

## AGAINST THE TIDE : MAKING WAVES AND BREAKING SILENCES

Erika Apfelbaum

To be published in Leo Mos (ed.). *Alternative History of Psychology in Autobiography*,  
Kluwer Academic/Plenum

Für Max und Mela  
In memoriam

### **1.Looking back to the future.**

La pensée elle-même naît d'événements de l'expérience vécue et doit leur demeurer liée comme aux seuls guides propres à l'orienter." (Hannah Arendt , 1972 P. 26)

In the introduction to her book of biographies (*Vies politiques [Men in Dark Times]*, 1974), Hannah Arendt points out that as we question certain men and women about the fashion in which each has lived their life and evolved on the world's stage, we take the measure of a whole epoch and we illuminate what is common for everyone. The following narrative is directly in line with Arendt's observation, since my life has unfolded and been closely connected with a significant period in the development of social psychology. Accordingly, my story may provide some insights into the socio-cultural and historical changes in the discipline during the period in which I have been both its witness and an active participant/contributor.

Of course, it must be understood that social psychology existed well before "my" time, in the 1950's. As I have noted elsewhere (Apfelbaum, 1986), during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, several factors were responsible for the growth of the social sciences. Most important, in Western societies, the industrial revolution and subsequent urbanisation radically disrupted the established social order. It became urgent to create new mechanisms of social control and categories of knowledge appropriate to the emerging mass societies. Attempts to conceptualize these issues flourished in what I have called the 'proto-social psychologies' of the time. But a century separates the 19<sup>th</sup> century formulations from what is today acknowledged as the subject-matter and methodologies of social psychology. The current praxis of mainstream social psychology as well as its more recent dissident expressions were largely developed in the aftermath of World War II, and the discipline did not become fully autonomous until the 1950's.

In 1951, I was in my first year at university, discovered psychology, and later that year decided that I wanted to graduate in this discipline. By the 1960's, when I became a full time

researcher in social psychology, it already had a well defined subject matter — social comparison and influence processes, aggression, interpersonal and group conflict, etc., — and specific methodological guidelines. I have, therefore, been both a witness of, and participant in, the growth and changing perspectives of the discipline during its “Golden Age” in the 1950's and 1960's (Apfelbaum, 1993b P.15 to 17), its subsequent “crisis” in the 1970's, as well as its later developments.

My research in interpersonal conflicts and bargaining during the 1960's attests to my initial commitment to an experimental approach to social phenomena. My work was rooted in what was then one of the leading paradigms of mainstream experimental social psychology. The fact that I was asked to review the research on this topic for one of the volumes of the Berkowitz series (Apfelbaum, 1974) indicates the recognition I was granted from one of the leading authorities in the discipline. I had by then already become interested in studying the role of power in social relations but my approach to this was still based on the mainstream game theory paradigm. It was only when I began to directly question the continuing neglect of power and suggest that it may well be the most significant dimension of social relations (Apfelbaum and Lubek, 1976; Apfelbaum, 1979), that I was criticized (cf. Deutsch, 1976, Triandis, 1979) and considered a renegade to mainstream social psychology.

The discipline was then in the midst of what Israel and Tajfel (1972) called the “crisis of social psychology.” This was part of the wider critical re-examination of the theoretical and epistemological foundations of all social science research. “The time had come to take stock and see where we are and where we should go” (Strickland, 1976, p.4). In this context, I was

drawn into the world of history of ideas, and the early development of social psychology, in order to understand some of the blind spots in the discipline and to see why it had deviated from its initial “raison d’être”. However, even when I seriously questioned the capacity of the discipline to take into account existing social conditions and pointed out its inadequacies, blind spots and silences, I remained convinced that social psychology was important as a discipline that could provide a unique understanding of the historical, sociological and individual contexts in which persons evolve.

Ultimately, my main interest has been to develop a framework for an integrative social psychology which explores how individuals evolve/construct their lives at the cross roads between their socio-historical and cultural experiences, as well as their sense of personal agency. My study of women in power positions (Apfelbaum, 1993a) represents this theoretical perspective, and my recent investigations of uprooting and memory are also part of it. I have only lately again encountered the writings of Maurice Halbwachs and Marcel Mauss, whose analyses and conceptions of social events and behaviors are seminal to such an integrative attempt.

So, it is the narrative of my three successive lives as social psychologist during a particular period of history (both in terms of world events as well as intellectual climate and

strategic scientific choices) which will be the subject matter of this chapter. But I am quite aware of the pitfalls inherent to writing one's own biography. There is a tendency to unfold the facts as if they necessarily had a logical order, or some kind of internal consistency, whereas in reality no-one's destiny follows from logical decisions and rules. My "decisions" have never been fully free choices. Instead, what becomes of one's life is the result of fortuitous meetings, encounters with unexpected events, and the vagaries of luck. Thus, my intellectual itinerary was not only determined by historical circumstances and opportunities, but also by the way in which I have (or not!) taken advantage of these opportunities. From this perspective, the evolution of my work over the years is illustrative of the type of social psychological analysis I consider to be necessary. In the context of this analysis, moreover, I will also discuss changes in the discipline, including the political, social and intellectual environment in which these changes occurred. Yet in doing so I do not pretend to take over the task of a historian. I am not an external observer. I am in the position of an engaged participant. Therefore, my narrative is necessarily biased: it is a construction filtered through my position in the world and in the discipline, through my own political and epistemological choices.

It will, of course, be mainly focused on my professional life, but I cannot simply hush up certain aspects of my private life insofar as they have had a direct impact on my praxis of the discipline: Thus, because of my North American partner, I led a "transatlantic" life which made me, for a few decades, part of the "intellectual jet set" society, a permanent expatriate in both my home and my host country and has given me a decentered perspective. This has become a second skin, an integral part of my lifestyle and understanding of social facts. Even when not forced by political circumstances, uprooting has a painful edge to it (Apfelbaum, 2000b). Yet at the same time, it has some advantages. It has given me a distanced intellectual perspective. As an outsider one is less dominated by the ideological and institutional constraints which rule society and scientific communities. Cultural idiosyncrasies and diversity become part of one's normal social environment and, rather than negating their reality, I have come to consider them as significant starting points for conceptualising social phenomena.

Nevertheless, my intellectual home and institutional affiliation have both remained French. The political and intellectual climate that have shaped the social sciences in France affected my career choices. My generation lived through a number of historical events which have strongly determined our vision of the world and the way we have approached the social sciences. More than anything else, the key event was World War II. All the biographical accounts by French historians (Nora, 1984) and sociologists (Mendras, 1995; Marié, 1989) acknowledge its impact. Strangely enough, however, these accounts never mention the Nazi genocide, as if it had no impact and no epistemological consequences. When I pointed to this

surprising case of collective amnesia in a paper where I discussed Kren and Rappoport's publication *The Holocaust and the Crisis of Human Behavior* (Apfelbaum, 1981), it simply fell on deaf ears. The anticolonial struggles were another important structuring event; for me, as for many others of my age cohort, the Algerian war was a moment of awakening to critical awareness of political life even if it did not have the same impact on the re-formulation of social psychology as the 1968 movements did a decade later.

One last word about my position as a woman in the scientific community, since I happen to be the only woman contributing to this volume. I have never been part of the boys club. I had sexual harassment experiences well before public attention was drawn to the issue. But at the same time, being a woman has never really hindered the advancement of my career. I believe that I owe certain invitations and promotions precisely to the fact that I was a woman and therefore not part of the implicit competition which existed among the boys : As an outsider, my promotion or invitation was a way to block the entrance of a male colleague. This might be a case of reverse gender discrimination . Perhaps I have also downplayed the gender discrimination component in my life because of my early exposure to “race” discrimination. I first experienced exclusion and discrimination in earnest, not as a woman, but as a young Jewish refugee when my entry into public school was denied on the ground that I was a foreigner. I learned French reciting the Christian prayers “Je vous salue Marie” and “Notre père qui êtes aux cieux” in a private catholic school where I was welcome. But let us not jump to the end.

## **2. Growing up in “dark times”**

“One is never through with childhood.” Jean Ferrat

### **A. Origins.**

I was born in Germany where my parents first met and lived for a number of years. They originally came from small towns in what was then the Austro-Hungarian empire. I know little of my father's father. On the only photo I have left of my grand parents, he appears as a very handsome man, proudly sitting next to his young wife. Widowed at the age of 34, my grandmother raised my father and his three brothers alone, working for one of her cousins who employed her in his shoe business. Her destiny reminds me of the fate of English women during Victorian times, when, widowed or orphaned with no resources nor social status, they were taken in by some member of their extended family and employed as governesses in their households. I did not really know my grandmother, but thinking of her struggle to raise four boisterous teenagers while employed at the turn of the XXth century when a woman's status was still fully subordinated to her husband's, leaves me with the image of a strong, opinionated individual.

While my father's family was poor, on my mother's side there was wealth. My

maternal grandfather had a flourishing steel business and had his estates at the local squire's estate : he was what Poliakov (1955) has called a "court Jew." He ruled over his family with an iron hand but provided his three daughters with a solid education. My mother learned French, played piano, danced the quadrille, went to university but was never allowed to pursue her dream of becoming a gardener (she later hinted at the fact that she really should have emigrated to Palestine and joined a kibbutz). My grandparents' lifestyle was that of the bourgeoisie so well described in Arthur Schnitzler's novels: there were maids, governesses and nannies who accompanied the whole family on their yearly trips to famous Austrian resorts. A couple of years ago, I visited Freud's home in Vienna, at 22 Bergstrasse, and discovered, with emotion, that my grandparents and Freud spent their summers in the very same places where, who knows, they may well have met socially. The décor in Freud's apartment with its colourful Persian carpets and photos of vacations in Bad Ischl, vividly evoked the stories which my mother had so often recounted. Everything in Freud's apartment was so familiar that I felt I had come "home".

I am born in 1934: "dark times" to coin Hannah Arendt's view of events were already under way in Germany. Victor Klemperer's journal (2000) gives a striking account of the rapid deteriorating social and political climate immediately after Hitler's rise to power, even though people were then still profoundly divided about how serious or dangerous the situation could truly become. In our own family, one of my uncles opposed my mother's pregnancy, claiming that the times were too uncertain and the future insecure. But my mother would not yield. Having just gone through the loss of a child (my 7 year-old sister), she saw no point in living without children. During the gloomy years of the war, this woman in her forties, who had up to then led a sheltered life, showed incredible courage in the face of intense danger, taking great risks to save our lives. Today I know what an invaluable gift her example has been for my own personal growth: She gave birth to me but I also owe my survival during World War II to her. And even more than that, because despite the hardships, she maintained a compelling joy in life which she passed on to me. Many years later, she once confessed: "I knew I would save you." And I, until her death, lived as if I was invulnerable. Being immortal was my way of repaying her for what the Armenian psychoanalyst Janine Altounian (cited in Apfelbaum, 2000b) said about the children of survivors of the Armenian genocide: they owed their parents a "bottomless debt for having received life [from their parents] at such an incommensurable price" (my translation: p.13).

