrial and commercial space, releasing an additional 1.1 million sq ft of space for event usage. Fourth, the Games provided a perceived opportunity to create significant numbers of new permanent and temporary jobs. Finally, Athens sought to achieve its re-branding as a European city of commerce and tourism, an important location for the location of economic activities in the eastern Mediterranean.

The relatively short period since 2004, suggests that the sustainability of the post-Games legacy is difficult to measure. Available evidence indicates that infrastructure and environment gains have been achieved. The underground rail network grew by a factor of 1.74, a new rail and bus network was created and 200k of new and upgraded motorways was completed. Atmospheric pollution has correspondingly declined. The Attica region undertook four areas of urban renewal and development in Thessaloniki, Patrai, Volos and Herakleion. Infrastructure development was mainly funded by public authorities (about 95 percent), while the private sector
contributed to about 20 percent of operational costs. Operating costs rose from an original budget of 611 $ million to $2.5 billion and Infrastructure costs rose by approximately 30 percent over original cost estimates.

The effects of the Games on employment in Athens and the Attica region were significant in the pre-Games period. For example, in 1998 the country’s labour force expanded from 4.5 million to 4.8 million employees, an increase of 7 percent. In the Attica prefecture, the rise was from 1.59 million to 1.78 million, an expansion of 11.8 percent. Equally, unemployment in Attica stood at 12 percent in 1999 but fell between 2003 and 2005 to 9 percent, one percent lower than the national average for that period. The sectors most benefiting from an expansion in full-time employment were construction and hotels and restaurants.

Immediately following the Games, the positive employment effect moved into reverse. In the three months after the Games, September-November 2004, Greek industry lost 70,000 jobs, the majority in construction. The adverse effect of contraction in the construction industry is reflected in its overall importance to the Greek economy. Between 1997 and 2003, construction industry turnover rose from six to 13 billion Euro; this represented ten percent of GDP in 2003. The sharp decline in the sector’s fortunes following the completion of the Games had a significant impact on business confidence in the wider Greek economy in the months immediately following their completion. The catalytic impact of the Games upon the fortunes of Athens has been a mixed affair. Infrastructure and environmental improvements have occurred along with the creation of new organisational expertise in project management, but these have to be balanced against the growing evidence of a weaker legacy in relation to employment and the progress of the wider Greek economy.

Athens; Strengths and Weaknesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City infrastructure improvements, especially transportation</td>
<td>Uncertainties about city’s capacity to deliver the games in pre-event phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental improvements – air quality to public realm</td>
<td>Cost-overruns and delays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-games employment impact on city and region</td>
<td>Post games employment effect not sustained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful games</td>
<td>Permanent sports facilities under-utilised post-games</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RIO DE JANEIRO 2016**

At a meeting of IOC members in March 2009, Carlos Nuzman, President of Brazil’s Olympic bid committee, outlined the strengths of the Rio bid to his audience:

"We can offer a new country and a new continent experiencing the Games. A nation with 65 million people under the age of 18 and a continent of 180 million young people. We can offer a very favorable time zone for broadcasters, new markets for sponsors and a stage like no other to host the Games. We can build a bridge from London 2012 to Rio 2016, passing the baton to pursue the mission of inspiring young people all around the world."
Rio’s candidature for the 2016 games followed the country’s hosting of the Pan American Games in 2007 and its success in securing the FIFA World Cup soccer finals taking place in 2014. The city was considered to be an early frontrunner in the competition to host the 2016 Olympics, though the IOC’s Candidature Acceptance Working Group report, published in March 2008, placed the city fourth (behind Tokyo, Madrid and Chicago) in its comparative evaluation of the seven cities that sought to host the Games.

Rio’s bid, titled ‘Show your Passion’, focuses upon the unique qualities of the festive city of Rio de Janeiro and emphasizes that a successful bid would ensure that the games would take place on the South American continent for the first time. The candidature file has several key themes. First, and most importantly, reflecting its demographic profile, the bid is oriented to an engagement with Brazil’s young. It expresses clearly how sport may be ‘a transformation tool for social inclusion and education’ (30) Second, the catalytic effect of hosting the games on the city’s infrastructure and, in particular, improving its deprived areas is stressed. Third, the bid highlights the growing importance of Brazil as the seventh largest economy in the world and how hosting the games would affirm the country’s rising global status. Fourth, Brazil’s regional role in sports development is underlined by a commitment to further develop training and support facilities for the continent’s athletes. The facilities that were first established for the 2007 Pan American Games would be upgraded to provide a regional ‘sports hub’ incorporating a National Olympic Training Centre for around twenty sports post-Games and an ‘X-Park’ for high performance training and community involvement. (31) Finally, the bid underlines the environmental improvements that hosting the games would bring, including improvements to waterways, air quality, waste management and land encroachment.

In the IOC Working Party report, Rio scored highly in the governance category, reflecting that the application was presented jointly by the National Olympic Committee and all three levels of government – federal, state and city. Financial guarantees for the games were underwritten by the national government, with games related costs being estimated at $2.8 billion and infrastructure developments estimated at $14.4 billion. The proposed games venues divide into four zones – the Barra (the Rio Olympic Park precinct), Deodoro, Maracana and Copacabana Beach - with 12 new sports venues being built in the period up to 2015. The IOC Working Party’s assessment of the Rio bid identified relative weaknesses in security, a concern arising from high levels of crime in the city, and accommodation - the shortage of 3,4,5 star hotel rooms and the proposed use of cruise ships to meet demand. Rio’s bid achieved a similar score to Chicago’s whilst the technical quality of Madrid and, in particular, Tokyo, placed these two cities in the leading positions.

Necessarily, the candidate files address a pre-defined IOC template and, therefore, focus upon common themes. In the period since its short listing, however, the Rio bid team and its government partners at city, regional and national levels, have focused in particular upon legacy and the role of mega events in catalyzing improvements in the socio-economic and cultural life of a city. This discourse reflects the emergence of Rio de Janeiro as a global city in the last decade for whom the process of urbanization, population growth and economic expansion, including the expansion of a significant informal economy, has exacerbated the long-standing problems of social segregation, street crime and violence and the trend toward a middle class that establishes itself in relatively secure and gated enclaves within the city and its suburbs. There is, however, strong evidence of the city’s political, intellectual and business leadership’s commitment to strategic planning to address these issues.

The first strategic plan was implemented between 1993 and 1996 and this was followed by a second version in 2001-2004, ‘As cidades da Cidade’, that involved the specification of twelve regional strategic plans for different parts of the city which recognize their specific historic patterns of socio-economic development and engages with local communities in creating public/private partnerships for local development projects. The innovative nature of
this plan includes the monitoring of its implementation by independent university research teams and community-based institutions, the promotion of the cultural industries and scientific and technological research facilities to support the development of new industries and sectors of employment and the engagement of local communities in the financial and budgetary processes required for the delivery of local projects. Complementing these local projects, other projects, reflective of the city’s ambitions for enhancing its international status, were devised for constructing a Guggenheim Museum in Rio and developing the waterfront, with the latter project drawing inspiration from the successful developments undertaken in Barcelona in preparation for its hosting of the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 1992. The Guggenheim proposal, in particular, met with significant criticism from within Brazil, with critics arguing that the financial support that such an iconic project would demand, would divert much needed investment away from more pressing social needs such as housing, infrastructure and education and would threaten the future of existing, smaller cultural institutions already located in the city.

Perhaps Rio’s bid to host the 2016 games reflects the city, regional and national governments intentions to address such concerns, to reconcile the desire to utilize iconic events to promote the city’s global status with the urgent need to address its underlying social, economic and environmental problems. The Brazilian authorities have over recent years drawn upon the experiences of major international cities when developing strategic plans for urban development. The hosting of the 2007 Pan American Games reflected the city and nation’s recognition of the value of sport, and sports mega events, as a potential catalyst for urban renewal and the promotion of social integration. The bid to host the Olympics in 2016 was consistent with this outlook; drawing upon experience from Barcelona in relation to city planning and development and London’s success in securing the 2012 games based upon its emphasis on the ‘soft’ legacies of youth participation in sport, social inclusivity and the celebration of multiculturalism.

Rio de Janeiro: Strengths and Weaknesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OLYMPIC REGENERATION COMPONENT OF WIDER CITY PLAN</td>
<td>TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE-ZONING OF CITY</td>
<td>HOTEL ACCOMMODATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAZIL BRANDING AS ‘DYNAMIC’ ECONOMY</td>
<td>CRIME, SOCIAL DISORDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL ‘SPORTS HUB’ – FOCUS ON YOUNG PEOPLE</td>
<td>CONCERNS ABOUT DIVERSION OF FUNDING AWAY FROM HOUSING, EDUCATION AND OTHER PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCUMULATION OF LEARNING FROM PREVIOUS HOST CITIES</td>
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MANCHESTER 2002 (SEVENTEENTH COMMONWEALTH GAMES)

The success of Manchester’s bid to host the 17th Commonwealth Games was announced in 1995. It is possible to attribute this success in part to the ‘bid legacy’ of Manchester’s candidature for the 1996 and the 2000 Olympics. New East Manchester Ltd, one of the UK’s first Urban Regeneration Companies, was established in 1999 to oversee the regeneration programme associated with the Games. The Company had three main stakeholders responsible for policy and funding. Manchester City Council, the local authority for the area in which New East Manchester operates; the Northwest Regional Development Agency and English Partnerships. The Commonwealth Games
Opportunities and Legacy Partnership Board was set up as a regional agency for managing the Legacy of the Games. The total public investment in the games and its infrastructure legacy was approximately £650 million, with £570 million concentrated upon the East Manchester area.

The hosting of the Games produced a number of longer term benefits according to several ‘impact’ reports. These included ‘The Lessons Learned: Review of the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester’ (DCMS, Sport England and Manchester City Council); ‘The Business Benefits Associated with the Commonwealth Games Legacy Programme’ (NW2002), ‘The Review of the 2002 Northwest Tourism Hub Team’ (Manchester City Council) and an extensive, ‘Independent Cost/Benefit Analysis’ undertaken by Cambridge Policy Consultants (CPC).