The courage and strength which my grandmother, my father's mother, and my own mother showed in the face of adversity have provided me with models of exceptionally capable women who likely shaped my own personality. Their strength was undoubtedly the foundation for my own, although I have only recently become aware of this.. For many years, I dreamed to lead the dependent life of one of these Harlequin novel's heroines, who lived happily ever after with their Prince Charming, in full security once they gained his

attention, love and fortune. But then I discovered that it was just a hoax because these novels stop just at the time when the characters are confronted with the sad difficulties of daily life (Apfelbaum, 2001).

When I think back to my childhood, I remember a fairly matriarchal environment not so much because of the history of my own family and the early “disappearance” of my father (I was six when we were forcefully separated and two years later, after having migrated from one French concentration camp to another, he was gassed in Auschwitz), but in the French countryside where I spent the war, World War I had already taken a heavy toll of young men, leaving many single women or widows. This came up again in my study of women in leadership positions (Apfelbaum, 1993a), when one of them remembered how insistently her war-widowed aunts had urged her to become a professional independent woman so as to be always self-sufficient and safe.

### **B. Wandering times.**

As if she anticipated the catastrophe to come, my grandmother urged her sons to leave Germany. My father was the first of the Apfelbaum brothers to migrate. My mother advocated an immigration to the US -- was it a premonition or simply the occasion to satisfy her appetite for seeing the world? She took with her a little black book which would until her death never again leave her purse (and now mine) with handwritten, patiently collected recipes of succulent pastries; they were supposed to allow her to earn our living, if necessary. It turned out to be a life-saving item when, during the war, she baked for the farmers who paid her back with eggs and milk.

My father procrastinated: he did not think that we had to go so far to escape from the Nazi danger. We would be safe in France, the country of the Revolution and of human rights -- had he forgotten that it also was the land of the Dreyfus affair?

My parents settled in Paris. I was barely mastering German, my mother tongue, when I was put into a French kindergarden and rapidly discovered the discomfort of not being able to make myself understood; it was my first painful encounter with ‘otherness.’ At an age when little girls played with their dolls and little boys played at war, the real war played its cruel games with me. The first ten years of my life were errant times; they were years of hide and seek, of sudden moves, of an unexplained arrest by the French army and a week later, an equally mysterious liberation. One by one, the familiar objects of my environment disappeared as the German armies advanced. I still remember the white furniture in my parents’ bedroom, and the black piano, a Bechstein, which had also made it to Paris. Even today, I have a feeling of loss and estrangement when people recount what a delight it was to rummage among the wonders of their grandmother’s attics. I am even more distressed when I think of my parents’ library, which had vanished well before I could read. For me, the

sensual pleasures of reading in the muffled atmosphere of one's family library constitutes a rite of passage in the lives of intellectuals and I have always been envious when reading biographies such as Sartre's or Vidal Naquet's, of the privileged moments they spent in their father's or grandfather's libraries. Having never had this luxury, I feel as if I could never fully pretend to the status of intellectual, which Michelle Fine and Rosemarie Roberts (1999) have so generously conferred on me.

Rather than learning from books, I learned from experiences of uprooting and humiliation. Childhood was the rough time of uncertainty and daily struggles to survive; but there were also moments of heedless, innocent happiness. I remember the unique taste of pilfered wild cherries in early summer heat, the rustling of autumn chestnut tree leaves in the Pyrenean forests. In fact, I was at the time more afraid of the will-o'-the-wisp as I passed near the cemetery than of the German convoys which regularly stopped in our school yard. Fear, retrospective fear, came later.

All in all, I led the ordinary life of a country girl, and was lucky enough to have no major interruption in my schooling. Indeed, I was different from the indigenous children and did not take part in all the festivities which punctuate village life, in particular those concerning the Church whose influence was still very powerful in the French country side. But this exclusion weighed less on me than the humiliations I witnessed in the classroom in which corporal punishment was still common praxis. ( IQ testing was unknown, so that no one had warned our teacher that the 14year old daughter of the miller was mentally retarded and would never learn to read!). To this day, witnessing humiliation is something that I find unbearable.

I was ten when the war ended just in time to free us from our forced residency and allow me to enter high school in the neighbouring town. We had no money left, and at the age of 45, my mother took on her first paid job as a worker in a small factory..

### **C. Years of silence**

.His silences are so fierce that I am unable to utter a single word "(Juliet,1995, my translation ).

Following the years of wandering, came the years of silence. Of these years, immediately following the war, I have little to say. It is as if these years had hardly left any significant imprint. Immediately after the few survivors of the Holocaust returned, "this event which should have never happened"(Arendt, 1964/87, p. 242) ) was covered over and followed by decades of abysmal silence. In fact, I feel as if I experienced the post-war years as an automaton or an alien in the world that surrounded me. Is this why I feel that I have learned so little during the high school years even though I was a fairly good student? Or is it that in the well-to-do part of Paris where the school was located, the teachers were more concerned to prepare girls for marriage than to open the gates of knowledge and stimulate

their intellectual appetite. School did not stimulate my curiosity or arouse interest in cultural events, may be in part because one of our teachers once scornfully declared that it was inappropriate to attend a theater performance if one was not properly dressed up : this then de facto excluded the poorest of us in the class and the few who came from working class backgrounds.

Joining the Communist youth movement was a brief temptation since its meetings seemed to provide the comradeship (accurately described in the film *Rouge Baiser*), and sense of belonging I so much wished for. I resisted the call not because of any sophisticated political consciousness which I totally lacked at the time, but because of an obscure fear of further alienation : It was not a deliberate move but rather an instinctual one. For a long time, I suffered from my inability to join “movements” or follow orders for the sake of a common cause; today I know this has saved me from being enticed into various dogmatic and/or sectarian movements.

I find that I have dwelt on the private part of my childhood period although I initially planned to limit myself to what belongs to the ego faber aspects of my life. Is it that because we women are more willing to admit the deep connection between the private and the public aspects on our lives, whereas men, by guile, tend to only focus on the most general elements? Or is it that men take their destiny for granted and do not feel the need to look for its origins, while women, at least those of my age cohort, tend to retrospectively justify their achievements by referring to external circumstances? This is what I found in my study of women in leadership position (Apfelbaum, 1993a), and has also been noted by many other researchers.

Returning to the particulars of my own intellectual development, the account of my childhood belongs here because I have only lately come to realize how heavily the early years influenced not only my personality but also the way I approach and conceive problems in social psychology. I was only ten when the war ended, too young to have taken an active part in it and I always have had the feeling, almost a sense of shame, of having been only a passive bystander. In the wake of World War II, as the world seemed manichean, divided between the brave and the cowardly, the question of how would I have behaved had I been a few years older, must remain unanswered. Even later, in the social milieu of the rising social sciences, age has been a major discriminating factor: either one belonged to the resistance network in the same way as one was part of the Marxist or Ecole Normale network, or one was too young for that. Not being part of this cohort increased the outsider feelings which my earlier wanderings had already given me.

### **3. An exhilarating discovery : the Sorbonne and the potentials of knowledge.**

I was just 17 when I stepped into the court of the Sorbonne for the first time, preparing for a degree in math without being convinced that this was the right track for me. But I had already refused the professional school, the newly opened Ecole Polytechnique

féminine, which my mother, eager to make me financially self sufficient, had suggested. That director promised her students a safe future, “you will become an assistant engineer” or, even more promising, “you will meet and marry a student at one of those prestigious male engineering schools during one of the yearly organised balls.” But I wanted neither of these opportunities! I did not see education as a path to marriage, quite the contrary; I dreamed that education would me give access to the world of men and put me on an equal footing with them. This is exactly what I found in the predominantly male math classes at the Sorbonne: true comradeship and passionate exchanges !

But there was much more. The Sorbonne concealed unlimited treasures . Knowledge was immediately available to anyone without distinction. Overwhelmed by the freedom that existed in this space, I became a frantic intellectual bulimic and suddenly very daring, probably because the Sorbonne seemed a magical refuge, an extraterritorial space protected from the burdens of the outside world. I was wonderstruck; I had found Aladdin’s cave: knowledge and learning became for me the antidote to all the lurking dangers of the world. The philosopher Gaston Bachelard was speaking about time and using poetic expressions such as the time crystal (le “cristal du temps”) : I was under the charm : philosophy was poetry. In the near-by Collège de France, Maurice Merleau-Ponty or Claude Levi-Strauss held weekly public lectures; for Jacques Lacan, it was necessary to go all the way to the large psychiatric institution, l’hôpital Saint Anne. But equally exciting was the courtyard of the Sorbonne itself : it was a permanent happening. One could see Jean Piaget pacing up and down with his younger colleagues and then rushing to deliver his widely attended weekly lectures, before running out for lunch at the nearby literary café Balzar where he was holding court and meeting students. From time to time, a social psychologist came running down from a tiny laboratory, located across the street, which also served as an office or meeting room, in order to recruit volunteers to participate in some group observation experiment (the Bales category system was very popular, as were the scaling techniques for attitude testing as well as content analysis). This all seemed quite mysterious but was yet another avenue to explore.

I discovered, almost by accident, the existence of psychology that first year, during a conversation with a student who had just given up natural science for psychology. It was a discipline outside the realm of the very limited program of philosophy available to science students. I quickly became a regular auditor at psychology classes, and even dared hand in an essay without being regularly enrolled. I decided on the spot that if I was not discovered and if I got at least a pass on the paper, I would give up math for psychology. So among all the possibilities offered by the Sorbonne, I decided in favor of psychology on the basis of a bet, albeit a much more modest one than Pascal’s. At that time, there were no career openings at all for social science students, and it seemed like a great adventure. With hindsight, I believe that what attracted me most to the discipline was its empirical perspective, its declared

rigorous and scientifically based approach to the understanding of social issues and human conduct. This line of thought, which represented the generally accepted credo of the time, suited me perfectly then and continued to do so for a long time.

### **3. Social psychology in the 1950's : a science in gestation,**

In those years, the social sciences were in the process of becoming, setting up new institutions, initiating new paradigms, and establishing their respective boundaries. This was happening simultaneously in the university and in the newly founded Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique-- an institution, unique to France, which offers full time research positions in all disciplines. Sociology was not introduced as a discipline in the university until 1958, but psychology already existed, although all of its subdisciplines were not equally developed. There was the well established psychology laboratory headed by Paul Fraise, with a long standing reputation going back to Alfred Binet and his successor Henri Piéron. Henri Wallon and Jean Piaget insured the renown and legitimacy of child psychology. But social psychology was still in limbo with no clear cut territory nor defined boundaries. The "certificat de psychologie sociale" was created in 1946 and the chair was held by the psychoanalyst Daniel Lagache, a former fellow student of Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Nizan, and Maurice Merleau Ponty at the Ecole Normale.

A "laboratory" was attached to the chair, and to run it, D. Lagache gathered around him people with very diverse intellectual and even cultural backgrounds, transfuges from philosophy, science and/or politics. Jean Maisonneuve, Paul Durandin, Robert Pagès or Serge Moscovici who have been my teachers were the principal protagonists of this first group. This early generation of social psychologists was a generation without forefathers; their training was not in psychology, let alone in social psychology. This created a climate of heuristic freedom, their diversity enriched the enterprise, giving it a stirring atmosphere of intellectual revolution. Each member of the group pushed towards new unexplored spaces and little by little staked their claims to a number of social psychological issues and topics.. The boundaries between what was in and what was out of social psychology was not yet clearly defined, nor were there well defined research traditions. The pioneer mentality which prevailed was exhilarating and spilled over to my generation. We were willing to participate in the adventure, despite the lack of safety for the future. We were not career oriented because there were no career possibilities at the time...this only happened much later. (Mendras, 1995 p.40).