A total of 400,000 people purchased tickets and during the event over 50,000 hotel nights within the city were purchased by visitors, a significant increase on previous years. The operating costs of the Games were within the budget set and since the games there have been no claims that ‘white elephant’ facilities disfigured the legacy. Manchester City, a major premier league soccer club, moved into the main stadium constructed for the games. The stadium was built to take 38,000 spectators (with £70 million of its total cost of £110 million being met by Sport England) and was subsequently enlarged to 48,000 to facilitate City’s move. According to the soccer club, the agreement that led to the move to the stadium in 2003-4 involved the club committing to invest in sports projects and community activities in the East Manchester area:

‘Under the agreement between the Council and Manchester City FC, 50% of the value of every seat over 32,000 and 60% of the value of every seat above 40,000 sold at MCFC matches will be reinvested into sporting facilities and projects in the East Manchester Area. The local community will be given access to the stadium facilities for 100 days each year and Sport England are looking into the possibility of using the venue to hold events such as school football tournaments and adult coaching sessions’ Source MCFC http://www.gameslegacy.co.uk/cgi-bin/index.cgi/30

The legacy achievements, despite Sport England funding, did not include the provision of a large scale athletics facility because the agreement with Manchester City precluded the retention of an athletics track. Despite this, several other legacy objectives were achieved including major improvements to the transport infrastructure, permanent employment gains post-games, and the strengthening of business networks:

‘Clearly, not all these jobs will have been created during the period of the Games as there will be a long-term stream of investment in East Manchester and the City - owing to the success of the Games in re-positioning Manchester as a truly international investor and visitor destination. Therefore, we re-estimate that 2,050 jobs will have been created before the Games, 250 during the Games, with a further 4,000 arising from developments 3-5 years post-Games. Our original estimates were 1,890, 300 and 3,910 jobs, respectively.

Our revised estimates of additional employment impacts show that the impact in Manchester will still be greatest in East Manchester, the focal point of the Games. Additional employment impacts for East Manchester amount to some 2,000 jobs in total; for the City of Manchester 2,900 jobs in total; for the North West 2,080 jobs in total; and 340 jobs in the whole of the UK. Our original estimates were 2,000, 2,800, 1,970 and 330 jobs, respectively.

Key business benefits and opportunities also included:

- commercial developments in East Manchester including a regional retail centre, a four star hotel, offices and new housing developments supporting up to 3,800 jobs. The development of North Manchester Business Park will add a further 6,000 or more jobs;
• the new ASDA/Walmart superstore, which has created some 800 jobs, of which about 30% have been filled by East Manchester residents, with 90% of jobs filled by residents within a 15 minute drive time of the store;

• the Commonwealth Economic Benefits programme - under the auspices of SRB NW2002 and MIDAS - has engaged with and extended the benefits of the Games to businesses in the North West. Through trade development and supply chain initiatives approximately 250 companies should realise an additional increase of £22m - no change from our original estimate - in their turnover, as a result of the Games;

• The centrepiece of the Economic Benefits programme was the creation of the Commonwealth Business Club which now has more than 5,500 businesses registered from a wide range of countries. The Business Club also organised 56 events, including two major conferences, attended by over 4,000 business representatives;

• a network of 700 businesses in a new North West Trade directory;

• a business matching service provided by Chamber Business Enterprises under the umbrella of the Commonwealth Business Club. There have been over 8,000 company searches on its website, 75 new requests for assistance received and 150 detailed manual business matching exercises carried out; and

• tourism spend from Games participants and visitors is now estimated at £29m - we previously estimated £28m - for Manchester

Source Cambridge Policy Consultants, http://www.gameslegacy.co.uk/cgi-bin/index.cgi/346

Finally, Manchester achieved a significant legacy in volunteering, education and sport facilities provision for the local community. Volunteering initiatives began with a Pre-Volunteers Programme (PVP) focused upon deprived groups within the north west region. Those participating in this programme, provided by the Manchester Training and Enterprise Council, were drawn from 23 regeneration areas within the region with the focus upon the unemployed, ethnic minority and disabled. Participants received accredited training and many went on to provide volunteer activities during the event itself. Over 22,000 volunteered to undertake approximately 10,000 roles during the Games. Since the games, regional organizations have reported that volunteers have continued to work with such organizations as Sport England, Millennium Volunteers and Timebank. Educational programmes were undertaken in schools, colleges and universities, with the following outcomes:

• a Commonwealth Games curriculum pack for primary and secondary schools which was sent to all schools nationally (33,000) as part of the Spirit of Friendship Festival. There were nearly 250,000 visits to the curriculum pack website between July and September 2002, averaging 2,700 per day which was more than the 2,500 average expected;

• over 1,000 schools across 50 countries have registered with the Commonlink website at the Commonwealth Institute;

• Around 75,000 primary age pupils participated in over 750 events as a part of the TOP Link Programme organized by the Youth Sports Trust;

a survey of East Manchester residents carried out during the summer of 2002 before the Games showed that 52% felt that the area was improving.

Source Cambridge Policy Consultants, http://www.gameslegacy.co.uk/cgi-bin/index.cgi/346

The facilities bequeathed for community use (in what became known as Sport City) included:

• a 400 metre Athletics track
• an indoor Athletics training facility
• a National Centre for Squash with seven courts
• an Indoor Tennis Centre
• Sports Science and Medicine facilities
the National Cycling Centre

Manchester: Strengths and Weaknesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regeneration of specific area – east Manchester</td>
<td>Initial concerns over funding model and level of support from central government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event facilities fully utilized post-games</td>
<td>Continuity of funding and support for education, skills and training projects post-games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major soft legacies in education, volunteering, skills development and training, especially focused upon disadvantaged groups</td>
<td>Legacy planning not sufficiently inclusive of local communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of business network and programme of regional inward investment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4 Best Practice: Summary

These examples of ‘best practice’ provide insights into achieving a successful post-games legacy:

- The event is a stage in a wider and longer term strategy aimed at regional/city-wide regeneration and economic development (Barcelona, Rio);
- The event provides an opportunity for infrastructure developments to strengthen the specific purpose and identity of districts (zoning) within the city (Barcelona);
- The event targets very specific locations for extensive regeneration rather than being loosely distributed across a city (Manchester, Sydney);
- Long term benefits arise from plans designed to sustain the regeneration ‘momentum’ – with each ‘new’ plan addressing previous omissions (Barcelona, Sydney) and introducing new dimensions (Rio, Barcelona);
- Effective regeneration programmes require cohesive and coordinated interventions at all stakeholder and governmental levels (Manchester, Barcelona, Sydney);
- There is a potential for a hiatus following the event which can be effectively avoided if ‘legacy’ is a key component of the preparations for the games (Sydney, Athens), otherwise iconic venues may become disconnected from the main life of the city and experience a period of disuse (Sydney) or decline (Athens);
- Soft legacy may become hard – improved perceptions of the city attracts business network development, tourism and inward investment (Manchester, Barcelona, Sydney);
- Soft legacies – education, volunteering – require careful planning to secure a post-games legacy (Manchester)
2.5 **The Olympic Park (Stratford): Plans and Proposals**

An Olympic complex, incorporating sports facilities and the athletes' housing or village, is but one model of the development of Olympic sites. Munich (1972), Montreal (1976) and Seoul (1988) had integrated sites typically located on the outskirts of the city. By contrast, Barcelona (1992) established four Olympic districts within close proximity of the city centre and connected by new highway links and Atlanta (1996) had sixteen separate venues connected by a major ring road. Equally, the housing legacy of these games varied. The Munich, Montreal and Atlanta games provided combinations of social housing and student accommodation as their legacy, whilst Seoul and Barcelona provided a model of high-quality housing development. The Sydney (2000) village was the first to be designed to meet the needs of its resident population, taking into account its demographic character and pre-games housing provision. Perhaps the underlying trend, however, in the post-1945 period has been for host cities to seek to integrate the construction and development of the Olympic facilities within a city or district-wide programme of urban development and/or renewal. London illustrates this trend.

From its inception the London bid was focused upon a specific area of the city; with the components of the Park being clearly designated as temporary or permanent sites, with each of the latter having a defined legacy use. It is this task of defining and shaping the park post-Games that now falls to the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) established in June 2009. In August 2009, the *Architects Journal* provided a useful summary of the tasks facing the company:

**Table 2.5.1: Legacy plans for the permanent Olympic Park**

![Map of the Olympic Park](image-url)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Architect</th>
<th>Games mode</th>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Certainty of plans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Olympic Stadium</td>
<td>Populous</td>
<td>Host venue with 80,000-seats for opening/closing ceremonies and track and field events</td>
<td>May become a smaller 25,000-seat venue, or remain at full size</td>
<td>Baroness Ford has questioned the reasoning behind building a half-temporary stadium, especially since the UK is hosting the 2015 rugby World Cup and bidding for the 2018 football World Cup</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Aquatics Centre</td>
<td>Zaha Hadid</td>
<td>17,500-capacity venue hosting swimming and diving events</td>
<td>Wings will be removed to reduce capacity to 2,500</td>
<td>Spiralling costs, up to £300 million from £75 million, were brought under control by simplifying the design. A £40 million, post-Games, add-on leisure centre and public wave pool was ditched last November</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Media Centre</td>
<td>Allies and Morrison</td>
<td>Host venue for 20,000-strong international press and broadcast media</td>
<td>Designed to be converted, in phases, into commercial spaces by being dismantled and rebuilt</td>
<td>Essentially a gigantic metal warehouse. Innovative cladding and reworking of the facade has dispelled most fears that it will sit as an eyesore at the edge of the park. However, no tenants have been found post-2012</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. VeloPark</td>
<td>Hopkins</td>
<td>Host to all cycling events. Includes the 6,000-seat Velodrome</td>
<td>The Velodrome and road circuit will remain intact. BMX and mountain bike courses will be redesigned</td>
<td>Costs escalated early on because the site was used as a landfill in Victorian times, resulting in a huge clean-up operation</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Eton Manor</td>
<td>Stanton Williams</td>
<td>Training venues</td>
<td>Stanton Williams is responsible for turning these three areas into a 3,000-capacity hockey stadium, indoor and outdoor tennis courts and allotments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Handball Arena

**Architect** Make

**Games mode** 7,000-capacity venue hosting preliminary handball and Paralympic goalball

**Legacy** The first venue to be opened in legacy mode, the arena will be used as a multi-sports venue and will host cultural, entertainment and business events

**Issues** Making the design as flexible as possible in legacy mode

**Certainty of plans** 99%

7. Olympic Village

**Architects include** Allford Hall Monaghan Morris, CF Møller, Denton Corker Marshall, dRMM, DSDHA, Glenn Howells Architects, Ian Simpson Architects, Lifschutz Davidson Sandilands, Make, Niall McLaughlin Architects, Panter Hudspith Architects, Patel Taylor and Piercy Conner

**Games mode** Home to 17,000 Olympic athletes in 11 residential blocks

**Legacy** Will be converted into 2,818 apartments, with 1,379 taken on by Triathlon Homes as affordable housing. The rest will be sold to developers for private resale

**Issues** The Olympic Village is currently owned by the taxpayer, so a value-for-money sale to future developers is essential. The conversion to apartments will take three years to complete

**Certainty of plans** 50%

8. Basketball Arena

**Architects** Sinclair Knight Merz, Wilkinson Eyre and KSS Design Group

**Games mode** 12,000-seat venue for basketball events

**Legacy** The ODA plans to recycle the majority of the structure. Plans to reuse it as a market hall have been ditched

**Issues** Designed as a temporary venue, it is likely to be pulled down

**Certainty of plans** 50%

A-E. Other temporary venues and infrastructure

Although the builders’ merchant and training facilities (A) and the fuel farm and waste consolidation centre (E) will revert to parkland in legacy mode, the future of the concrete batching plants (B), the Olympic Park health centre (C) and the logistics and command offices (D) remains uncertain
The summary focuses upon the built environment of the park but does not address the conceptualization of the whole public space. Indeed, it remains uncertain in the period of transition from the LDA and ODA to the OPLC as to whether the OPLC will assume responsibility for the whole site or merely a designated portion of it. How ‘gaps’ may appear in the legacy ‘narrative’ and planning and development process, may be illustrated by examining two issues. The first relates to the overall conception of the Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF) and its links to other major policy initiatives and, secondly, and more specifically, to the question of housing development in the Olympic Park.