During this period everything was possible. Social psychology was then still closely affiliated with sociology and coexisted in the same institute, the Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques. When it was created, recalls the rural sociologist Mendras (1995, P.57), Georges Gurvitch, Raymond Aron and Georges Friedmann, acting like feudal lords, divided sociology into separate fields and distributed them to young researchers: handing the workers

to Alain Touraine, education to Viviane Isambert, the women to Madeleine Guilbert, the literature to Roland Barthes, etc.” Robert Pagès invented social psychology” ... “This is how the politics of science was at work at the time”. The formal institutional split between the two disciplines occurred in 1967, when financial reasons dictated that social psychologists should turn towards the hard sciences if they wanted to have the means to become competitive with North American experimental social psychology.

The major inspiration during these post war founding years for the social sciences came to a large extent from the US (Apfelbaum, 1993b, p.16). Speaking of the sociologists, Mendras notes : "Except for the communists and their fellow travellers all my generation went to the US." (Mendras, 1995 p.44) . For social psychology as well, in the 1950's a trip to the US was almost an initiation ritual. I remember the excitement in Robert Pagès's voice when he reported to us his experiences of the T groups in which he had participated in Michigan. By then, he had become the head of Lagache's laboratory, but despite his interest in group dynamics, he gave a firm experimental orientation to his research group, once the times permitted recruitment.

More generally, it was a period of economic expansion which encouraged the development of the social sciences, including social psychology. In the US, the importance of this discipline was recognized because of its contributions to the war effort, and this led to the growth of university positions and research funds (Apfelbaum, 1986; 1992, 1993b, p. 14). In France, a similar evolution occurred, although on a much more modest scale, and my generation fully benefited from it. In the late 1950's, social psychology was “in.” Now, it had suddenly become possible to make a career in the social sciences. There were jobs in industry (although not for women), counselling or in motivation research for advertising companies. Simultaneously, the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique began to hire and this is how I became in 1961 a full time researcher at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.

The discipline had by now reached maturity with its own paradigms and clearly outlined theoretical and methodological orientations. The editorial boards governing its learned societies and scientific journals acted as gatekeepers, protecting the boundaries of the discipline, implementing the theoretical-empirical rules, controlling what was in and what was out. Quantitative methods were in, qualitative out, making subjectivity an outcast; laboratory deception experiments had become social psychologist's stock-in-trade, so that subjects' behavior was manipulated and then monitored within tightly controlled situations. These developments led to acceptance of the “...notion of a man as an emitter of responses,... whose social nature and social context might be interesting, but coincidental” (Strickland, 1976; p.4). No longer did Kurt Lewin's field theory or his conception of groups receive more than lip service; questions relevant to democracy were out as social psychology increasingly shifted towards a behavioristic orientation. John Thibaut and Harold Kelley's (two of Kurt

Lewin's former students) "translation" of the Lewinian notion of group into a behavioristic formulation is a case in point here: the analysis results in a "clean" social science, free of any political or ideological overtones. McCarthyism is in part responsible for the growing appeal of behavioristic models, and their increasing hegemony over social psychology. But the shift also contributed to making social psychology more acceptable among the hard sciences. In this process of normalisation, the dissident voices of theorists such as Fritz Heider and Muzafer Sherif were not heard, and they tended to become virtual expatriates from the discipline. As for more integrative views of the social realities, such as those expressed by Maurice Halbwachs (1924), Marcel Mauss (1969) or J.F. Brown (1936), they soon were forgotten. It is interesting to note that of the four volumes on antisemitism edited by Theodor Adorno during his North American stay, and which represent a systematic attempt to deal with a "social issue" in an integrative and interdisciplinary perspective, *The Authoritarian Personality* volume is the only one to have been integrated into the knowledge basis of the discipline. Adorno's extensive discussions of the need for a rigorous multi-disciplinary approach, which among other things would integrate sociology with psychoanalysis, was never passed on to the social psychology students of the 1960's. This perspective got lost in the normalisation process then at work, whereby social phenomena were translated into aseptic categories thought to be necessary for the development of general laws.

#### **4. becoming a social psychologist in the 1960's or the discreet charms of mainstream.**

When I came into the job market nothing at first marked me out for this strange occupation : researching...It all seems to be the consequence of a number of chance improvisations that I grabbed (Duby, 1984 p. 111)

In 1960, I applied to the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique for a full time research position. My proposal to study the development of cooperative/competitive social interchanges, was based on experimental methods developed by game theorists. The circumstances were quite favorable. I tend to think that I was "I was at the right place at the right moment" borrowing this explanation to the justification given by the first women to access to high leadership positions and become cabinet ministers (Apfelbaum, 1993a) . Given the increase in hiring possibilities, Robert Pagès was developing his team in the Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale, giving it an orientation which encouraged experimental projects and mathematical formalisation at the same time as he was opening it up to the widest possible range of social psychological topics. In the midst of these developments, I was assigned -- or may be I chose -- the area of conflicts, bargaining and negotiation. In the US, research on conflict and conflict resolution had already become an important area. Funding was plentiful, partly because of the Cold War and the hope that psychologists would be able to contribute to the resolution of conflicts. The gaming situation borrowed from game theory research in economics was the most widely used experimental technique and helped make conflict

research one of the leading paradigms in social psychology. So, the choice of my research topic was not entirely fortuitous. In France, moreover, given the limited number of researchers, I was at first almost the only one to work in this area and soon became part of the international conflict research community.

In brief, I was, at the time, very much in the mainstream of social psychology, and quite enthusiastic about participating in what appeared to me to be an enticing scientific enterprise aimed at shedding some light on human interchange patterns. Being center stage in mainstream social psychology and receiving recognition for my work gave me legitimacy and a secure feeling of “belonging.” But on closer examination, my theoretical orientation was, from the outset, slightly at odds with the framework in which most of the current research was being done. Therefore, as I look back at the decade when I worked with the gaming paradigm, the unfolding of my career and the reception of my research appears similar to that of John Garcia, which Ian Lubek and I (Lubek and Apfelbaum, 1987) have analysed in depth. The case of John Garcia was for us an illustration of how a mainstream community can resist the necessity for a paradigm shift in the face of anomalous data and dissenting results. Garcia’s research was normally accepted for publication by mainstream journals as long as his “off” results remained couched in the language of the mainstream neo-behavioristic vision of learning processes. Things changed radically once he explicitly questioned the validity of the paradigm and from that time on, his articles were rejected by the same editors who previously had been positive. When we examined the origins of John Garcia’s divergences with the neo-behavioristic dominant views on learning, we found that he had had a fairly eclectic training among cognitivists and that he received great support from his mentors for his unconventional initiatives,

My own freedom towards the dominant way of approaching conflict issues can similarly be traced to a fairly unconventional training in psychology. The circumstances of my European apprenticeship at a time when psychology was still quite loosely defined and its boundaries not clearly delimited provided me and my generation with an eclectic training as well as a broad and relatively unified view of psychology (“L’unité de la psychologie” by D. Lagache was a strong major reference for us). The pioneering spirit which prevailed then in social psychology and among our mentors gave us considerable freedom. Furthermore, our evaluation systems at that time were much less constraining than those in North America, and this flexibility allowed me to think critically and develop a research program along less conformist lines.

When I started to work in the area of conflicts, theorizing on the subject rested mainly on two underlying assumptions about human behavior. The first defined social behavior as mainly driven by utilitarian motives, so that the course of interactions are determined by rational calculations concerning the future benefits following from various actions. The second assumption specified personality attributes as determinants of cooperative or competitive behaviors. Both of these views ignored the social, contextual and relational

components of human behavior. In fact, research studies in this area attempted "...to eliminate actual interactions between the players, in particular by matching the subjects with a preprogrammed stooge" (Apfelbaum, 1974, p.104), a procedure which eliminates the partner's attitude from consideration. In putting the emphasis on linear causal explanations, research deemphasised the circular and reciprocal nature of all interpersonal relations. This excluded the possibility of exploring dynamic aspects of conflict, including the changing attitudes of the participants. Thus, in the research of the early 1970's, the relationship between the participants and their respective behaviors toward one another were not of central importance, and this made conflict primarily an *intrapersonal* rather than an *interpersonal* phenomenon. Also ignored was how the social context of the conflicts might influence their outcomes.

My own research, on the contrary, emphasized the relational dimension of conflicts. From the outset, I contended that to understand the outcome of a conflict situation, it is necessary to analyse the development of interpersonal exchanges as an ongoing process in which each party responds to the other's moves, and this "reactivity" can be formally described as a two way learning process. Such reactivity was introduced in the gaming experiments themselves by programming the stooge to respond differently depending on the behavior of the experimental subject. This research program combined my interests in mathematics and psychology in the effort to track the dynamics of interpersonal interchanges. I also introduced techniques to explore the subject's initial perceptions of each other as well as of the social meaning of the task (cf. Apfelbaum, 1974 p.105).

Although my work deviated from the main body of conflict research, it was at first well received by the research community. I was asked to review the literature on conflicts and bargaining for the Berkowitz volumes on experimental social psychology which, at the time, was the standard reference work defining legitimate fields of study for the discipline. In this review chapter, I devoted a large section to power, which in my later publications became more explicitly the basis for a call for a paradigm shift. But at first, my comments did not seem challenging, probably because they remained couched in terms which did not antagonise the mainstream research community. I limited my comments to pointing out a number of unattended issues. Namely, that (a), little research had been devoted to asymmetrical power situations, (b) that prevailing experimental designs in conflict research were unable to stage power struggles and such phenomena as "revolts, riots and aggression....which have different internal logics and dynamics, and (c), that the gaming experiments were irrelevant because they do not take place within the context and perspective of dynamic social change. Even when power disparity is introduced as a variable, the experimental design is presented as established and legitimate –even if not explicitly defined as such -- [which] excludes the possibility (or at least the perceived possibility) of challenging this legitimacy and of moving the conflict to terrains other than those defined by the initial situation. Experimental designs have built-in limits which inhibit any behaviors

other than those permitted within the circumscribed experimental situations.

These criticisms are in line with methodological issues discussed by Michael Billig (1976, p. 310). Paraphrasing him, I would contend that in gaming situations, the most glaring, and yet neglected feature of the whole situation is the experimenter who creates the situation and defines its social meaning. In accepting to participate in the experiment, the subjects have to accept the social context as presented by the experimenter and are unable to challenge his/her authority. Thus, *when forced to remain in interaction*, in the experiments, subjects learned to cooperate, but not necessarily because they are willing to do so. The alternative of refusing to continue and leaving the situation is never considered. Consequently, the experiments are incapable of examining any uprising against authority, whereas in real situations involving conflicting or oppressed individuals/groups this can and does occur. In order to explore these issues I designed some exploratory experiments together with Bernard Personnaz (Apfelbaum and Personnaz, 1974-75; 1977-78). They were set up in such a way that subjects had the opportunity to debate not only the outcome of the situation but the legitimacy of their power disparity, and they did so. (See Apfelbaum, 1974 p. 148). This made it clear to me that it was necessary to conceptualize, and to find a framework that would allow me to theorize about dissent, resistance and the development of a sense of agency among the powerless.