2.6 The Legacy Masterplan Framework: Area Plans

The LMF Area Plans were created under the direction of the LDA. Under the broader strategic objectives of the Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMP), the Area Plans focus upon proposals for the development of high quality and sustainable communities in six locations within the vicinity of the Olympic Park, Stratford:

- Stratford Waterfront – a waterfront location, adjacent to Waterworks River and Stratford city;
- Olympic Quarter – sport, education and housing development near to the main stadium;
- Old Ford – a family housing area;
- Hackney Wick East – a learning, living, neighbourhood area;
- Stratford Village – a family neighbourhood next to Stratford City
- Pudding Mill Lane – a mixed employment and housing development

The Area Plans are currently the subject of public consultation; the proposals seek to establish community developments building, in part, on existing features to be found in each location. The Area Plans aspire to provide a significant increase in housing (10,000-12,000 new homes) and contribute to the development of a ‘new town’ within East London.

The relationship between these Area Plans and other policy initiatives at sub-regional level is not clear. How the Area Plans may complement other policy initiatives and investment strategies recently developed at sub-regional level – the Strategic Regeneration Framework (SRF) and the ‘draft’ Multi Area Agreement – has not been articulated by the London 2012 stakeholders. The SRF is currently the subject of debate amongst the stakeholder network. These discussions are focusing upon the ways in which the ‘convergence’ of East London with the rest of London may be achieved through the identification of specific policy objectives and the setting of performance targets for improving the socio-economic position of resident communities. Aligning these policy initiatives and investment plans with the aspirations expressed in the area plans is essential if integrated economic and socially cohesive future development is to occur. Unless this takes place there is a real risk of confusion and conflicts arising between the current policy initiatives under discussion at area and sub-regional levels.
2.7 **Housing in the Olympic Park**

Housing is perhaps one of the key indicators of the success or otherwise of the legacy of hosting the summer Olympic Games. Several positive and negative impacts have accompanied evaluations of housing developments in Olympic host cities. These include:

**Positives:**
- Improved transport and infrastructure enhancing accessibility and increasing land and housing values;
- Increase in the volume and quality of new housing units;
- Improvement to existing housing stock arising from the preparation for the games;
- Improvement to the housing environment and quality of stock arising from the provision of a ‘green’ games;

**Negatives:**
- Displacement of existing communities to build the Olympic Park;
- Rising land and property values causing local residents to be displaced by new housing developments - a process of ‘gentrification’;
- Enhancement of the public realm accompanied by the privatisation of hitherto public spaces.
- A successful housing ‘legacy’ may seek to minimise the negatives and maximise the positives.

In its Legacy Action Plan ‘Before, During and After – making the most of the London 2012 Games’ published in June 2008, the government outlined its plans for housing development in the Olympic Park:

‘Build over 9,000 new homes, a large proportion of which to be affordable; and provide new sport, leisure, education and health facilities that meet the needs of residents, business, and elite sport Legacy’


The provision of 9,000 new homes was a target set prior to the onset of the credit crunch and subsequent economic recession. The 9,000 included a proportion of the housing development that was a component of the nearby development of Stratford City. The estimated Olympic-related new housing was approximately 4000 units.

The target arose from plans to engage with the private sector (Land Lease and its banking consortium) to establish a partnership for housing developments that focused upon the building of the athlete’s village and after the games converting this to a mix of public and private sector housing, with a proportion of the housing being affordable or social housing. It is possible to evaluate performance against this base line target for the Olympic Park:

New Housing – a private sector agreement with Lend Lease and a banking consortium was, in the wake of the economic conditions arising from the credit crunch, rejected and the Olympic Village development was taken into public ownership in May, 2009. The total cost of the village, including £147 million post games development costs, was set at £1,095 million which is funded by:

- £650 million public investment (derived from the Olympic budget)
- £324 million additional government funding (agreed May 2009)
- £268 million for social housing - a grant from the Homes and Communities Agency and lending from a private consortium of banks on commercial terms with Triathlon Homes managing this element of the housing package
The government projects that at least one third of the costs will be recouped through property sales after the games. **The original plan for 4,000 units has been scaled back, to 2,800 housing units, 1380 of which will be social housing.**

According to London 2012, the social housing units will be:

‘owned by Triathlon Homes Limited (Triathlon), a joint-venture between (i) two large and experienced local social landlords (East Thames and Southern Housing Group) and (ii) First Base, a leading urban regeneration developer. The 1380 units are primarily earmarked for rental social housing, with a fraction dedicated to respectively affordable and intermediate housing (including shared ownership homes). The units will be built in compliance with (or exceeding) the most stringent standards set for housing (“Decent Homes Standards”). Ancillary infrastructure, such as three connecting bridges crossing neighbouring railway tracks, will be included within the scope of the project’.


The housing development will focus upon high standards of construction and be driven by high quality environmental standards. These attributes may ensure that the park assumes an important role in providing an example of ‘best practice’ urban development. However, to ensure that this occurs, several ‘gaps’ must be addressed by the OPLC.

**2.8 GAPS IN PARK LEGACY PLANNING**

To date the focus of legacy planning has been on the built environment of the park but this does not address the conceptualization of the whole public space. Indeed, it remains uncertain in the period of transition from the LDA and ODA to the OPLC as to whether the OPLC will assume responsibility for the whole site or merely a designated portion of it. There are several matters to be resolved through the clarification of the legacy company’s role, these include:

- The funding model for the OPLC’s development of the Park, including the conversion of the permanent buildings that will remain post-games;
- The purposes of two key permanent venues post-games – the Olympic stadium; and the Media Centre;
- How the authority to plan and design the development of the Park may be vested in the OPLC, given that the parkland covers four London boroughs;
- The specific dimensions of the park area to be designated for legacy use;
- How the Park’s development will relate to other significant development projects within the ‘Olympic Arc’, including the major retail/housing/office and community development of Stratford City;
- The processes (timescale/stakeholders) by which proposals for the use of permanent venues will be finally agreed;
- The mechanisms by which government promises set within the regional regeneration framework concerning the Park’s legacy may be achieved – here ‘gaps’ may appear;
- The legal and social designation of the park for ‘public use’; public access to the Park (and Stratford City) may be restricted for security reasons during the pre- and event phases of development, however, after the games public use of the park and ‘footfall’ through the park may be restricted if the park, or constituent areas within it are designated as being under the ownership or control of development and/or estate management companies – such limitations may create ‘splintered communities’.
2.9 THE FIVE OLYMPIC BOROUGHS: KEY ISSUES

Of the government’s five promises arising from the hosting of the Olympic games in 2012, ‘transforming’ East London is perhaps the least specific and most ambitious. Relating ‘transformation’ to the data provided by the Index of Multiple Deprivation (see Section 1), suggests that the objective is to make significant improvements in reducing deprivation by enhancing the well-being of existing local communities. This may be achieved in a variety of ways and take place over a timescale that extends several years beyond 2012 and the games themselves. Income levels, employment, educational achievement, housing and health may be regarded as major signifiers of a community’s well-being.

Evidence from previous host cities suggest that it is possible to enhance a specific area of a city by displacing or replacing lower socio-economic groups with those from higher socio-economic backgrounds. In effect, this process of ‘gentrification’ tends to change the geographical location of social inequality rather than address the underlying socio-economic issues that gave rise to it. The most that may be achieved is the movement of relatively deprived socio-economic groups to areas where land values, house prices and basic amenities are cheaper than in the designated area of regeneration. To minimise the ‘displacement/replacement effect’, thereby enhancing social integration and achieving ‘sustainable communities’, it is necessary to focus upon addressing those conditions that generate significant degrees of movement (the inward and outward mobility) of local communities. In recognising this, the five Olympic boroughs have focused upon three main themes arising from the Strategic Regeneration Framework and the draft Olympic boroughs’ Multi Area Agreement (MAA), these are worklessness and skills, housing and the public realm. These sub-regional initiatives are supported by national policies.

2.9.1 WORKLESSNESS AND SKILLS

The Government Olympic Executive (GOE), the executive group with responsibility for taking an overview of London 2012 from within the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) published the following employment aims for London 2012 (November 15 2008):

The 2012 Games will play an active role in meeting the challenges of the current economic environment by:

- Creating opportunities for the tourism, media, sport and many other sectors
- Increasing the potential for inward investment and export
- Reducing unemployment - with a target of 70,000 people across London, including 20,000 in the five host boroughs
- Creating temporary jobs - with 10,000 jobs on site at the peak and 30,000 contract jobs to stage the Games
- Long-term job creation, with up to 12,000 new jobs in the Olympic Park and up to 50,000 in the Lower Lea Valley as a whole.
- Opening up skills and employment opportunities for most, if not all, sectors, extending well beyond the Olympic Park and London.

The available evidence to date suggests that these goals, set before the onset of the current economic recession, are very challenging given recent rises in UK unemployment levels. However, within the specific framework provided by the London 2012 project, commitments to provide opportunities for local people in relation to construction employment and training are being fulfilled:

**Table 2.9.1: Employment in Construction of the Olympic site (Stratford)**

| Sources: GLA, LDA, Olympic Delivery Authority |
The figures set down in table 1 refer only to those employed in the construction of the Olympic Park (Stratford) for the period June 2007-July 2009. At the peak of construction about 11,000 workers will be employed on the site. Evidence of local employment creation (five Olympic boroughs) refers to those workers employed on the site who reside in the local boroughs. Local residency includes workers with EU and non-EU status. According to an ODA statement on employment in July 2009, the contractor workforce included 20 percent black and ethnic minority, 6 percent women and 1 percent disabled workers.

The Skills Academy for Construction established a Construction Plant Training Centre at the Olympic Park (Stratford) in February 2008. Two further centres have since been established in Newham (late 2008) and Waltham Forest (early 2009). The skills learnt at the Construction Plant Training Centre focus on those required for successive stages of the Olympic construction project and the qualifications arise from undertaking short courses or apprenticeships. The Training Centre for the Olympic Park is located at Eton Manor, Hackney. Government funding for this training is set at £38 million.

In its first year of operation the Training Centre at the Olympic Park provided:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total No Employed</th>
<th>Total No. Employed who are residents of 5 Olympic boroughs (target 15%)</th>
<th>Total No employed from host boroughs who were previously unemployed</th>
<th>Total No employed, rest of London</th>
<th>Total Black, Asian and Ethnic Minority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 2007</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>225 (26%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>278 (33%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2008</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>359 (19%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>630 (33%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>2786</td>
<td>451 (18%)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>873 (31%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td>3315</td>
<td>751 (23%)</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1131 (34%)</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>4434</td>
<td>866 (20%)</td>
<td>264 (10%)</td>
<td>1503 (34%)</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In January 2009, the government announced its intention to provide a further 250 apprenticeship opportunities related to London 2012 (with 3% of all contract workers required to be apprentices, this applies to future contracts worth approximately £500 million). In its report published in July 2009, the ODA indicated that of a revised target of 350 apprentices working on the Olympic project, 69 were currently employed. The ODA is achieving employment and skills development targets, specific to the construction phase of the Olympic project, in relation to the local (five borough) workforce and in terms of providing employment for those who were previously unemployed and resident in the five boroughs. There is some distance to go in achieving targets for the employment of apprentices by contractors and in the employment of disabled workers (the ODA is seeking to increase the percentage of disabled workers from 1 percent in July 2009 to 3 percent by the employment peak in 2010/2011).
2.9.2 Delivering Housing Policy: Affordable Housing

The development of housing policy in the United Kingdom involves central, city-wide and local government agencies, as well as other enterprises and organisations such as housing associations and private developers. In the wake of the credit crunch, housing development by the private sector has slowed dramatically, leaving the public sector as the main investor in new housing, particularly affordable housing.

In 2009 the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) was established by central government to oversee housing development and regeneration. In London, the HCA regional board is chaired by the Mayor of London and the board has responsibility for £5 billion of investment in housing between 2008 and 2011. In turn, the Mayor and London boroughs have committed to the construction of 40,000 affordable homes across London over this period. As part of his draft housing strategy, the Mayor is engaged in negotiations with local authorities aimed at agreeing targets for affordable housing development in each borough.

The draft London Housing Strategy was published by the Mayor in May 2009. It contains a number of objectives, including:

1.1.1 Providing more homes
   a The 50 per cent affordable housing target will be abolished.
   b Individual borough-based housing investment targets will be agreed, with the aim of delivering 50,000 affordable homes between 2008 and 2011.

1.1.2 Providing a better mix of homes
   a More family sized homes, particularly affordable homes, will be provided, with 42 per cent of social rented and, by 2011, 16 per cent of intermediate homes having three bedrooms or more.
   b More homes will be provided to meet the access, space and adaptability needs of disabled and older people.

1.1.3 Creating mixed communities
   a New housing developments will contain a mix of market, intermediate and social rented homes.
   b Greater social mix will be promoted in neighbourhoods dominated by a single tenure.

The Mayor will work with the HCA, London boroughs and other partners to:

1.1A oversee an investment programme to deliver 50,000 affordable homes by March 2011
1.1B agree housing investment targets with each borough
1.1C review the need and capacity for additional homes in London, including supported and specialist housing
1.1D achieve targets for 42 per cent of social rented and, by 2011, 16 per cent of new intermediate housing to have three bedrooms or more
1.1E monitor the bedroom size mix of all additional housing
1.1F monitor changes in the housing market, including new supply, property prices and repossessions
1.1G monitor the delivery of accessible housing and ensure enforcement of benchmark access standards, such as the Lifetime Homes and wheelchair accessible housing standards
1.1H develop proposals to improve tenure mix in neighbourhoods dominated by a single tenure.

Source: The London Housing Strategy, draft for consultation, published May 2009
http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/housing/strategy/docs/london-housing-strategy09.pdf
The focus of affordable housing development in the Mayor’s proposals requires significant contributions from the Olympic boroughs, four of which had agreed affordable housing targets by June 2009. By that date, 21 London boroughs (out of 33) had agreed targets for the construction of 23,154 affordable homes, of these 9,240 (40% of the agreed target number) are to be located in four of the Olympic boroughs. These are:

- Greenwich 1,487
- Hackney 1,779
- Tower Hamlets 5,064
- Waltham Forest 1,090

The fifth borough, Newham, is also the site of the Olympic Park. By mid-2009, Newham had not agreed an affordable housing target. The Mayor of Newham, Sir Robin Wales, has argued that the focus of affordable housing development in the East of London and in particular, in the Olympic boroughs would result in the continued concentration of poorer families in social housing developments in those boroughs. The consequence for London as a whole was likely to be the reinforcement of social divisions with some boroughs, typically to the west of the city, retaining their relatively wealthy status while boroughs to the East would continue to be the location for poorer sections of the city’s population. Newham’s goal was convergence with the rest of London in relation to the quality of housing stock, family income and other social indicators, rather than continued acceptance of the historical divergence in the trajectories of the ‘poor’ east compared to the ‘rich’ west. (See, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/davehillblog/audio/2009/may/28/robin-wales-boris-johnson-newham-housing). To facilitate convergence, existing communities would need to be able to achieve greater housing mobility within the borough, via the provision of greater housing choice (size and value) as well as through the improvement of quality of housing stock in the rented, privately owned and social housing sectors.

The case for ‘convergence’ relies upon the improvement in housing and in several other social indicators (including health, employment and incomes) to be achieved over a decade or more during which Newham’s experience of a shifting population – reflected in high levels of migration into and out of the borough – would fall. A more rapid process of convergence would require the inward movement of higher income groups attracted by the Olympic Park and other infrastructural improvements, a process that does not achieve a social transformation of the fortunes of the existing community and which has been referred to earlier as ‘gentrification’.

2.9.3 The Public Realm
Public realm initiatives are designed to capture ‘soft’ legacies associated with the ‘feel-good’ experience of the games and ally these to ‘hard’ legacies in relation to the standards of construction and the development of public spaces. The five Olympic boroughs are focused upon improving the public realm to make east London an attractive location for its communities, a welcoming destination for visitors and a focus for inward investment. To achieve these goals the quality of the environment outside the Olympic Park must be improved in order to match the high standards achieved by the built environment within the Park. The environmental and construction standards achieved in the period up to 2012, will determine the quality of the longer term regeneration of areas outside the ‘Olympic Arc’, including the remainder of the Lea Valley and other developments along the Thames Gateway.

The focus is upon new developments and the enhancement of existing facilities and amenities. Improvements to the standards of provision of public amenities include a significant improvement for the disabled by ensuring step-free accessibility and the promotion of walking and cycling routes, the maximising of recycling and the development of energy-saving lighting schemes. These proposals are designed to address the issues arising from a high population density within the five Olympic boroughs and provide a positive environment for living and
working in, particularly for the young. The five boroughs have a population density that is 50 percent higher than the London average; the boroughs being home to 1.1 million people with over a quarter of these being children and young people. The immediate tasks, therefore, of cleaning and maintaining are allied to longer term goals of reducing worklessness and improving employment opportunities and developing skills.

The aspirations for the public realm focus mainly on the ‘supply side’ in relation to public policy and provision. The key to longer term success or ‘sustainability’ may depend upon the patterns of inward investment that the games and the wider regeneration programme may facilitate. Inward investment that enables the growth of new industries and occupations and the re-balancing of London’s economy is, perhaps, an important policy gap, one that is at any early stage of consideration by key stakeholders involved with ‘London 2012’.
2.10. Sustainable Development and Place Making

Vision statements key themes and aspirations as articulated for stakeholders in 2007: It is intended that the shared vision will provide confidence to stakeholders and Legacy Partners, but will also be flexible to reflect the medium and long-term phasing of legacy development. The shared vision will be a statement establishing a clear aspiration.
In many ways sustainability and legacy refer to interrelated and overlapping concerns – invoking a long view and seeking to contextualise and mitigate ‘impacts’ from the event to better ensure lasting benefits. Sustainability, however, is not simply reducible to ‘legacy’. Instead it points to a specification of focus on two areas; one environmental, the other socio-economic. Thus sustainability covers a spectrum of Olympic-legacy priorities ranging from eco-diversity to the skill and jobs agendas.

Emphasizing the first of these two areas Pal Schmitt, Chair of the IOC Sport and Environment commission makes clear that Sustainability is central to the mission of the International Olympic Committee:

The Olympic Movement and the International Olympic Committee in particular therefore have a role to play in the field of environment protection and sustainable development, to ensure that present and future generations will be able to enjoy sports activities in a preserved socio-economic, healthy and natural environment (IOC 2007:7 emphasis added)

The IOC president, Jacques Rogge, is recorded as having observed that the Olympics in Beijing will be the “last of the money-no-object spectacles for the foreseeable future” and that London’s bid highlighting sustainability and legacy was in line with future IOC thinking: “We are in the mode for lean games,” he said earlier this year (to The Guardian).

Recent games, in line with IOC bid book requirements and broader shifts in policy and popular thinking, have made some attempts to respond to the growing assertiveness and relevance of ‘green’, ‘environmental’ and sustainability agendas. The increased scrutiny of NGO and other bodies, at national and international level, alongside a longstanding and incremental shift to prominence of ‘green’ and ‘sustainable’ ideas, ensures that sustainability will be a central concern before, during and after the London 2012 games.

**Table 2.10.1 Past Cities Sustainability Scorecards**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCORECARDS</th>
<th>Barcelona</th>
<th>Atlanta</th>
<th>Sydney</th>
<th>Athens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guidelines drawn up with NGOs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean-up and return of waste land to social and economic use</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewable energy use</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water use and recycling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste management and recycling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport infrastructure and ‘green’ fuel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biodiversity maintenance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbon: event footprint management</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbon: visitor footprint management</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sourcing: sustainability</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sourcing: fair trade</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
London’s bid book commitments are echoed in particular in one of London’s five ‘legacy’ promises (DCMS 2008) in the undertaking to make the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living. LOCOG and the ODA have each published sustainability policy documents and have detailed policy frameworks.