### **5. Breaking away: shifting paradigm.**

One expects intellectuals to share the spirit of their time but it is confounding that they remain its victim rather than offering their own view.”(Furet, 1995, p.19)

In the direct aftermath of World War 2 the reconstruction spirit led to the conviction, deeply entrenched in public consciousness, that the horrors of the war and, in particular, the Holocaust had been just “a momentary madness.” Thus it became possible to follow the prevailing post-enlightenment ideology and maintain faith in science as the royal road toward progress and greater human welfare. I was very much in tune with this perspective. Even the Algerian war did not disrupt the view that my intellectual activity was separate from my civic life. I saw no contradiction in being on the side of the anti-colonial struggle during the Algerian war while dutifully working in my laboratory, running gaming experiments which ignored such conflicts.

1968, once and for all, broke the earlier consensus about the knowledge base of social psychology. It was a major turning point in my intellectual trajectory, a break away from my earlier praxis of the discipline. From then on, my work has been animated by the spirit of the 1968 movement. Because my office was located near the Sorbonne, I was in the midst of

events challenging the traditions of the old Sorbonne, and I took an active part in them. Furthermore, what was happening in the streets directly concerned me because it raised unavoidable questions about the relevance of my research activities to real world phenomena. The ongoing uprisings against authority and assertions of previously silenced groups were indeed manifestations of conflicts, yet unrelated to what I was studying in my laboratory. In my experiments, the subjects had no opportunity to speak up. I had conned them into believing that the experimental situation did not allow them to walk out. If science was to shed light on real issues in the world, these discrepancies needed to be addressed. I did not know then that I was on the way to losing some of my illusions about the neutrality of the scientific enterprise.

Within a few days, the students' early protests turned into a broader uprising: suddenly we were in a pre-revolutionary period in France. During the month of May, the students' marches were met with police brutality; testimonies describing what went on were collected and published in the first book about this period, *Le livre noir des Journées de Mai* (Anonymous, 1968) : I contributed to its preparation and publication and at the same time, participated in as many meetings as possible. In heated debates, the basic values of society, culture, education, etc. were revisited and questioned. It was an exhilarating time: For all the money in the world, comments the hero of Schigsal's play "Le regard", I would not have wanted to be old during the 1960's, but it is almost a blessing to be old in the 1990's.

The events of that year and the years to follow left deep imprints on our life styles and social values as well as on the epistemologies of the social sciences. In August 1968, the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia and the resistance of the Czech population against the power of Soviet Union brought yet another encounter with dissent and revolt : I had the opportunity of observing closely this resistance when, in September 1968, I participated in the first East-West conference on social psychology held in Prague. Then, in 1970, I spent the year in the United States. I travelled across the country presenting my research on interpersonal conflict while also participating in Black Power rallies and discovering various expressions of the counterculture and the rising feminist movements.

In short, the world and history caught up with me and the gap between the social realities of the time and our ways of theorizing about them in the secluded atmosphere of research labs struck me as inappropriate. The reductionist vision that our continued commitment to experimentation imposed upon the way we understood social events seemed totally misleading. The time had come to revisit the gaming paradigm for studies of conflicts and question its adequacy to deal with the current uprisings and struggles against oppression. . And, beyond this particular case, it was urgent to explore the limitations which prevailing research practices imposed on the discipline's theoretical and epistemological orientations. If the purpose of social psychology was "to understand the main phenomena of social and political life" (Moscovici, 1970), we would have to reintroduce and take into account the dynamics and complexity of social situations. This meant going beyond the

model which considered individuals as simple responders to stimuli while ignoring the broader context in which they evolve and which determine their sense of agency. (Cf. Apfelbaum, 1997).

I was not the only one to sound the alarm and insist on the necessity to reconsider social psychology's basic assumptions. On these matters however, the members of the Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale were deeply divided during the 1968 movement. Some advocated solidarity with the students, and actively worked at changing the research structures and institutions without ever challenging the basic assumptions on which their discipline was based. For others however, such as Michel Pêcheux or myself, the events and debates of that period called for a critical reconsideration of the whole discipline (cf. Kandel, 1999). But, even among us, there were some major differences. Michel Pêcheux, a former student of Louis Althusser at the Ecole Normale, took social psychology to task from a strictly Marxist perspective. Employing rigid party line language, he, together with P. Bruno, Michel Plon and Jean-Pierre Poitou (1973), denounced the bourgeois capitalistic origins of social psychology, stressing its individualistic orientation and its denial of the subject's autonomy. They further accused the discipline of serving the 'economic and political interests of the ruling class', as well as failing to integrate the materialistic foundations of oppression and the fundamental character of class struggle. (cf. Kandel, pp.287/288). In their view, social psychology was beyond redemption. As Michel Pêcheux once confided to me, "I chose to work in social psychology in order to disrupt and destroy it from inside". Along the same ideological party line, Plon (1974), in another article, focussed his criticisms on conflict resolution research, denouncing its irredeemable flaws.

Even though I shared some of the elements of these critiques, my own position was radically different. I blamed social psychology for its blind spots, for having gone astray, and missed important meetings with its proper subject matter, but I was not ready, without a further "hearing", to throw the baby out with the bath and condemn it unconditionally. Unlike my Marxist colleagues, I did not see myself as a judge, prosecutor or people's commissar. I remained convinced – and still am – that social psychology could offer a unique level of analysis that neither psychology nor sociology could provide. It could embrace the interface between the individual and the collective, and represent the tension between socio-historical forces and personal agency. This seems to me to be the unique terrain of social psychology. Clearly, the empirical directions taken by the discipline over the last few decades had distracted it from this goal, and it was necessary to understand why. Thus, my interest in the history of social psychology emerged.

#### **A. A voyage into the past of social psychology.**

I ventured into the past of the discipline in order to examine its early roots and *raison d'être*. Accordingly, I pursued the early pronouncements and formulations of social psychology, and followed the lines of its development in the first half of the 20th century as it matured into an autonomous academic discipline. And in this process I unravelled its blind

spots, mistaken directions, and ambivalent relations with socio-political matters. The voyage was full of teachings. My efforts in this area, in particular with Ian Lubek, brought to light entire lost social psychologies that had existed in France, such as the work of Hamon and Tarde (Apfelbaum and Lubek, 1982). But even more important in terms of the early existence of integrative views of social psychology was the discovery of Maurice Halbwachs's *The Social Framework for Memory* (1924), and of Marcel Mauss's integrative notion of total social fact (fait social total), as well as, in the U.S., J. F. Brown's *Psychology of the Social Order*. All took into account the structural, cultural, and historical components of behavior together with the individual's personal motives.

As a result of certain realities (the need to be integrated in the scientific community of psychology) as well as for political reasons (see Apfelbaum, 1986), the complexities of social phenomena were progressively ignored in favor of oversimplified analytical paradigms. "Taking over the social questions but simultaneously trying to undermine their political components has been a constant result (or perhaps strategy) of the psychologizing of scientific psychologists. This de-politicizing of social questions was the pre-set condition for letting social psychology in as a sub-discipline. While academic admission was granted, social psychology... had to provide legitimating scientific credentials and, in so doing, the social questions it asked were then stripped of their socio-political significance." (Apfelbaum, 1986, p.9-10). The interviews which I did, in 1977, with the early generation of social psychologists made it quite obvious how this de-politicizing was enhanced during the anti-communist McCarthy period. The trend then was to emphasize individual factors over social forces, and the result was to pushing social psychology towards a behavioristic perspective. Consequently, the effects of historical social factors (such as economic transformations) and the power inequities between groups remained outside the purview of psychology. In other words, my trip across history acted as a "mirror" reflecting how the discipline had been detoured away from significant questions of domination and power, into more trivial cul-de-sacs of interpersonal conflict. If I engaged in the work of critical history which "takes on a subversive function, destabilizing the very foundations of the discipline (Apfelbaum, 1992 p.533)," it was not to destroy social psychology but to be able to argue for a reframing of its principles. For me, the history has never been an end in itself, but rather, a means toward the end of reformulating its methods and subject matter.

### **B.Social psychology through the looking glass of domination.**

More specifically, I wanted to find a framework to analyse real world liberation movements that could not be simply subsumed and described through the class struggle looking glass, as my Marxist colleagues advocated. Neither could such movements be adequately explored with a model which does not take into account the context and perspective of dynamic social change, or that ignores the relational, embedded and circular dynamics of social relations. One also has to account for the fact that invisible silenced

communities can, under certain conditions, express agency and resistance to the oppressive rules under which they live. How does one overcome humiliation? I was intrigued by such questions as: "Under what circumstances do underprivileged groups initiate resistance, challenge the legitimacy of existing system and engage in norm-breaking behavior?" (Apfelbaum, 1974. P. 149). Why, for example, did the Algerian uprising break out only in 1954? Why was there a rebellion of the Jews in the ghetto of Warsaw? And why did Black Power movements develop in the 1970's?

During the 1970's, groups that had been silenced for centuries suddenly spoke up and challenged the system. With increasing forcefulness, colonized populations, Blacks, women....denounced their oppressive situations and claimed recognition, legitimacy and emancipation. But the existing models and theories of conflict, whether interpersonal, intergroup, or international, which had guided our research in the past seemed irrelevant to these new social realities. Questions of power and domination had generally been ingored (cf. Apfelbaum and Lubek, 1976). I searched in vain through social psychology but found nothing that addressed these issues or could be of any help to understand the dynamics and dialectical aspects of power relations.

"Where has all the power gone" was the initial disconcerting question which I raised as an introduction to a chapter titled: "Relations of domination and movements of liberation: an analysis of power between groups" (Apfelbaum, 1979). Here was a major blind spot of the discipline, making social psychology "the late 20<sup>th</sup> century hand-maiden to domination" much in the same way as "in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, biology provided the scientific discourse through which social domination and inequity could be justified" (cf. Fine and Roberts, 1999; p.264).

The Ottawa international conference on 'Priorities and Paradigms of Social Psychology' in 1974, provided the first opportunity to raise and develop these issues publicly. A selected number of social psychologists had been asked to assess the progress of their respective research areas; my task, as I understood it, was to present the balance sheet on conflict and bargaining research. In my talk, later published as a co-authored paper with Ian Lubek (Apfelbaum and Lubek, 1976), for the first time, I unambiguously and extensively questioned the limits of our knowledge base in the light of the recent liberation movements.

Conflict research had originated in the 1950's, in the context of the Cold War. The specter of two equally armed superpowers, each with a similar mistrust of the other's motivations and a strong desire to win, loomed as the paramount prototype of all conflict. Furthermore, as social psychologists adopted a "game theory" model for the analysis of conflict, they limited their analyses to conflicts of interest, because gaming situations assume that there is a basic consensus between the opponents about the goals each of them wish to attain. The game theory approach therefore rules out of consideration conflicts of liberation such as those noted above, where there is little or no consensus between the parties involved.

Having examined the origins and limitations of current conflict research based on gaming situations, I set out to prepare the ground for a perspective on conflict which would allow it to be viewed within a context of dynamic social change.