The LOCOG Sustainability Policy identifies priority themes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2.10.2 LOCOG SUSTAINABILITY POLICY IDENTIFIES PRIORITY THEMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change – the Games can make a real difference by minimising greenhouse gas emissions, from construction to legacy, and by ensuring that legacy facilities are able to cope with the impacts of climate change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste – London 2012 is committed to minimizing construction waste, will send no waste produced during the Games to landfill, and will act as a catalyst for encouraging the development of new waste processing infrastructure in east London and promoting changes in public attitudes and behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biodiversity – London 2012 will minimise the impact of the Games on the ecology of the Lower Lea Valley and at other Games venues during the planning construction and operational phases; it will leave a legacy of enhanced habitats within the Olympic Park; and will foster an understanding of the importance of biodiversity in supporting healthy lifestyles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion – the Games will be genuinely open to all, will promote inclusion and attitude change, specially towards disability, celebrate the diversity of the people of London and the UK, and will create new employment, training and business opportunities, contributing to the social and economic regeneration of communities living around the Olympic Park site and the wider Lower Lea Valley.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy living – the Games will be used to inspire people across the country to take up sport and develop active, healthy and sustainable lifestyles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the work of translating the commitment to sustainability into the built fabric of the Games the ODA has a detailed reporting procedure to better ensure compliance. ‘Green’ practices are built into Games procurement procedures. So it is clear that there is some effective self auditing in relation to aspects of the sustainability agenda.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OLYMPIC DELIVERY AUTHORITY OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>Climate change</th>
<th>Waste</th>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Biodiversity and ecology</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Healthy living</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biodiversity and ecology</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
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The ODA cross references these commitments against its main areas of activity.
The comprehensive review of Olympic activities, examined under the terms of the LOCOG sustainability policy, illustrate commitments to environmentally focused definitions of sustainability in a convincing way. While the relationships with sponsors is left at a general level, it is clear that some commitments are undertaken, even while there is no obvious mechanism for auditing or assessing sponsors’ compliance. One could question the compatibility of a commitment to provision of opportunities for healthy living with some sponsors’ protection of their rights to exclusivity in food provision in the Olympic park in Games time for example (as was seen in past Games).

A further and more serious pause for thought lies in the elision of ‘green’ sustainability agendas to encompass themes understood in terms of ‘sustainable communities’ as defined in the 2007 Act of that name.
The version of sustainability that is privileged in the LOCOG and ODA is praiseworthy. It assures a green and environmentally better east London post 2012 and is a contribution to delivering on the legacy promises. It is a contribution to the quality of the public realm and combines both commitments to improved quality of life with a serious address to diminishing negative environmental consequences. However, it is important to consider the extent to which the accountabilities and assessments brought to bear in relation to this form of sustainability. As a reminder the Sustainable Communities Act is described as follows:

**Sustainability of local communities**

1. The principal aim of this Act is to promote the sustainability of local communities.

2. In this Act references to promoting the sustainability of local communities, in relation to a local authority, are references to encouraging the improvement of the *economic, social* or environmental well-being of the authority’s area, or part of its area. (Sustainable Communities Act 2007)

3. In this section “social well-being” includes participation in civic and political activity.

4. It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to assist local authorities in promoting the sustainability of local communities in the ways specified in this Act.

The Olympic legacy discourse of sustainability seems to elide the economic, political and social aspects of sustainable communities within a package of assurances and accountabilities where emphasis is given to environmental aspects primarily. It should be noted that the IOC’s Olympic Games Impact assessment has a broader ambit, but it is unconnected to any policy drivers and provides a generalized audit tailored partly to the requirements of the IOC. It has not provided much leverage, in past editions of the Games, to impact social and economic target setting and community strategies. The address to inequality seems invisible in the sustainability agenda pursued by Olympic authorities. This is perhaps realistic given the responsibilities of these bodies. However, for transformational legacies to be in evidence in the social and economic realm in 2020 these agendas must be more fully articulated and more securely located in relation to specified governmental strategic areas.
2.11 Placemaking

There is a tension between the work of ‘community building’ and the promotional activity of ‘place-making’. It is important to pursue both agendas. It is important not to elide commitments to public realm improvement and ‘place-making’ which has an orientation to tourism and to building FDI and national investment in the area. Both are important legacy aims, and the latter can assist with building sustainable communities in some instances (Barcelona). However the complementarities and possible contradictions between tourism place-making and community building are important to acknowledge.

Olympic cities and nations demonstrably enter into various attempts, as the branding language has it, to ‘reposition’ themselves. This strategy is a response to an increasingly competitive global ‘market’. Cities (and nations) aim to attract mobile capital, labour and tourism – as well as further mega events – as a means to develop, grow and assert themselves on the world stage. Both bidding for the games (successfully or unsuccessfully) and in particular hosting the event, can signal to a global audience that this or that place (city, region, or nation) is in transition, increasingly ready to accommodate new businesses, new events and new ways of life. Burbank et al. (2001) argue that this entrepreneurial approach to city management in particular marks a shift in the modes and aims of municipal government, moving away from mundane government to a promotional and ‘place-making’ projection of the area (a borough or a municipality), the Olympics can assist in promotional strategies towards:

- improving ‘location factors’ to bring in investors, new businesses (Preuss 2007);
- gaining attention from business and leisure tourists;
- signifying ‘the good life’ to tourists and potential inhabitants;
- reassurance against anxieties about ‘unfamiliar’ cites and nations or countries in political, economic or social transition.

in London there are significant sub-regions and locales which hope to benefit from the promotional aura of the 2012 games, even while some critics of the Olympics argue that London is already firmly on the global map, and unable to benefit – in ways Beijing, Sydney, Atlanta and Barcelona did. Notwithstanding such assessments, the following is indicative of the esteem in which East London is held, and in relation to any ‘global’ aspirations:

Versailles? Washington? Gordon Brown offers visiting world leaders ... Canning Town
Robert Mendick, Chief Reporter, Evening Standard
24.03.09

Next week, Barack Obama and the leaders of the planet’s most powerful economies will attend the G20 summit at the vast ExCel conference centre. Their mission is to find a solution to the global financial crisis. It will be hard work but there will doubtless be time for the Obamas, the Sarkozys and the Browns (OK maybe not the Browns) to enjoy themselves.

Yet the ExCel centre sits east of Canary Wharf in sunless Canning Town, an area of the capital so grim that parcel delivery firm DHL once refused to go there - while happily venturing into Baghdad. It’s also notorious for poor health. Every step I travel from Kensington to Canning Town I lose a year of life expectancy. But in the spirit of furthering international relations, we took a trip to Canning Town, in a forgotten corner of east London close to where the River Lee meets the Thames, to see what tourist delights await Obama & Co. The journey begins at Canning Town Tube and DLR station, next to the A13 flyover, which cuts Canning Town in two and deafens those nearby.

First stop is the station plaque commemorating the Thames Iron Works, which once stood there. It supplied the iron for Westminster, Hammersmith and Blackfriars bridges, 144 warships and employed 7,000 men. In 1894, Thames Ironworks FC was formed, changing its name to West Ham United six years later. (Note to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, England would not have won the 1966 World Cup without “the Irons”.) At the station, I stop passers-by for guidance on what to do next in Canning Town. “I don’t know,” says newsagent Yogesh Patel, 22, before bursting into laughter. Jenny Bowen, a passing
librarian, suggests the ex lib libra. Luckily help is on hand, in the shape of Ian Kirby, whose job it is (believe it or not) to train people in Canning Town and the rest of the London borough of Newham as tourist guides in time for the Olympics. He conducts four guided tours across the borough, including one around Canning Town that takes in the ExCel centre. "There is a lot to see around here," insists Mr Kirby, citing such examples as the Brick Lane Music Hall, the last music hall left in Britain and which is no longer in Brick Lane but Canning Town; the site of Britain’s biggest ever explosion when a dynamite factory blew up in 1917; and a cat rescue centre that saved the strays from the Olympic site before the builders moved in.

Olympic venues, such as the excel centre, will expect to accrue kudos from their Olympic partnership. Indeed the nomination of ExCeL as London’s international convention centre is early evidence of the success of this aspect of the place-making strategy. The following shows a recent report indicating a partial change of heart in relation to east London as a viable global business tourist destination.

**Goodnight Vienna, hello Canning Town; CONFERENCE CALL EAST END TAKES ON WORLD AS EXCEL IS MADE OFFICIAL MEETING CENTRE**


Date: Thursday, October 1 2009, Ross Lydall

FORGET Vienna, Paris and Barcelona and say hello to Canning Town - the world’s newest site for an international conference centre. Mayor Boris Johnson and Visit London today threw their weight behind the expanding ExCeL venue in east London by adopting it as the capital’s International Convention Centre. It ends a five-year search for an ICC that could hold up to 20,000 people. London is unique among major European capital cities in not having an ICC - meaning it loses millions of pounds a year generated by large business gatherings. The decision to back ExCel - which will now be helped by the Mayor’s promotional budget - also rules out building a conference centre in central London in the short term. At present the Queen Elizabeth II conference centre in Westminster, which has an arena able to hold 700, is the capital’s largest purpose-built conference centre. The lack of a major venue has left London 19th in the International Congress and Conventions Association rankings. Dan Ritterband, the Mayor’s director of marketing, said: "London doesn’t do 19th position on anything. We need to get into the top." ExCeL is undergoing a £165 million expansion that will add 50 per cent capacity when it is completed next May. It hosted the G20 in April and will also be used as an Olympic venue in 2012. But despite good access to the Docklands Light Railway and London City Airport, it has been criticised for its hangar-like appearance and lack of London character.

Stratford, site of the main Olympic transport hub, will certainly become more prominent ‘on the map’. Local municipal boroughs (especially Newham, Tower Hamlets, Greenwich, Waltham Forest and Hackney) wish to boost their associations with the 2012 event – as ‘host boroughs’ and so enhance their ‘brand image’.

There is a tension, also, between an understanding, and projection, of 2012 as an East London event, as opposed to its conception as a London-wide enterprise. One of the intended benefits of hosting 2012 is to be that London would affirm ‘World city’ status. The west end, the city of London and long-established tourist, retail and leisure locations have a good deal of global ‘cultural capital’ already – with East London hoping that the Olympic experience will go some way in rebalancing (greater) London’s profile to better reflect the extended east end. The geographies of promotional activity around 2012 will feed the emergent sense, globally and locally, of post-Olympic London.
Each of the local boroughs offer detailed plans for ‘legacy’. The articulation of the borough legacy plans with the overarching legacy framework – and the capacity of individual boroughs to deliver their ‘legacy’ is a challenge for the London 2012 legacy.
**Table 2.11.1 Scenarios: Splintering Urbanism and the Olympic Park**

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<td>To make the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living</td>
<td>The creation of the Olympic park as an open and accessible green space devoted to (partly) locally defined conceptions of the public good and handed in part or in totality back to the stewardship of local and London-wide government—without the pressure to maximise return on investment as soon as possible. The creation of centres of excellence developing and disseminating environmental technologies and education via leisure facilities and new local enterprises centred around the park</td>
<td>The creation of an Olympic park that seeks to reconcile ‘public good’ and the shorter term recouping of public investment. This produces a ‘hybrid’ development, creating areas of public utility alongside restricted access driven by commercial development needs for exclusivity. The distinctive parts may work but they do generate an effective ‘whole’.</td>
<td>The fragmentation of the park in a cost-driven attempt maximally to recoup the Olympic investment in the short-term. The risk is that premium housing and exclusionary leisure facilities will dis-embedded the park and its usage from the everyday flows and spaces over local life in East London—inducing and repeating the landscape of splintered urbanism (Graham &amp; Marvin, 2001) evident around other large-scale East London regeneration projects.</td>
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<td>To make the UK a world-class sporting nation in terms of elite success, mass participation and school sport</td>
<td>Continued public investment in accessible sport and leisure activities (such as the ‘free swim initiatives’ already announced). Investments in school sports, Combined public investment with commercial management of the permanent sport and leisure facilities; achieves combinations of community access, elite sports</td>
<td>Over investment in the Olympic spectacle and signifying elite success at the expense of ongoing practical assistance to grass roots’ initiatives in school sport, active</td>
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<td><strong>To transform the heart of East London</strong></td>
<td>sports scholarships for gifted athletes and local initiatives tailored to the needs of specific and complex populations</td>
<td>provision but ‘new’ programmes based on local initiatives restricted</td>
<td>leisure and sports education. A delegation of training and support to sponsors and private training providers</td>
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<tr>
<td>To inspire a new generation of young people to take part in local volunteering, cultural and physical activity</td>
<td>Imaginative education and skills training programmes complementing and continuing the stimuli provided by the official games volunteering programmes. Support for continued and extended volunteering initiatives post-2012 and the export of volunteering expertise to other regions/ events. Development of Egan-review style training/education sustainable community development. Early start volunteering tied to</td>
<td>Volunteering post-event taken Mainly into the public/voluntary sectors via limited schemes; some post-games support/enthusiasm for initiatives aimed at enhancing civic engagement and undertaken by entrepreneurs attracted to the Olympic Park site</td>
<td>A highly regimented volunteering system entirely focused on specific Olympic issues without sufficient pre- and post-games support to ensure that the volunteering ethos does not dissipate</td>
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To demonstrate that the UK is a creative, inclusive and welcoming place in which to live, to visit and for business (Department for Culture Media and Sport (DCMS), 2007).

| sustainable community themes | Emergent successful indications of emerging legacy and in the act of sharing and passing on (via emerging tourism and network connectivity/sharing know-how and future events) the innovative, exciting and distinctive vision of a re-figured/re-figuring (East) London on a global stage | Development of a mixed use legacy that seeks to mobilize past/existing assumptions about business development in London (financial/business/public services) rather than providing an ‘example’ of a ‘new’ vision aimed at greater economic and entrepreneurial diversity | Investing in a traditional brand and place marketing campaign promising (via commercial inducements to business) specific and improved location factors and primarily targeting large, established business in areas such as financial services. The Olympics inducing only an extension of Canary Wharf-style commercial redevelopment |

The scenarios point to three possible outcomes - successful, steady-state and unsuccessful ‘legacy’. Successful legacy can best understood in terms of identifying the ingredients of social transformation arising from the games. Social transformation depends upon a policy context in which where there is a shared and sustained commitment to actively guide and lead transformation; this is a matter of governance, but also government.
Each step towards transformative legacy momentum and subsequent transformative Olympic intervention in the city depends upon securing confidence in the actual, projected or expected completion/fulfillment of the previous stage. Public and Private investments are needed to ensure/underwrite the component processes/activities. Each stage requires different kinds of audit, evaluation and accountability.

Ongoing psychosocial and economic investment (public and private) is dependent upon the ongoing credibility of this narrative – an authentic sense of moving towards a transformative event. The interdependencies are to do with the governmental infrastructure and the management of transitions between and across phases. The ‘legacy’ phase, and its ‘transformational’ activities are the most demanding – requiring long term investment and government/governance to capitalise on and optimally mobilise the hard and ‘soft’ Olympic assets/impacts accrued / developed in the previous 4 stages.

Fig: managing and governing the economic / social activities in preparation for the London 2012 Games. (n.b. see Pine and Gilmore 1999 The Experience Economy for a commercial oriented model of consumer experience management. This model draws on their stage based understanding, while seeing to apply it to a phenomenon – mega events – which is part of a process of collective/governmental production/consumption.
2.12 Transformational Legacy Momentum

The figure provides a further perspective on the challenge of building a transformational legacy from London 2012. The diagram identifies 5 phases of activity; land remediation; building/construction; services and systems management; the event experience and the final stage: transformation. While it is clear that such phases are likely to be entered into in an Olympic or other mega event project, it is helpful to articulate the ‘stages’ and to be alert to the different properties of, and requirements attaching to each of the phases. One part of an analytic commitment to seeing legacy emerging from continuing narrative/narratives is to suggest that integrating these phases coherently, while respecting the specific properties and tasks entailed to each phase, is amongst the major challenges facing London’s Olympic legacy stakeholders. The model seeks to distinguish – in a deliberately schematic articulation – five distinct phases in the preparatory activities. The properties of each phase are specific, even while their interactions are, in reality and necessarily, continuous.

At the fundamental level the materiality / medium through which the activity is realized at each stage is markedly different. As Pine and Gilmore have it, in a similar (Pine and Gilmore: 1999; 2007) model upon which this conception is partly based, the five stages privilege five different kinds of action, respectively; extraction; making; delivery; staging and guiding. There are also different ways of charging attached to each ‘phase’, although this is complex to map in the case of the Olympics it is helpful to think of the location of the respective budgets attaching to remediation, event-costs and the legacy etc.

At the remediation and construction phases we are talking about the manipulation and processing of land, correlate here to fungible commodities extracted for market, the bricks and steel, buildings; the materiality from which a ‘hard legacy’ must emerge. The service-oriented activity is performed in the more abstract mode of process design, performance/IPR and project management and other such operations, for instance in the systematization of procurement processes or in human resource management. The event/experience phase rests upon the success of the previous three phases, which (per-)form the infrastructures (abstract and concrete) upon which the event-experience depends. This must be staged effectively and affectively. The ‘materiality’ of the experience phase is human and emotional; constituted in excitement, emotional engagement, anticipation and surprise, sentiment, memory and desire, but also anxiety. It is through the experiential engagement, registered multiply in the staging of the Games ‘production’ and embodied in the event via those producing it ‘front of house’ (athletes, officials, spokes persons, media) and by consuming the Games (fans, communities, observers, bloggers and twitterers) that the ‘soft’ legacy is born. While the event itself is the major vector for the ‘experiential phase’, the appeal to affective engagements (in their variety) should be built into the event ‘prospect’, its buildings (as public icons and destinations), the event (as spectacle) and into the retrospect (as memorial narration, inspiration and celebration). The experience phase as described here sounds highly abstract; but all it really refers to is that the Olympics should touch its audiences and inspire stakeholders, fans, volunteers and athletes, communities and so on, with intense enjoyment and emotion. Numerous popular accounts of the games attest to just this (e.g. in Sydney, Barcelona, Calgary and Torino). We suggest that this phase – ephemeral and immaterial as it might appear – and negligible to the cost-benefit accountancy of project planning, is an important contributor to the overall success of the Games in any aim to produce lasting transformation. The transition is all-important. While 2012 provides a significant horizon, transformation depends upon capturing a longer term ‘momentum’ born of the (successful) prior phases, and maintained by future visioning and investments. Transformation depends upon a guiding vision able to marshal the space of the city lately revivified by remediation, building, infrastructure improvements, improved human and social capital resources and the promotional buzz attendant upon the memorable event experience. None of these are legacy. To become ‘legacy’ they need to be transformed – embedded into the fabric of the refigured city. This is achieved by the continued engagement of government and to the persistence of the 2012 vision and promises in the wake of the Games.
This can best be explored by explicating a further aspect of the model. In particular as the diagram suggests, each phase/type of activity in the building of a transformational mega event legacy requires a slightly different forms of management/oversight/ governance and accountability.

We suggest that this is an important point for London: The frameworks in place in ODA, LOCOG, DCMS and as evidenced other agencies’ ‘legacy’ documentation are sufficient to ensure that the Olympic development in each interdependent phase up to and including the Olympic ‘experience’ is well conceived and on track. There is a risk, however, that ‘the ‘final’ stage’ – Transformation’ will not be achieved or sustained as at this stage and in relation to this phase it is less clear that necessary investment, governance and leadership is in place. Indeed governance may not be the right word. While various kinds of managerial expertise and project-oriented management are well suited to the oversight of extraction, construction, service management and event staging – and indeed preferable to direct governmental control – the ‘management’ of social, community and economic transformation (and correlative investments) should remain ultimately a matter for confident government-lead planning. It is unclear if the OPLC has the scope or organizational capacity to operate in this way.

There is a risk that the focus on the 2012 event, privileged in the organizational orientation of the ODA, LOCOG, DCMS will become too pressurized by the imminent need to stage a good event experience and so, proportionately distracted from the longer term transformational legacy orientation. Indeed this would be only natural as the lifecycle of LOCOG in particular formally excludes any serious legacy engagement. In addition LOCOG appears to defer to the IOC as much as to national and local government in its definitions and implementations of ‘legacy’ planning. The OPLC is charged with the longer term view. Legacy planning and development requires such a lead agency to establish an overview of the Olympic Park development within a wider community and regional context, this remit is potentially beyond the scope of the OPLC but not yet owned by an appropriate central government department. To emphasize: while the Olympic park is both a substantive and a symbolic piece of the legacy jigsaw puzzle, the scale of investment required for any deep seated socio-economic change in east London – the investment in legacy transformation – can only come from strategically governed public sources.

The assurance of longstanding transformation then is finally a matter of ‘governance’. The next section considers this in more detail.
3.0 GOVERNANCE AND THE GAMES

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Governance is a relatively neglected theme in publications, reports and public discussion of the long term impact of major events such as the Olympic and Paralympic Games. A flexible, collaborative and representative organisational framework for a mega event is, however, integral to its success and is a major influence upon the achievement of legacy goals. For ‘Olympic cities’, as legacy outcomes have come to incorporate a wider range of social, cultural, economic and environmental policy themes, so governance has assumed an increased importance in determining their capacity to secure longer term benefits from hosting the Games.

Governance refers to ways of bringing institutions representing the state, communities and the market into forms of public/private partnership to deliver regeneration projects. The concept of governance is a fluid, contested term in the academic literature. Until the 1980s, governance in the UK was mainly undertaken by government, with national government determining policy and, through the mechanisms of local government, major housing and redevelopment programmes were undertaken. Since the 1980s, successive governments have separated policy-making from its delivery and have increasingly used voluntary, private and ‘arms length’ institutions to provide the services required to implement urban regeneration projects. The private sector, and in particular, private finance has been regarded as an important contributor with government funding being used initially to attract private investment into projects. In this sense, public funding provides the capacity for the state to ‘lever in’ additional private sector funding.