When I first gave my presentation, I was still strongly convinced that science was a self-correcting enterprise with rules for the determination of “truth.” I did not believe that personal power issues existed in scientific circles, nor did I suspect that raising theoretical questions aimed at refocusing a given research field could be interpreted as a personal threat, or threat to the research community, and trigger angry reactions. So I was surprised when my discussion, which seemed to me crucial to the future development of this particular area of the discipline, was met with a strong rebuttal from Morton Deutsch (Deutsch, 1976). His remarks, often bordering on the *ad hominem*, seemed more concerned with my professional credibility than with discussion or debate of my ideas. The immediate consequence was a split among people at the conference, between those with traditional views of social psychology who would no longer have anything to do with me, and those who were ready to hear an alternative and/or critical analysis.

Indeed, I was arguing for an epistemological rupture by stating that questions of power should be at the center of social psychological analyses, that domination was the critical issue in social relations, and that we needed to reintroduce a structural perspective to social psychology.(Apfelbaum & Lubek, 1976; Apfelbaum, 1979). This would open the way to a major reframing not only of the problematics of conflicts but also general social theory. With hindsight, it seems no wonder that this kind of discourse stimulated hostile defensive reactions (cf. Deutsch, 1976; see also the bitter-sweet concluding comments of Harry Triandis of my chapter in Austin and Worchel’s *Social Psychology of intergroup relations*, 1979). In the late 1970s, this line of thought, not only in social psychology but in sociology as well, was somewhat threatening to the Establishment, or at least “surprising”, argues the French feminist sociologist Colette Guillaumin (1981):

“...the *relationships* of domination and the actors involved in these relationships .. [were] so seldom *thought about* that the discovery of the existence of the dominated actors, so surprising in itself, cannot for a certain period of time be integrated into their thinking” ( Guillaumin, 1981/1995 p. 159 -- emphasis in original. Cited in Apfelbaum, 1999; p.301).

Any researcher experiencing such criticism as was directed at me can be powerfully thwarted in one or more aspect of their scientific careers – publication, research funding, training students, career security – by the defensive reactions of a scientific community which feels threatened (Lubek and Apfelbaum, 1987 p.83). Following Deutsch’s harsh rebuttal, I could have easily myself become a renegade against the discipline or at least been marginalised and dismissed from the international research community. But I was lucky : once again I was at the right place at the right time. It was the right time because in the

aftermath of the late 1960's movements, there was an opening for alternative views to be heard. Or, to put it otherwise, for their own sake, the establishment needed to include a few token alternative voices and, as a critical social psychologist, I became one of them. I was invited to contribute to the textbook edited by Worchel and Austin titled: *"The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations"*. Alternative scientific circles were emerging in which I found my niche; they became my reference groups, my intellectual family, and helped me construct a new (scientific) identity. Today, these groups have attained significant professional recognition for their work in critical psychology, feminist psychology, theoretical psychology, and the history of the social sciences.

Undaunted by the experience at the 1974 conference, I went on exploring the various aspects of domination. How, for example, could micro social relations and individual behavior be analysed as re-enactments of the macro level politics of oppression? And more generally, how could the power disparity between groups generate individual identity strategies? I was struggling to find a conceptual framework and language that could relate individual psychological processes to larger structural and cultural processes. That is, my aim was to analyse the dialectics of intergroup and intragroup processes, including the dynamics of group formation and fragmentation, how this could influence individual identities, as well as how people might gain a sense of agency in the most dire of situations.

Clearly, this was an ambitious project and too much of a challenge to the standard practices of a discipline seeking primarily to establish straightforward causal explanations. Yet, the mechanisms by which subordinated groups can regain agency cannot be examined without also considering the strategies by which dominant groups maintain their power. It is necessary to examine domination and subordination simultaneously, in a dialectical perspective that can show how they mutually affect each other. Thus, when a dominant group seeks to break down a subordinated group's cohesiveness in order to maintain its hegemony, the subordinated group seeks means to resist. And in addition to violent modes of domination such as genocide, torture or terror, there are also more subtle, micro modes of domination at work. Degrouping (Apfelbaum, 1979;1999) is one of the mechanisms that groups with more resources and privileges use to protect and perpetuate their advantage. It can take various forms such as creating a mythical standard and applying it as a universal law, or denying diversity in order to stigmatize a group and exclude its members. As Memmi argued in *Attempt of a Definition : Dominated Men* "it is not the difference which always entails racism; it is racism which makes use of the difference". Tokenism is another mode of degrouping in which a limited number of individuals are given opportunities to join the dominant group. Conversely, regrouping -- i.e., maintaining or restoring a sense of community -- is a collective response by which subordinates (re)create a common framework, for example reclaiming a common set of traditions, language, and social practices which in turn provide the basis for individual agency.

Michel Foucault's work as well as Hannah Arendt's conception of the pariah figure (Arendt 1948/1976) have been true inspirations helping me to overcome the conceptual limitations imposed by the narrowly defined boundaries of my discipline. Both provided important intellectual tools for exploring the potentials for resistance by subordinated and/or silenced groups. Foucault's seminars at the Collège de France, in 1975, were seminal for my thinking when he elaborated, in front of an attentive and dedicated audience, his general conception of power, insisting on its fundamental relational character and on the fact that it cannot be conceived without taking into account the multiple potential forms of resistance to it.(Foucault, 1976).

The distinction Hannah Arendt made between the parvenu and the conscious pariah indirectly sheds light on the dialectical tension between degrouping and regrouping. The parvenu can be considered as enacting tokenism: adopting uncritically the values and norms of the dominant group and breaking away from his/her socio-historical roots, tokenism is the price paid for the privilege of assimilation into the dominant group. The parvenu who is always at beck and call of the dominant group remains in a precarious situation, as does the pariah. But the latter has chosen to be an outsider, to remain at the margins while refusing to repudiate his/her socio-historical integrity: this is an act of autonomy and freedom (of "humanity" to use Arendt's words), an active political attitude. To claim one's position as pariah, as Gandhi did in British India, is a way of forcing the society as a whole to acknowledge its responsibility for this exclusion. This act of resistance falls into the category of regrouping

When I first published my analysis of domination, there was not much of a response from the social science community. The chapter (Apfelbaum, 1979) was even removed, without my knowledge, from the second edition of the widely distributed handbook of Austin and Worchel on intergroup relations. I only recently discovered that since then, despite its "disappearance", the chapter has had an active, although subterranean life, copies being distributed like samizdats to successive generations of students (cf Gurin, 1999; Hurtado, 1999). Not only had my arguments not fallen into oblivion but they "provided a comprehensive and generative framework in which to place understand and reinterpret certain research programs" (Stewart and Zucker, 1999, p.276).

Interestingly enough, the resistance against my attempt to introduce the subject of domination within social psychology some twenty years ago still exists today. When my chapter "Relations of Dominations and Movements of Liberation" was recently republished, Patricia Gurin ( 1999, p.279), noted in her appraisal, "Even today, most social psychological theories of intergroup relations fail to talk about power at all", while Stewart and Zucker (1999) add that arguing for direct linkages between large-scale, macro-level social structures and individual psychology. "remains woefully marginal or forgotten in the discipline of psychology"( p.296). Why is it still so subversive to deal with issues of power? Perhaps it is

that the disparity which exists between those who are granted and those who are denied rights and privileges makes it difficult to continue using quantitative methods which are relevant only as long as one assumes that individuals are interchangeable, similarly motivated and pursue identical goals. But the burden introduced by a focus on the analysis of power goes far beyond a simple question of choice in methodology. In dealing with power and in stressing the structural disparities existing in society, one cannot avoid exposing the flaws and fallacies in prevailing views of democracy. The pattern here appears similar to the reaction against feminist political scientists (Pateman, 1988; Varikas, 1995) when they denounced the sexist fallacies of “egalitarian” citizenship and the falsehoods contained in the notion of universalism.

### **C. Uprooting and communication across cultural and traumatic boundaries**

With the ending of the Cold War, if not before, uprooting began to be recognized as a major socio-political reality. In much of the world, political upheavals or economic necessities pushed growing numbers of people away from their homes, forcing them into uncertain journeys with little more than suitcases filled with artifacts from their past lives. Just as the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century has been labelled “the era of the masses” (Apfelbaum, 1990; Moscovici, 1985), so the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century may be viewed as the “era of uprooting.” Whereas the prior century had witnessed massive migrations from rural to urban areas that disrupted traditional social settings, uprooting was now transforming the deep physiognomy and structural features of our social space. At both the societal and individual levels, efforts to communicate across cultural divides created new tensions and identity conflicts. These social and individual problems resulted from the coexistence, within the same space, of communities with different cultural backgrounds, values and histories. Such issues can only be addressed within a conceptual framework that takes into account the increasing heterogeneity and changing realities of social life. Social psychologists have developed substantial knowledge about the construction of personal, social and collective identities when people are living in stable conditions environments, but have not really explored how people cope with major social and political changes, and how such changes affect their sense of identity and feelings of belonging. We know very little about how one can “socially be in the world” following major socio-political disruptions. We have failed to explore in earnest the full range of social and psychological injuries associated with uprooting, the realities of dislocation, and their profound consequences for the human condition.

In retrospect, the work I did with Ana Vasquez, a political refugee from Chile, was the first step toward my concern with these questions. I met her shortly before the 1976 international congress of psychology, where she was to present a paper, based on the experiences of former inmates in Pinochet’s prisons, on the uses of psychological techniques

in torture. Together with a few other colleagues, I helped her prepare the paper for an academic audience. This first encounter marked the beginning of our friendship and research collaboration. Ana soon took an active part in the small research seminar that I was running for my doctoral students and a few academics who shared similar interests in institutional and political power struggles. We were trying to develop an appropriate theoretical framework that would allow analysis from the perspectives of both dominant and subordinate groups. We also wanted to focus on resistance, and attempts to gain agency, rather than simply describing submission and passivity. As noted by F. Cherry (1999), the seminar was "...a group of immigrants, exiles, outsiders of some sort or another, to our societies and to our disciplines (p.274)." We debated questions of objectivity, unearthed critical early historical formulations of social psychology, and explored the means of giving voices to those who had been denied the right to speak up. These discussions were seminal for the elaboration of a critical social psychological perspective.

Much of my work with Ana Vasquez was based on the extensive narratives which she had collected from her fellow countrymen and women as well as from political refugees from other countries in South America. Their voices spoke of personal dislocation and the devastating consequences which follow when those social frames of reference providing one's sense of identity are shattered. They seemed to echo Hannah Arendt's account of her painful experience of uprooting after her flight from Nazi Germany:

We have lost our home, our foyer, that is to say the familiarity of our daily life. We have lost our profession, that is to say, the assurance of being of some service in the world. We have lost our maternal language, that is to say, our natural reactions, the simplicity of gestures and the spontaneous expression of our feelings (1943/1987, p. 58, my translation).

The Chilean political exiles, having escaped Pinochet's imprisonment and torture in their home country, now found that the forced uprooting meant much more than just the loss of their home place, or what Norbert Elias (1950/1987) called the *habitus*. It meant the failure of long-standing commitments to values which had defined their *raison d'être*, and thus the disintegration of the basic fabric of their former identity. As a result, they could see no possibility, and perhaps had even lost their desire, to elaborate any new life project, especially within a foreign setting, no matter how welcoming and friendly (Apfelbaum, 1999). They became orphans detached from their life projects and, still bewildered, frequently repeated, "I have lost my identity". This key expression epitomized their pain and distress at having suddenly become politically divested and culturally irrelevant.

But there was a surprising gender difference among these exiles. When interviewed, the women never expressed distress similar to that of men, although they had also been professionally and politically active and had experienced the same loss of their social persona and political hopes. Yet, whereas many of the men seemed to be at total loss, most of the women were kept busy carrying their family through the daily hardships of adaptation to

the host country, becoming caretakers and homemakers. These highly gendered functions seem quasi-universal, having no territorial, social or cultural anchorage; they can be performed anywhere. More importantly, through these traditional activities, the women created a bridge between their past and present worlds, keeping alive their cultural roots and the memories of the world left behind. Their traditional home maker activities thus became a truly socio-political role.

In confronting the “identity crises” voiced by Ana Vasquez’s exiled compatriots, I increasingly came to doubt that currently accepted theories of identity proposed by social psychology could adequately encompass the full range of relevant issues, especially those manifest in periods of political turbulence, when migrations and uprootings are involved. As I reflect upon my professional trajectory, there seems to be a certain “*déjà vu*” pattern here, because once again, historical social realities caught up with me, and opened the way to a critical reappraisal of mainstream social psychological theories. Just as the observation of the emerging liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970's had earlier suggested the limitations of traditional conflict theories, the realities of uprooting now led me to re-examine the existing conceptions of personal identity. During the past 30 years, mainstream social identity scholarship had mainly adopted a perspective which focussed on the individual, and generally assumed that the environment was unchanging and stable. As a result, little attention had been paid to the role of such broader contextual factors as historical events and socio-political forces in the development of the individual. But the disrupting effects of expatriations on people’s lives reveal the importance of these contextual factors and underscore how much one’s sense of personal integrity is linked to changing realities in one’s environment.

Forced uprootings are clearly not the most common occurrences in people’s lives. Nevertheless, they are of theoretical interest because they highlight identity processes which otherwise might remain unnoticed. Furthermore, even though political upheavals represent extreme cases of social disruptions, they stand as test cases of the much wider spectrum of social ruptures which, during the course of a life time, modify our social environment, threaten our previous social adjustment, and consequently affect our daily existence. The implications of such changes, at an individual level, may be for the better when socio-political changes provide new opportunities -- as was the case when women were granted the vote, or equal opportunity policies were promulgated giving women the option to move beyond their traditional social roles. But they can also be for the worse when new policies deprive whole categories of people of earlier taken for granted rights -- as happens, for example, in times of economic recession. Whether they open or close opportunities, the changes induce a sense of insecurity and loss, disrupt established habits, familiar interchanges and earlier socially acknowledged ways of being and call for a repositioning of

the person within the new social context. By analogy with forced uprooting, which is more intense and abrupt, I have come to speak of social uprooting when environmental changes require people to adapt and alter their personal adjustments. Any form of uprooting involves a price that must be paid as people lose the security of their familiar situation and seize opportunities to assert self determination and agency. The case study of working-class British women who have become professionals described by Valerie Walkerdine in her film, *Didn't She do Well* examines the problems faced by women engaged in a process of upward mobility. This example of social uprooting emphasizes the burdens and the severe feelings of alienation which the women experienced both in their new milieu as well as in their original home places, even though it was their choice to move from one life space into another.

More generally, the ways in which one takes up and deals with the challenges of social uprooting provide revealing insights about one's identity: depending on idiosyncratic personal characteristics, and personal history, the uprooting may put the individual at a total loss, or it may open the opportunity to break away from earlier constraining social norms, customs and traditions, and become a pathway toward personal development and creativity (see Apfelbaum, 2000a). Responses to uprootings vary greatly from one person or category of persons to another. An exemplary case in point is the variability we found between men and women's ways of coping with exile in the sample of political refugees from South America (Apfelbaum and Vasquez, 1984). The personal givens which are often seen as defining us right from birth (sex, social or ethnic origin) are by no means permanent. Instead, they should be viewed as the personal frameworks or filters through which the changing socio-historical context is processed, takes on particular meaning for individuals, and may serve to initiate or reorient their life project. Each person replays them in his/her idiosyncratic unique way; thus each life represents a unique narrative which reveals how we cope with change and organize, within specific cultural and socio-political circumstances, the various elements of our personal history.

Rarely does life follow a steady stream, and, to the extent that we do not live in a vacuum nor in an invariable social space, ultimately a life course can be conceived as a succession of existential uprootings, all of which follow from the various life challenges that confront us.

As I followed this line of thought, I was progressively compelled to shift away from a deterministic conception towards a more dynamic perspective on identity, viewing it as a fluctuating equilibrium, a permanent, ongoing negotiation with changing social realities. When viewed in this perspective, the study of identity shifts to the study of strategies of adaptation, and agency becomes a key issue. This also demands a shift away from theories of the person as just another passive source of responses mainly determined by his/her original givens. In others words, all situations provide a certain degree of freedom; it is then up to the

individual to appropriate this freedom depending on the price he/she is willing to pay for this move. A case in point is the story of a former dancer who, when ordered by an SS officer to dance as she was about to enter the gas chamber, complies and uses the opportunity to seize the officer's gun and shoot him, thereby regaining an existential moment of agency (Bettelheim, 1966, cited by Apfelbaum, 1974, p.151).

During the 1980's I had an opportunity to empirically explore this theoretical framework.

In 1974 President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had appointed four women as Cabinet Ministers. It was the first time, in France, that women were given the opportunity to take part in politics. These nominations were in part the President's acknowledgment and response to the ongoing struggles of the feminist movements. From the late 1960's on, they had strongly challenged the basis of the "gender contract" (Rantalaiho,1992), calling into question the rules which informally regulate the relations between men and women and determine the socially legitimate habitus or social spaces ascribed to women. For all women, this period has been one of major social changes. Laws were being introduced that opened a number of new social opportunities, and the media's changing representations of women's social roles encouraged them to move beyond their traditional ascribed habitus. As gender boundaries became more permeable, women could more openly and explicitly nurture professional projects. Making incursions into spaces until then thought to be closed to them became socially more acceptable, therefore less "risky" and more frequent.

This period saw the first large scale movement of women into politics. It seemed to me to offer a unique opportunity to explore, in situ, how women could move away from their traditional locations. What personal qualities and social circumstances allowed them, particularly those gaining high level political position, to take on such a major challenge? What obstacles did they have to face at both the public and private level? In brief, what price did they have to pay for migrating into a new social and professional location? In fact, as they ventured into spaces away from their expected traditional home places and transgressed the boundaries of ascribed social roles, they were often seen as "outsiders, and gender expats,"and became the object of all sorts of derogatory gibes. This was especially true when they moved into politics, a public space which was considered, especially by the French, to be reserved for males. Thus, women in high level political position were at odds with their female peers, and at the same time were not fully accepted by their professional male colleagues. They had to face and cope with the burdens of the double marginality which resulted from their "transgression" (Apfelbaum, 1993a). The migration of women into politics became in my view, a test case for all gendered uprootings. (Apfelbaum, 1993a), and an occasion to investigate various facets of the issues generated by social gendered migration.

I proceeded to interview the French women who had become high level political and

managerial leaders. I later also interviewed their Norwegian counterparts: the cabinet ministers of both the liberal and conservative party because, as opposed to France which was just then opening up the corridors of political power to women, Norway had already done this for a long time, with 40% of the cabinet positions being occupied by women. Most interesting was the cross-cultural perspective which made it possible to examine the cultural, political and value systems influencing the strategies and narratives of their rise to power positions. Here again, my work contradicted traditional social psychology approaches to leadership. I was not a specialist in this area, nor did I intend to become one. Instead, my study of women in leadership positions was mainly one more occasion to critically evaluate the underlying epistemological assumptions of my discipline and show how they limit our ability to account for the world's evolving realities.

Liberation movements, uprootings, women's migrations into new social and professional location were some of the most pressing social issues confronting us in the last few decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. To make sense of these phenomena, new approaches needed to be elaborated which took into account the realities of a world in permanent flux as well as the heterogeneity of the people who make up our social environment. Why were both of these problems almost totally absent from the agenda of mainstream social psychology? One important reason involves the ahistorical nature of scientific social psychology. It has generally assumed that we live in a stable environment in which people are defined by tradition and custom, and bound by the rigidities of inherited biological and social givens. But the truth is that we are repeatedly confronted with a world in permanent flux, where old allegiances and ways of being in the world are constantly challenged, shaken and destroyed, and our established values and normative systems are called into question.

This reality of the human condition calls for a profound reevaluation of our ways of understanding relationships between the individual and society. Immersed in such a world, people are themselves in process, having to come to terms with the burden of seeing their world views altered by new new political, cultural and technological events.. In this perspective, new theories of the person emphasizing responsiveness and agency are required, as well as a dialectical understanding of the interactions between ongoing socio-political trends and personal adjustments. The failure of social psychology to recognize and act on this perspective follows from its implicit epistemological assumptions. Their origins can be traced to the conception of the society which prevailed at the time when the social sciences were first formulated (Apfelbaum, 1986). It is the offspring of the liberal egalitarian tradition and of a representation of democracy based on the notion of universality: the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and America's Declaration of Independence, both, proclaiming all men

to be equal. This vision of democracy is itself modelled on the classical Athenian ideal, where decisions were made by an homogeneous assembly of equal male citizens, speaking the same language, sharing the same worldviews and traditions a priori excluding the “other”, i.e. women, and slaves. Clearly, therefore, assumptions about democracy based on the Athenian ideal do not fit contemporary societies with their increasing flow of migration, socio-political and cultural uprootings. Modern societies are made up of people with different cultural backgrounds, divergent socio-political traditions, values and differential access to power and resources.

Given the fundamental heterogeneity of our social environment, the structural asymmetries that determine the nature of social interchange and shape personal and public personae should be obvious. Nevertheless, they are rarely considered or discussed in the literature of mainstream social psychology. Correction of this situation would require new theoretical perspectives and research methods in order to understand the complex implications of diversity. It also would demand serious re-evaluation of the ideology of equality underlying the praxis of social psychology.

#### **D. Memorializing and society’s politics of memory.**

Although the foregoing critical comments may appear too radical, they seemed to be confirmed as I continued exploring the various implications of uprooting. It became clear that migration was disruptive not only because of the loss of cultural groundings but also because of the loss of one’s historical roots. Individuals must not only adapt to changing realities, but their sense of identity also depends upon the collective meaning of their past. Yet social psychology has not dealt with this issue: the way in which the historicity of the persons, both in terms of their family sagas as well as of general historical events, determines their social being in the world. Social psychologists have so far viewed the social world, as unencumbered by the complexities of a long-term history, and accepted an equally minimalist view of the individual as a-historical, and de-contextualized, more of an object than a subject (Apfelbaum, 1997). One can easily trace the origins of this epistemological fiction to the credo of a modernity which dismissed the past in order to clear the way for a “new man,” But contrary to B.F. Skinner’s claims in *“Beyond Freedom and Dignity”*, no one can live without antecedents (Piralian, 1994, p.7). There is no utopian looking forward without looking backwards. The failure to look backwards prevents the possibility of elaborating new forms of subjectivity, argues Couze Venn (2002). For social psychologists, it is therefore indispensable to explore the impact of legacy and conceptualize the processes of memorializing. This has been at the crux of my more recent work dealing with memorialisation. Here, as in other facets of my work, the analysis is again grounded on the observation of extreme situations, such as genocide, torture or apartheid, because the devastating consequences of being unable to take grasp or process the past, are in these cases

particularly acute and more readily visible.