The partnerships arising from this leverage model may vary according to the levels of cooperation and interdependence of the public and private institutions engaged in specific projects. The form of institutional relations may remain ‘state-centred’, privilege the financial and commercial interests of the private sector, or seek to reflect a broader coalition or ‘network’ of all stakeholders, including, for example, local communities and voluntary groups. In summary, governance is a complex matter, it may be helpful to analyse the form of institutional relations by reference to three approaches:

- State centred – where central government provides the policy framework and the role of non-state institutions is mainly confined to the (part) financing and delivery of the project;
- Public/private partnership - where the economic or commercial interests of the latter are privileged in the process of the projects development;
- Networks of Stakeholders – where the interests of all stakeholders (the state, private sector and local communities and civic groups) are represented in the governance framework and the vision and policy goals of the project

In practice, it may be more difficult to clearly distinguish between the approaches identified above for a variety of reasons. For example, governance frameworks may take the form of a network of stakeholders but in the process of a project’s development, specific commercial interests may prevail (Atlanta 1996) or the proposed balance of private/public funding may be undermined by external economic conditions that impede the private sector’s capacity to raise sufficient capital to fully engage with the project in the manner intended (London 2012).

Also, in the case of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, the IOC requires the host city and state/federal or national government to provide financial guarantees as an important component of the applicant city’s bid; in this context, there exists significant pressures that tilt the governance model away from a partnership or wider network and
toward a state-centred approach. Finally, a longitudinal study of a city’s experience of hosting the Games may reveal that the influence exerted by specific stakeholders may vary over the whole period of the project from the pre-event to the event and post event phases. The governance framework is, therefore, not fixed as the typology above implies, it is a process that is susceptible to external social, political and cultural pressures that arise over the whole period of urban development/regeneration associated with the games (Seoul 1988).

3.2 Lessons from the LDDC ‘Docklands’ Case

The ‘Docklands’ development is reviewed here for three reasons; first, it was the primary and most extensive regeneration project undertaken in East London following the closure of the city’s docks. Second, it is the prime example, of the leverage approach to urban renewal in the UK and, lastly, the social implications of its development for existing communities in inner East London has provoked much debate over recent years.

Canary Wharf represented an ambitious 1980s scheme set up to expand the city’s financial centre eastwards, emulating the success of the Manhattan development in New York, undertaken in the 1960s. The scheme, overseen by the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), circumvented local authorities and established planning frameworks to afford developers opportunities to invest in extensive high rise office development and upmarket housing. The original scheme presented in 1985 was for 8.8 million square feet of offices, hotels, shops, restaurants and 8,000 parking spaces to be located in the northern sector of the Isle of Dogs. The docklands light railway was the only form of transport connecting the new development to the City. Peter Hall has argued that the Local Government, Planning and Land Act of 1980 that provided the legal basis for urban development corporations, such as the LDDC, represented

‘the most extraordinary set of powers ever given to a set of quangos, and by the same token the most extraordinary incursion into local authority powers ever authorised by a British government’ (Hall1999:912-3).

This ‘market driven’ pro-business initiative, designed to provide ‘leverage’ through which initial public investment gave the impetus for subsequent large scale investment from the private sector, eventually succeeded in attracting major companies to relocate to Canary Wharf but not until several financial crises were overcome. Initially, the developers, Olympia and York, had to attract tenants by offering very low rents. The company, at the same time, diversified into other commercial activities in North America that fared badly. The recession of the early 1990s that hit London and other major economies pushed down the value of the buildings upon which construction loans were secured for the development of Canary Wharf. Lenders to Olympic and York took fright and called in their loans. Olympic and York went into receivership. The receiver kept Canary Wharf going, however, and it came out of receivership in 1993 and was eventually sold to a consortium of investors for £800 million in 1995. The consortium was led by Paul Reichmann, the owner of Olympia and York and the originator of the Canary Wharf development scheme. By the late 1990s, Canary Wharf was favourably positioned to take advantage of the upsurge in the finance sector in London and it attracted major ‘blue chip’ financial services companies to locate on the Isle of dogs. The extension of the Jubilee line, connecting Waterloo and London Bridge to Canary Wharf facilitated this expansion. By early 2000, Canary Wharf had over 11 million square feet of office development and could provide space for 90,000 office workers. Since 2000 Canary Wharf has continued to expand with consequent rises in employment, retail and leisure provision and the construction of new high quality housing units.

Assessment of the Canary Wharf development has been highly polarized. A new financial centre has been constructed and evaluations suggest that ‘every £1 million of public sector cost generated net additional benefits in the Urban Development Area of 23 jobs, 8300 sq m of office floor space, 7.8 housing units plus many other diverse benefits’ (Rhodes and Tyler, 1998:32 quoted in Hamnett 2003:242). Conversely, criticism has focused upon
the removal of local democratic controls and the replacement of the existing population by a new, more prosperous group of young professionals. Between 1981 and 1991 Tower Hamlets, the borough in which Canary wharf is located, experienced a significant change in population that was reflected in the growth in owner occupation and the reduction in proportions of council and social housing – in 1981 the authority had 85 percent council housing and 15 percent private housing and by 2008 nearly 60 percent was private sector housing. The complex social legacy of the Canary Wharf development for Tower Hamlets has been highlighted in Section 1. The regeneration of the area did not ensure that existing residents were the main beneficiaries. Between 2003 and 2007, for example, whilst 49,000 new jobs were created in the area, the claimant count for the wards in the closest proximity (Millwall, Blackwall and Cubitt Town) remained flat.

The Canary Wharf development is an example of a public/private sector partnership that privileged the commercial interests of a specific sector of the city’s economy with the development achieving commercial viability but with significant social implications – the creation of divided or splintered communities of ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. The impetus for a London bid to host the 2012 Games arose, in part, from government (national, city-wide and local) seeking to address the inadequacies and the social ‘imbalances’ of the commercially-driven ‘leverage’ model of regeneration that was typified by the Canary Wharf development.

3.3 OLYMPIC CITIES AND GOVERNANCE – DISCOVERING BEST PRACTICE

The discussion of governance has been largely influenced by the official reports prepared by cities after the games. These have mainly concentrated on the preparatory and event phases rather than extending to consider legacy in the context of urban development or renewal. This, perhaps, reflects the fact that Olympic Organising Committees (OCOGs) have a fixed lifespan, with their existence ending following the closure of the games and the completion of their immediate post-games tasks. OCOG resources are limited primarily to event-related income and expenditure, so while legacy may be a theme intrinsic to the games, responsibility for its achievement lies outside of the remit of the OCOG and with other stakeholders in the governance framework. The capacity for this framework to flexibly persist beyond the games has varied. In seeking to identify best practice, the main consideration here is the extent to which governance structures provided the capacity for a city to achieve longer term benefits -a qualitative (or transformative) change in the socio-economic development of the city or part thereof. Table 3.3.1 provides a brief summary of the governance model and the legacy outcomes achieved by five past host cities:

Table 3.3.1 Governance Models and Legacy Outcomes of Host Cities 1992-2008

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<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Governance Type</th>
<th>Key Stakeholders</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Barcelona 1992</td>
<td>Network</td>
<td>National/regional/city government; COOB’92 and Barcelona Holding Olympic, SA (HOLSA)</td>
<td>• ‘inter-institutional consensus’;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Continued urban development programmes 1992-2012</td>
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<td>• Plans include Forum of Cultures (East) and Poblenou (West); redressing imbalances of previous phases of development</td>
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<td>Atlanta 1996</td>
<td>Public/Private Partnership</td>
<td>ACOG (Atlanta Olympic Organising Committee –private)</td>
<td>• ACOG interests prevailed;</td>
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<td>Sydney 2000</td>
<td>Network</td>
<td>Sydney Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (SOCOG), the Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA) and the Olympic Transport and Roads Authority (ORTA); Minister for the Olympics also appointed as President of SOCOG; Sydney Games Coordinating Group also established (1999) to oversee progress and mediate/resolve conflicts between stakeholders; Voluntary and environmental groups involved in regular consultations, though their influence diminished in the period immediately before the event. Agencies with specific functional responsibilities for delivering the games brought together early in 2000 under a single umbrella as 'Sydney 2000'</td>
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<td>● Effective coordination between the event-related organizations and government at local, state and national levels; Governance structure was modified and ‘evolved’ in pre-event phase; Only following the games was ‘legacy’ addressed as a policy theme in a systematic way – Sydney Olympic Park Authority (SOPA) was established nine months after the games ended; SOPA given responsibility for creating ‘a vibrant and active centre’ focused upon ensuring Olympic Park was integrated into Sydney’s urban development.</td>
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<td>Athens 2004</td>
<td>State-centred</td>
<td>Athens 2004 Olympic Games Committee, and two high level bodies - Committee of Coordination of Olympic Preparation (DESOP) and the ‘Project Monitoring Group’ (OPE). These were overseen by the Ministry of Culture and the Secretary for the Games - they monitored progress of projects, resolved issues arising between policy makers and delivery agencies and worked with the Ministry of Finance to</td>
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<td>● Cross-agency cooperation achieved by firm state intervention as games came closer; Widespread public/media concern about preparations; Event’s success changed this image but governance framework was event focused with little attention to legacy; City and region secured</td>
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The relationship between the governance model and the achievement of legacy outcomes is complex and any provisional conclusions must acknowledge that the evidence available is not consistently captured by host cities using comparable data sets over consistent periods of time. Second, legacy achievements are subject to wider economic, cultural and environmental conditions that vary considerably between host cities and nations. Finally, the governance model adopted by each host city reflects the type of institutional and political relations that prevail within the host nations at the time. Accepting these important caveats, it is possible to suggest that:

- The 'leverage' model of public/private sector partnership tends to generate legacies that are favourable to private sector or commercial interests but which reinforce existing patterns of social disadvantage through displacement/replacement and the process of 'gentrification'; subsequent phases of planning and development assume a similar character (Atlanta 1996);
- The state-centred approach may reflect the relative weakness of cross-institutional cooperation (Athens 2004) or the prevailing political and institutional arrangements within the host nation (Beijing 2008), while it may ‘guarantee’ the successful financing and completion of the event, it facilities social transformation only in so far as legacy is a central component of longer term planning (Barcelona 1992; Beijing 2008);
- The social network model of governance may provide enhanced institutional flexibility but may also bring greater organizational complexity unless ‘cross-institutional consensus’ is effectively linked to successive stages of legacy planning and development (Barcelona 1992));
- Social network relationships may lose focus and momentum if agencies are mainly event -related rather than legacy-focused (Sydney 2000).
3.4 Olympic Cities, Community Engagement and Social Integration

Community engagement has two main dimensions; first, in relation to evaluating public support for hosting the games and, second, in gauging the involvement of communities in event-related activities and their engagement with the broader process of urban development and regeneration that may accompany hosting the games. The evaluation of public support is often captured by quantitative (e.g. opinion polls) and qualitative (e.g. focus groups) approaches as well as being reflected in the extent to which active engagement with the event is encouraged through volunteering. Involvement with the wider process of urban regeneration is reflected in the ways that community representatives may be directly involved in the governance framework or are engaged with policy makers via consultation.

Public support – at the bid preparation phase, public opinion may play a decisive role in determining the extent to which authorities progress a bid or commit public funds to it. For the Los Angeles (1984) games, it was clear from the outset that an important section of the California public was opposed to public funds being used to underwrite the bid and in the previous decade, Denver citizens rejected the opportunity to host the 1976 winter Olympics. Recently, host city populations have been more willing to support the games coming to their town. Typically, over time for the host city and nation, the pattern of support has been high at the bid phase, fallen during the preparation phase (especially when financing arrangements have come under pressure) and restored to a high level of public support during the year of the event itself.

Volunteering - Volunteer programmes are an integral part of the Olympic and Paralympic games and have generated large numbers of participants involved in a diverse range of activities associated with the event. The summer Olympic and Paralympic games may create opportunities for around 50,000 volunteers with programmes commencing typically two years prior to the event itself. Over recent games, volunteering has involved the training of a ‘core’ of paid volunteer organizers (Sydney, Athens) and the provision of training opportunities for unpaid volunteers to engage in a diverse range of activities including the provision of services to visitors, sports-related organizational and administrative tasks, cultural Olympiad activities and broader educational programmes, especially for young people and specific groups such as the disabled. Manchester (Commonwealth Games, 2002) provided opportunities to lend volunteering a new dimension based upon its association with promoting social inclusion. Volunteers were drawn from the young living in the most socially disadvantaged areas of north west England and these participated in training programmes that offered educational qualifications aimed at demonstrating participants’ readiness for employment. The volunteer programme helped generate a database of volunteers whose activities continued after the games through their involvement with a network of third sector and existing volunteering agencies within the region. The use of volunteering to strengthen civic engagement after the games and to associate its projects with social objectives designed to improve the public realm, enhance health and well-being, improve social awareness and provide practical support for, for example, accessibility, are relatively recent and more innovative approaches to attaching volunteering to achieving positive post-games legacies.

Community Engagement – there are several obstacles to community engagement with the wider process of urban development and renewal associated with hosting a mega event:

- The governance frameworks established to use the mega event to catalyse more rapid change than would normally occur, tend to mitigate against effective community involvement; communities often feel that the event, in all its phases, happens to them rather than involves them (Burbank et al 2001);
Public/private partnership approaches often replace the legal and democratic processes that facilitate community dialogue at the planning and development phases (Minton, 2009); The ownership and control of the Olympic Park and its environs passes to special authorities with powers that often preclude direct public involvement, especially those special powers to compulsory purchase land and amenities (Preuss, 2004)

These obstacles are not confined to mega event developments, in North America and the UK over recent years, other major urban development projects have tended to assume these characteristics as Minton (2006, 2009) has argued and as the Docklands case has also revealed. The dilution of local democratic influence is associated with assumptions about the wider economy and the dynamic that drives it:

‘When the boom turns to bust, because the schemes are based on the inexorably rising land and property values, deals fall apart. Investors can’t pay back the loans and banks become reluctant to lend, finding that the huge rise in value forecast for the future have vanished into thin air and that they have lent far more than they can afford. This is the reason schemes around the UK are on hold..this is an approach to planning our cities which is underpinned by borrowing, debt and large speculative increases in property prices, which means it contributes in no small part to the boom and bust cycle’. (Minton 2009:28)

Such an approach based upon speculative development tends to provide housing and other amenities that do not address the needs of existing communities but are designed for the upwardly mobile, young professionals attracted to the regenerated area. In the wake of the credit crunch and subsequent recession, there is, however, an opportunity to re-think this model and the overall approach to legacy. As legacy has become an increasingly important component of mega event planning, especially with London 2012, the wider economic, social, environmental and cultural agenda provides important opportunities to create different forms of community involvement and an engagement with approaches aimed at achieving a more balanced and diverse economy, one that is less reliant upon speculative development and not mainly driven by a consumption-based model of services driven growth.

3.5 THE GOVERNANCE OF ‘LONDON 2012’

In its report published in February 2007, the National Audit Office (NAO) identified several risks arising from the complex governance structure developed to deliver the games. The risks arose, for example, from not having one person with overall responsibility for delivering the games, the lack of detailed procurement policies and from the need to coordinate effectively across a diverse range of organisations and agencies (NAO 2007:15). In a second report published in June 2008, the NAOs concerns were assuaged on many features of the event’s delivery (including procurement arrangements) and moved toward more specific themes related to policing and security, private sector funding to support the development of the Olympic Village and the lack of detailed plans for the legacy uses of the permanent facilities that would remain after the games (NAO: 2008). With the use of contingency funds to finance a wholly-publicly funded Olympic village agreed in summer 2009, the other main foci of concern relating to security and legacy uses remain. The main gap appears to be in legacy planning, a task now primarily in the hands of the recently created Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC). The NAO reports, however, have a relatively narrow focus, mainly upon risk management and finance. From a broader perspective it may be suggested that the ‘network’ model of governance that characterizes key stakeholder engagement in ‘London 2012’ is operating effectively in its event-related functions but issues remain in relation to the legacy usage of the Olympic Park and, perhaps, in the local and wider regional contexts where the role of local authorities and regional agencies are less clearly articulated. Here the future role of the OPLC and its relationship with other key legacy stakeholders is most important to achieving a ‘transformative’ legacy.
On the positive side, in its early months of operation, OPLC has identified a vision for the development of the Olympic Park which is designed to achieve a balance between social and commercial goals; it is also working closely with the Mayor’s office and the five Olympic host boroughs and is committed to integrating its plans within the Strategic Regeneration Framework (SRF) and the sub-regional Multi Area Agreement of the five boroughs. These plans focus upon transformational goals, such as, addressing ‘worklessness’, skills development and housing for all; plans that seek to achieve parity between East London and the rest of the city (a policy referred to as ‘convergence’). The OPLC is, therefore, highly sensitized to the ‘transformation’ agenda; it is, however, working within a highly constrained public investment environment. To date, it appears that OPLC funding will be underwritten via the transfer of LDA funds to meet all overhead costs and through the transfer of programme budgets where these have become the OPLC’s responsibility. These transfers will underwrite OPLC corporate costs for the period 2010-13 and will also include a grant from the Department of Communities and Local Government (CLG) of £800,000 for 2009-10. These arrangements may cover OPLC costs until 2013 but funding sources beyond that date, for the period 2013-19, have not been identified. It is precisely during this period that the OPLC will be performing the key role in the development of the Olympic Park and overseeing its integration into the life of the city.

Constraints imposed upon public spending by the condition of the wider economy and the funding uncertainties facing the OPLC beyond 2013, create a risk that the Park and the development of its surrounding area, will rely heavily upon securing private investment that may privilege commercial interests and marginalise social gain. Perhaps Atlanta provides the clearest example of this risk with the Park’s development privileging the lifestyle interests of the professional classes and providing a site for the relocation of capital and types of employment that excluded the poorer resident population. As a leading figure in Atlanta’s Olympic Committee argued, the Olympics ‘were not a welfare programme, they are a business venture’. Whilst this perception is not shared by the OPLC, combinations of rising land values in the vicinity of Olympic developments and the pressure to reduce or contain public investment levels may, in the period 2013-2019, ensure that the balance between commercial and social legacies is tilted toward the former.

If the legacy development programme for the Olympic Park is driven by exploiting the short term opportunities presented by the Park area offering premium values over those currently existing in the sub-region, then development may be driven by commercial gain, the inward movement of upwardly mobile consumers and the early sale of public assets in order to reduce government deficits. Conversely, if public investment is forthcoming in the post-event phase, the Park and its environs can be developed holistically, community-use and access secured and a balanced achieved between the ‘public good’ and enterprise.

In the regional context whilst the Stratford City and Olympic Park developments are perceived as one of four major instruments of economic growth and development across the Thames Gateway (the others are Canary Wharf, London Gateway Tilbury, a major shipping infrastructure development, and Ebbsfleet, a Channel rail link station and location for housing growth), the specific contributions of each and how these will address local deprivation issues across the whole Gateway remains unclear. Indeed, the capacity for these projects to generate significant improvements in the regional skills base, wage levels and employment rates has perhaps diminished in the wake of the credit crunch and subsequent recession since housing development has stalled and the growth potential of financial and business-related services diminished. Finally, at the local level, the funding and implementation of the Multi-Area Agreement of the five Olympic boroughs remains uncertain. Paradoxically, the ‘network’ model of governance may facilitate a development momentum that is more akin to the outcomes associated with the ‘leverage’ model that underpinned the development of Canary Wharf. Such a possible outcome is likely to reinforce social polarities rather than reduce them.
3.6 **London 2012 Governance: Gaps and Recommendations**

- The network model of governance is operating effectively in its event-related functions but issues remain concerning legacy planning, especially the use(s) of several permanent facilities post-games;
- Legacy planning and development requires a lead agency to establish an overview of the Olympic Park development within a wider community and regional context, this remit is potentially beyond the scope of the OPLC but not yet owned by an appropriate central government department;
- The role of the newly formed OPLC is not clearly defined in terms of scope, planning and legal powers;
- Sources of OPLC’s ‘transformative investment’ funding in the critical 2013-2019 period are not specified or guaranteed;
- The relationships between the Olympic Park development and other major projects, such as Stratford City, are not clearly articulated as part of a wider East London plan;
- The four major instruments of economic growth and development across the Thames Gateway are the Olympic Park/Stratford City, Canary Wharf, London Gateway Tilbury, a major shipping infrastructure development, and Ebbsfleet, a Channel rail link station and location for housing expansion. The credit crunch and resulting recession has significantly slowed housing and other development in the Thames Gateway and employment has fallen in finance and related sectors. The extent to which these ‘drivers’ of change may be able to assist in tackling worklessness, improve the skills base of the resident population and meet housing needs across the region requires urgent review.

In summary, legacy planning is an important component of the London 2012 project; London is ahead of many past host cities in developing proposals for the legacy use of the Olympic Park and the surrounding sub-region. London 2012’s commitment to social transformation in East London exceeds the ambitions of past host cities. The governance framework for ‘London 2012’ is likely to produce ‘a successful games’. The capacity to achieve a ‘transformative momentum’ in legacy mode depends upon achieving an effective balance between commercial and social goals, addressing knowledge gaps relating to the role of the OPLC and specifying how this role and remit relates to the wider city/regional policy framework. Ownership, oversight and accountability for this integrative approach require the clear identification of lead agencies at local/sub-regional, city-wide and national level. If local democracy, accountability and funding sources are to be aligned, the five Olympic boroughs, the Mayor’s office and the Department of Communities and Local Government are, currently, the appropriate bodies to assume these roles.
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