“I can't throw a bridge between the present and the past, and therefore [I] can't make time move” claims Eva Hoffman (1989, p. 116-117), who as a child after World War 2, migrated with her parents from Poland to Canada.

This comment is a perfect illustration of the devastating consequences when a leaded silence hovers over the family saga, and also shows that in order to move forward, one must have a strong sense of the past. Knowledge of the past helps to process the present and provides a foundation on which to ground the future. Lacking such knowledge, children of both the Armenian and Jewish genocide survivors have described similar difficulties finding places in a world in which they feel like “cultural orphans” because of the mysterious empty spaces in their life histories. Even when historical knowledge is available through official accounts, however, it often remains disembodied, and can never be fully integrated with one's own history. It is the memory of our past that serves as a driving force and structuring factor in the construction of our identities.

My interest in these issues had been first triggered in 1977, while I was travelling across the United States interviewing my social psychology “forefathers” (D. Katz, T. Newcomb, F. Allport, H. Kelley, J. Thibaut, etc) in conjunction with my critical historiography work. I found in the bookstores of all the universities I visited, an abundance of first-hand accounts of Holocaust survivors, including narratives by their children describing how heavily burdened they felt by the silence of their parents, who refused to speak of their past history. I also was invited on several occasions to attend groups of children of these survivors where their “problems of being socially in the world” were discussed. Why had the silence within the family, enhanced by the collective social amnesia about the Holocaust, been so damaging? And how could one explain the unexpected efforts of survivors, after thirty years of silence, to seek a public forum for their personal history and memories? Clearly, as the years passed by, the memory of the Shoah was becoming more and more distant and ritualized, rather than remembered and directly narrated. Memorialising was a way to save this event from oblivion and delay the time when it would be nothing more than ‘mere history,’ but this was only part of the explanation

I had observed no similar phenomenon in France but this was not really surprising since we have quite a different approach to social problems. However, the Holocaust also gained public attention when the French “deniers”, those who denied the full reality of the Holocaust, claimed that no genocide had taken place. In November 1978, *l'Express*, a respectable weekly magazine (4/11/78) reported the statement of the former Commissioner of Jewish Affairs in the Vichy regime, Darquier de Pellepoix, who claimed that only lice had been gassed in Auschwitz. Almost simultaneously, the equally respectable French newspaper *Le Monde* opened its columns to Henri Faurisson who, in a brief article entitled “Good

news,”announced that there had been no gas chambers.

The simultaneity of the reclaiming of the Holocaust by survivors and of its denial by the negationists was puzzling and deserved attention. It was as if the taboo which had been responsible for the prior years of silence and collective amnesia had suddenly been lifted (Apfelbaum, 1983). While the Holocaust deniers took advantage of the silence to disseminate their pernicious ideas, they were opposed by the testimonies of survivors speaking out against the collective amnesia. Both could be understood as reacting to parsimonious official narratives where the events had been publicly recorded, and their arguments emphasized the contradictions between private and public memory. It seemed to me that this situation was being played out at both the individual psychological level and the broader interpersonal level of society. Consequently, I set out to explore the different facets and interpersonal levels of memorializing, in other words, the interplay between private and public memory and the way in which the state politics of memory determines our social existence.

I have already emphasized that one’s identity must be rooted in a historical continuity. But the processing and assimilation of the past is never just a solitary procedure. It is, on the contrary a highly social process of communications and interchanges. “No one finds peace in silence, even when it is their choice to remain silent,” claims Dori Laub (1995, p.164). The vital importance of telling in order to exist socially in the world has been strongly documented, in particular by Armenian psychoanalysts such as Jeanine Altounian (1990) and H  l  ne Piralian (1994). But I also found great inspiration in the half century old writings of Maurice Halbwachs. He had already (Halbwachs, 1924) stressed the importance of interpersonal meaningful exchanges for memorialization. Namely, that storing individual experiences and emotions into memory depends on the possibility of sharing them with others and, I would add, on the trust the narrator has in the interlocutor’s capacity to hear. Traumatic personal experiences and memories that appear meaningless to others induce silence and alienation from one’s experiences and environment. Survivors of genocide or of other dislocating experiences, such as torture or rape, often report the sense of dissociation they feel between their private and public existence. Halbwachs also extensively demonstrates the way in which different social institutions (such as, for example, the family, schools and religious systems) legitimize private memory by setting the standards for normative truth, or to put it in contemporary terminology, by determining the official version of events..

My own work followed this line. I went on to examine how telling and memorialising were further influenced -- facilitated or hindered -- by official narratives accounting for traumatic events, This is accomplished at the collective public level through history books, legal responses to collective violence, and various forms of commemoration. It is noteworthy that the near-continuous chain of genocidal events, and regimes marked by terror, torture and gross violations of human rights throughout the second half of the XXth century, and, on the

other hand, the increasing concern with human rights have led, over the last few decades, to the invention of new and distinctive legal forms of responses to genocide, torture and dislocation (see Minow, 1998). In the aftermath of massive violence, as societies transition away from terrorist or dictatorial regimes, they have found it necessary to address their past in order to establish the basis for social trust and peaceful coexistence between former adversaries.

Whether it is an official government “apology” for past harm (e.g. to the aboriginal peoples or to the Holocaust survivors when President Chirac recognized the responsibility of the state in the Jewish population’s deportation from France), a reconciliation process, **or** an international tribunal for war crimes and mass rape, these actions all represent some form of transitional justice (Teitel, 2000) carried out by the state. They provide an official framework to account for what happened. This allows victims to see their suffering and disruptive experiences as the consequence of a broader social cataclysm, and facilitates the beginning of a restorative process.

Whatever form they may take, official public narratives place personal experiences in the larger flow of History, serve to legitimize individual acts of remembering, and helps those who have been victimized to come out of anonymity; to regain their sociality and sense of historicity.

At a more general level, this analysis of memorializing stresses once again how individual well-being and social existence is shaped by broad societal currents and political currents and the necessity for social psychologists to include these dimensions in their analyses. To the extent that the state politics of memory defines public impressions of historical realities and is itself contingent upon compromises between ideals of justice and pragmatic politics, our sense of identity and social existence may be substantially connected with fluctuations of Realpolitik.

### **8. And what now? Did she do well ?**

Everything, then, seemed clear and righteous. But now, I feel lost. Life is behind me and suddenly everything needs to be thought out again (Makine *Le testament français*, p. 229 my translation)

As I am writing these pages and looking/reflecting back at these years through the looking glass of the recent/young generation of psychologists, I become increasingly aware how presumptuous, and even ironic, might seem to insist, as I have done on several occasions, on the challenge that these ideas have been for the Establishment. Yet, they have been considered so at the time when they were first formulated. I am part of a whole

generation of psychologists who have been significantly affected in one way or another by the changes in the socio-political and intellectual climate of the 1960's-- the counter-cultural movements, the anti-psychiatry movement, the civil rights, as well as the feminist movements. The result has been a deep commitment to a critical perspective in psychology and the movement placed its protagonists in positions of outsider to their discipline; but it has also created a strong alternative scientific community, an intellectual family which helped each of us to continue to exist within the institution even when the price to pay was sometimes quite high/substantial (one sees here at work the process of regrouping which I have described above (see p.26 of this manuscript). Clearly, things have moved to a large extent over the last thirty years or so and critical work is no longer the terrain of the margins (see Valérie Walkerdine, 2002, p.2). Nor is it limited to addressing the pitfalls of psychology. It has gained visibility and become an established area. Two examples among many other possibilities, illustrates the diversity and variety of euristically stimulating research trends which are today fast expanding : the first Millennium Conference on critical psychology, held in Sydney in 1999 and more along the line of explorations in cultural diversity, the book edited by Corinne Squire on Culture in Psychology.

As this voyage into the past comes to an end, I feel that my life in social psychology has been well worth living. Is it because the autobiographical process is “first of all a task of personal salvation” (Gusdorf, 1980, p.39)? Even though I have tried to be honest, no one can ever be sure of this. Autobiographical memory and interpretative appraisal are so intimately related that any final evaluation is likely to be biased in a positive direction.

Speaking of selective memory, I certainly have not given full credit to all the encounters which have been meaningful in my professional life. There is one, however, that I cannot pass over in silence because it marked a major epistemological turnabout in my thinking, which could (or should?) have led me to start working from radically different premises, or to even give up social psychology altogether -- I did even for a while consider opening an “epistemological restaurant” as a gesture of protest.

The encounter occurred while I was in Kansas, interviewing Fritz Heider, and met Leon Rappoport, who invited me to give a talk at his nearby university . He drove me from Kansas City to Manhattan (Kansas) in an old, unreliable Chevrolet with a failing heating system, blowing alternatively cold and hot air. I was warned that the car could break down any minute and we could be stranded in the midst of the prairies which I first discovered on this occasion. This landscape appeared very inhospitable and sadly monotonous, and it triggered off fearful fantasies of solitary confinement. I felt miserable and wondered why I had come until Leon started to speak of his ongoing work on the Holocaust with his historian colleague George Kren. He discussed their immersion in the Holocaust literature and the difficulty of finding ways to properly conceptualize the material, and last but not least, what he saw as the wide ranging epistemological implications of the Holocaust.

This conversation, as later the reading of Kren and Rappoport’s book “*The*

*Holocaust and the Crisis of Human Behavior*” (1980), stayed with me over the years because it opened my eyes to another level of critical consciousness, and was the starting point of my growing doubts about social psychology as a whole. It later dawned on me (Apfelbaum, 1982), that perhaps Kren and Rappoport’s engagement with such profoundly disturbing existential issues and their implications for all of us, including social scientists, had been possible, or at least facilitated, by their isolation in a stark rural environment, and relative freedom from pressures to publish or perish. I don’t remember the details of the conversation, nor do I wish to summarize the main theses of their book. But the arguments developed in their conclusion remain all too tragically relevant today given the near-continuous chain of genocidal events throughout the second part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. I read them as an inescapable demand for social scientists to face the implications of the failure of Western moral values to prevent the horrific behaviors revealed by the Holocaust. “If one keeps at the Holocaust long enough, then...one knows, finally, that one might either do it, or be done to.” (P.126). If this conclusion is accepted, then conventional views of the Holocaust as a momentary historical aberration (Apfelbaum, 1982; see also Bauman, 1989) must be rejected, and we must re-examine our assumptions about the fundamental dimensions of human nature. The whole social science project has largely been based on the idea that people are intrinsically good, and if we can discover why they occasionally become violent and destructive, we can find scientific “cures” to prevent this.

Have we not as social scientists missed the relevant questions?

Let me end with a final word from the recent Nobel Prize winner Imre Kertesz. In his book “*Kaddish Pour un Enfant qui ne naîtra pas*”, he recounts how one of his fellow inmates saved his life one day by bringing him his daily food allowance at the risk of being shot. In this environment, such an altruist act was highly irrational, claims Kertesz, who concludes that ultimately, what needs to be explained about human behavior is the good not the evil.

## REFERENCES

Altounian, J. (1990). *Ouvrez-moi seulement les chemins d’Arménie. Un génocide aux déserts de l’inconscient*. Paris : Les belles Lettres.

Anonymous. 1968 *Le livre Noir des Journées de Mai*. Paris : Seuil

Apfelbaum E. (1974). On conflicts and bargaining. In L. Berkowitz (ed). *Advances in experimental social psychology*. Vol. 7. New York : Academic Press pp.103-159

Apfelbaum, E, Personnaz, B.(1974-75) Inégalité, contestation et négociation : Une expérience “pour voir”. *Bulletin de Psychologie* 28, N°16-17, 778-783

Apfelbaum, E., Lubek, I. (1976). Resolution or Revolution ? The theory of conflicts in question. In L. Strickland, F.E. Aboud, K.J. Gergen (eds). *Social Psychology in Transition*. New York : Plenum press. pp. 71-95.

- Apfelbaum, E, Personnaz, B.(1977-78) Résistances dans les groupes subordonnés. Conduites d'opposition et rupture de contrat *Bulletin de Psychologie*, 31, N°3-6, 270-276
- Apfelbaum, E. (1979) Relations of domination and Movements of liberation : an analysis of power between groups. In: W. Austin, S. Worchel (eds). *The social psychology of intergroup relations*. Monterey : Cole, 188-204. Reprinted in *Feminism and Psychology*. 1999. N°3. 267-273
- Apfelbaum, E. (1981). Forgetting the past. *Partisan Review*. 48. N°4. 608-617
- Apfelbaum, E. (1982) La bonne conscience n'est plus ce qu'elle était. *Les nouveaux cahiers* N°69. 16-24
- Apfelbaum, E., Lubek I. (1982) Augustin Hamon aux origines de la psychologie sociale française. *Recherches de psychologie sociale*. 35-48
- Apfelbaum, E. (1983) Mémoire à éclipses et mémoire volée. *Traces*. 281-288
- Apfelbaum, E. Vasquez, Ana (1984) Les réalités changeantes de l'identité. *Peuples méditerranéens*. N°24, 83-100.
- Apfelbaum, E. (1986) Prolegomena for a history of social psychology : some hypotheses for its emergence in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and its raison d'être. In Larsen, K.(Ed.)*Dialectics and ideology in psychology*. New York : Ablex. Pp.3-13.
- Apfelbaum, E. & Mc Guire, G. (1986). Models of suggestive influence and the disqualification of the social crowd. In C. Grauman & S. Moscovici (Eds), *Changing conceptions of crowd mind and behavior*. New York: Springer Verlag .pp. 27-50.
- Apfelbaum, E. (1990) Désordre individuel et désordre social *Hermès*, N°6-7, 35-42.
- Apfelbaum, E. (1992) Some teachings from the history of social psychology. *Canadian psychology*, 33, 529-538.
- Apfelbaum, E. (1993a) Norwegian and French women in high leadership positions : The importance of cultural contexts upon gendered relations. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*. 17, 409-429.
- Apfelbaum, E.(1993b) Quelques leçons d'une histoire de la psychologie sociale. *Sociétés Contemporaines*.N°13. 13-25
- Apfelbaum, E. (1997). ' Le monde selon la psychologie sociale'. Colloque "Regards de la psychologie. Laboratoire de Psychologie sociale de l'EHESS et l'ADRIPS. 15-16 Mai 1997. Unpublished manuscript.
- Apfelbaum, E. (1999). Twenty years later..*Feminism and Psychology*. 9. N°3. 300-315.
- Apfelbaum, E. (2000a). The impact of culture in the face of genocide. Struggling between a silenced home culture and a foreign host culture. In C. Squire (Ed), *Culture in psychology*: 163-174. London: Routledge.
- Apfelbaum, E. (2000b). 'And now what, after such tribulations. Memory and dislocation in the era of uprooting'. *American Psychologist* 55: 1008-1013.
- Apfelbaum, E. (2001)Popular culture : the stubborn particulars of asymmetrical gender

relations.

Paper presented at the symposium on : exploring culture in psychology. British Psychological Association.. Glaskow March 28-31 .

Apfelbaum, E. (2002) Restoring lives shattered by collective violence. In Chris van der Merwe, Rolf Wolfswinkel (eds.) *Telling wounds. Narrative, trauma and memory. Working through the SA armed conflicts of the 20<sup>th</sup> century*. Proceedings of the conference. Capetown (SA) :University of Capetown.

Arendt, Hannah (1964/1987) Seule demeure la langue maternelle. In H. Arendt (ed.), *La tradition cachée* Paris: Christian Bourgeois. pp. 221-256.

Arendt, Hannah (1972) Préface in Hannah Arendt (ed.) *La crise de la culture* (Between past and future). Paris :Gallimard/Folio. Pp. 11-27.

Arendt Hannah (1974). *Vies politiques. (Men in dark times)*. Paris : Gallimard/Tel. First published in 1971

Austin, W., Worchel S. (eds). *The social psychology of intergroup relations*. Monterey : Cole,

Bauman, Z. (1989) *Modernity and the Holocaust*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Berkowitz L (ed). *Advances in experimental social psychology*. New York : Academic Press

Bruno P., Plon M., Pêcheux M.(1973). La psychologie sociale : une utopie en crise. *La Nouvelle Critique* 62 72-78; and 64 21-28

Brown J.F. (1936) *Psychology and the Social Order*. New York : Mac Graw Hill.

Cherry 1999) The convergence of power, history and memory in the work of Erika Apfelbaum. *Feminism and Psychology*. 9. N°3. 273-278

Deutsch, Morton (1976). On cursing the darkness versus lighting a candle. In L. Strickland, F.E. Aboud, K.J. Gergen (eds). *Social Psychology in Transition*. New York : Plenum press. pp. 95-101

Deconchy J.P.2000 Interview of 19/04:2000 in Delouvé, 2000 Le laboratoire de Psychologie sociale Master's degree Unpublished. p.60

Duby (1987) Le plaisir de l'historien. In Pierre Nora (ed) *Essais d'ego-histoire*. Paris :Gallimard. Pp. 109-138

Elias, N. (1950/1987) *La société des individus*. Paris: Fayard.

Fine M., Roberts R. (1999) On Erika Apfelbaum : Public intellectual. *Feminism and Psychology*. 9. N°3.261-267.

Foucault, M. (1976) *La volonté de savoir*. Paris : Gallimard.

Furet François (1995) *Le passé d'une illusion. Essai sur l'idée communiste au XXème siècle*. Paris. Calmann Lévy

Guillaumin, C. (1981). The practice of power and belief in Nature. Part II. The naturalist discourse. In : C. Guillaumin (1995) *Racism, sexism, power and ideology*. London. Routledge p. 211-232.

Gurin P. (1999) The power of Apfelbaum's analysis. *Feminism and Psychology*. 9. N°3.

278-282.

Gusdorf, G. (1980) Conditions and limits of autobiography. In J. Olney(Ed.) *Autobiography : Essays theoretical and critical*. Princeton NJ : Princeton University Press. Pp. 28-48

Halbwachs, M. (1924/1952) *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire (The framework for memory)*. Paris: P.U.F.

Hoffman, E. (1989). *Lost in translation*. New York: Penguin.

Hurtado A.(1999) Re-viewing Erika Apfelbaum *Feminism and Psychology*. 9. N°3. 282-286

Israel J., Tajfel H. (1972) *The context of social psychology : A critical assessment*. London : Academic Press.

Juliet (1995).*Lambeaux*, Paris : POL P.25-26

Kandel L. (1999) I remember the 1970's. *Feminism and Psychology*. 9. N°3.286-291

Kertesz, I. (1996) *Kaddish pour un enfant qui ne naîtra pas*. Paris : Actes Sud

Klemperer, V.(2000) *Mes soldats de papier. Journal 1933-1941*. Paris : Seuil. First published in german 1995.

Kren, G. and Rappoport , L. (1980). *The Holocaust and the crisis of human behavior*. New York: Holmes and Meier.

Laub, D. (1995). Truth and testimony: The process and the struggle. In C. Caruth (Ed), *Trauma: Explorations in memory*:Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Pp.13-60.

Lubek, I., Apfelbaum, E. (1987). Neo-behaviorism and the "Garcia effect" : A "social psychology of science" approach to the history of a paradigm clash in psychology. In : M. Ash, W. Woodward (Eds.). *Psychology in the twentieth century thought and society*.

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, pp. 59-91

Mauss, M. (1969). *Oeuvres*. Paris : P.U.F.

Marié M., (1989) *Les terres et les mots*. Paris : Meridiens Klincksieck

Mendras Henri (1995) *Comment devenir sociologue. Souvenirs d'un vieux mandarin*. Paris. Hubert Nyssen. Actes Sud

Minow, M. (1998). *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness. Facing history after genocide and mass violence*. Boston : Beacon Press.

Moscovici, S. (1970). Préface. In Jodelet, D. *Psychologie sociale en mouvement*. Paris : PUF

Moscovici, S. (1985). *The age of the crowd*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nora P. (1984). *Essais d'ego-histoire*. Paris : Gallimard.

Pateman 1988 Pateman, Carol (1988) *The sexual contract*. Oxford : Polity Press

Perrot Michelle (1987) L'air du temps. In Pierre Nora (ed) *Essais d'ego-histoire*. Paris Gallimard Pp. 241\_292

Piralian, H. (1994). *Génocide et transmission*. Paris : l'Harmattan

Plon, M.(1974).On the meaning of the notion of conflict and its study in social psychology. *European Journal of social psychology*. 4. 389-436.

Poliakow L. (1955). *Histoire de l'antisémitisme. Du Christ aux Juifs de cour*. Paris (Vol. 1): Calmann-Lévy.

- Rantalaaho, L. (1992). *Shaping structural change and reshaping the gender contract*. Paper presented at the European Conference on Women and Power. Athens (Greece)
- Stewart A., Zucker A. (1999) Regrouping social identities. *Feminism and Psychology*. 9. N°3. 296-300.
- Strickland L. (1976) L Priorities and Paradigms. The conference and the book In. Strickland, F.E. Aboud, K.J. Gergen (eds). *Social Psychology in Transition*. New York : Plenum press. PP. 3-11
- Teitel, R. (2000). *Transitional Justice*. London. Oxford University Press
- Triandis, (1979) Commentary. In William G Austin & Stephen Worchel. *The social psychology of intergroup relations*. Monterey : Brooks and Coles. Pp.321-334
- Varikas, Eleni (1995) Genre et démocratie historique ou le paradoxe de l'égalité par le privilège. In Riot-Sarcey (ed). *Démocratie et représentation*. Paris. Kimé
- Walkerdine, V. "Didn't she do well?" Film
- Walkerdine, V. Introduction In: V. Walkerdine (ed) *Challenging subjects. Critical psychology for a new millennium*. London : Palgrave. Pp.1-3.